Jessica Langford v. City of St. Louis, Missouri
3 F.4th 1054
| 8th Cir. | 2021Background:
- Langford participated in the 2017 Women’s March in St. Louis and, after the rally, walked in the street while police were attempting to reopen Market Street to traffic.
- Officers repeatedly ordered marchers to move to the sidewalk; Langford refused, moved to the curb lane, and spoke to an officer instead of stepping onto the sidewalk.
- She was arrested under St. Louis Rev. Code § 17.16.275 (prohibiting positioning oneself so as to obstruct traffic) and the related dispersal-offense provision; there were no vehicles on the street at the time but police were reopening it.
- The charge was later dismissed and Langford sued the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the ordinance was facially overbroad (First Amendment), void for vagueness (Due Process), and unconstitutional as applied.
- The district court granted partial summary judgment for Langford, enjoined enforcement of the ordinance, and the City appealed.
- The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding the ordinance is neither overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague and was not shown to have been applied discriminatorily to Langford.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Facial overbreadth (First Amendment) | Ordinance punishes protected expressive conduct and is not narrowly tailored, chilling speech | Ordinance targets conduct (obstructing reasonable traffic), not speech; serves legitimate traffic-control interest | Rejected — ordinance regulates conduct, not speech, and is not substantially overbroad |
| Vagueness (Due Process) | Language is vague, lacks mens rea, invites arbitrary enforcement | Terms are commonly understood; Missouri law would supply a culpable mental state (purposely/knowingly) | Rejected — provides fair notice and minimal law-enforcement guidance; state law limits cure mens rea gap |
| As-applied / selective enforcement | Arrest unconstitutional here because no traffic was present and enforcement was selective | Langford ignored repeated dispersal orders while officers reopened the street; no evidence of invidious, content-based selective enforcement | Rejected — improper arrest (probable cause issue) does not render ordinance unconstitutional; no record of discriminatory enforcement |
Key Cases Cited
- Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (overbreadth doctrine and review against a statute's legitimate sweep)
- Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003) (overbreadth unlikely for laws regulating conduct rather than speech)
- United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (test for incidental burdens on speech by conduct-regulating laws)
- Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (statute impermissibly applied where officials exercised uncontrolled discretion and discriminated)
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (vagueness doctrine and requirement of fair notice)
- Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) (practical limits on drafting criminal statutes with absolute precision)
- Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (ordinance must be directed with reasonable specificity at prohibited conduct)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (limitations on enforcement discretion under vagueness principles)
- United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (distinguishing prosecutorial assurances from binding limiting constructions)