Joan Nichols, Respondnet v. State of Minnesota, Office of the Secretary of State, A15-2080

Background

Joan Nichols was briefly hired in 2012 as communications director at the Minnesota Office of the Secretary of State (OSS) and later sued for common-law fraudulent inducement, fraudulent concealment, and promissory estoppel after asserting the job differed from pre-hire representations.
The district court earlier dismissed the statutory false-inducement claim under sovereign immunity; that dismissal was affirmed on appeal and by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
On remand, the district court denied summary judgment as to the common-law fraudulent-inducement claim, finding genuine issues whether OSS misrepresented the communications director’s role with the media and responsibility for press conferences.
Defendants (OSS, Ritchie, Fraser) moved for summary judgment asserting common-law official immunity (and vicarious official immunity) bars the fraudulent-inducement claim unless Nichols can show willful or malicious conduct.
The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo and held the record contained no genuine fact issues about representations concerning media contact or press-conference responsibilities, concluding official immunity (and vicarious immunity) barred the fraudulent-inducement claim.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether common-law official immunity bars Nichols's fraudulent-inducement claim	Nichols: interview statements and job description led her to reasonably believe she would be primary media contact and organize press conferences; those misrepresentations were intentional	Defendants: representations were discretionary, not ministerial; no clearly established prohibition; no malicious/willful conduct; record shows Nichols did perform media-related tasks through Turgeon	Held: No genuine fact issue that defendants promised direct media contact or sole press-conference duties; conduct is discretionary and not shown to be malicious; official immunity bars the claim
Whether interview questions and job description constituted actionable representations about direct media contact	Nichols: interview question and job description implied direct media responsibility	Defendants: job description did not state primary media contact; interview question asked about advising staff, not direct contact; undisputed that Nichols answered media inquiries via Turgeon	Held: Interview and job description do not support a factual dispute that Nichols was promised direct media contact; summary judgment appropriate
Whether statements about organizing press conferences were fraudulent	Nichols: she was told she would organize press conferences; in practice Turgeon handled them and Ritchie rarely held them	Defendants: job description only said "organizing press conferences"; Nichols assisted Turgeon and record shows she helped with conferences	Held: No genuine issue that defendants misrepresented press-conference responsibility; summary judgment appropriate
Whether vicarious official immunity shields the governmental employer	Nichols: (implicitly) employer should remain liable for agent's misconduct	Defendants: supervisors/employer entitled to vicarious immunity when employee conduct is immunized	Held: Vicarious official immunity applies; governmental entity protected from liability based on acts of immune employees

Key Cases Cited

Gleason v. Metro. Council Transit Operations, 582 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 1998) (denial of summary judgment based on official immunity is immediately appealable)
Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. 2006) (standard for identifying governmental conduct and discretionary-function analysis)
Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 2004) (high standard for finding willful or malicious conduct under official immunity)
Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100 (Minn. 1991) (malice defined as intentional commission of an act the official has reason to believe is legally prohibited)
Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 598 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1999) (malice usually a jury question; need for clearly established law to show willful violation)
Vassallo ex rel. Brown v. Majeski, 842 N.W.2d 456 (Minn. 2014) (malice may be decided as matter of law when facts undisputed)
LeBaron v. Minnesota Bd. of Pub. Defense, 499 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. App. 1993) (intentional fraudulent-inducement tort can establish malice)
Dokman v. County of Hennepin, 637 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. App. 2001) (vicarious official immunity protects governmental entity from acts of immune employees)