Jerry Sargent, 837 F.3d 675

Background

Sargent pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and received a 327‑month sentence after the district court enhanced his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on four prior convictions: arson, first‑degree wanton endangerment, trafficking >5 lbs. marijuana, and first‑degree rape.
Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. Sargent filed a first §2255 motion in 2014 (denied) raising an Alleyne challenge; denial of a COA followed.
Sargent seeks authorization to file a second or successive §2255 motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255(h)(2), relying on Johnson v. United States (invalidating the ACCA residual clause) and asserting that at least two of his predicate convictions no longer qualify.
The panel reviewed which prior convictions, if any, remain qualifying predicates after Johnson: arson (enumerated), marijuana trafficking (serious drug offense), wanton endangerment (previously treated as covered by the residual clause), and first‑degree rape (statute potentially divisible).
The record lacks Shepard documents necessary to apply the modified categorical approach to determine which statutory alternative formed the basis of Sargent’s rape conviction; the PSR is not an acceptable Shepard document.

Issues

Issue	Sargent's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Sargent can obtain authorization to file a second/successive §2255 under §2255(h)(2) based on Johnson	Johnson announced a new constitutional rule (invalidating ACCA residual clause) that is retroactive and undermines Sargent’s ACCA enhancement	The government implicitly contends that not all of Sargent’s predicates are affected and that the record may show three qualifying predicates remain	Granted: Sixth Circuit found Sargent made a prima facie showing under Johnson and authorized filing; case remanded to district court
Whether arson and marijuana trafficking convictions were affected by Johnson	Arson and marijuana trafficking no longer count (Sargent argues arson reversed)	Arson is an enumerated ACCA offense and marijuana trafficking is a serious drug offense; Johnson only invalidated the residual clause	Held: Neither arson nor marijuana trafficking are affected by Johnson; they still qualify (and arson reversal claim unsupported)
Whether wanton endangerment conviction still qualifies as a violent felony	Wanton endangerment was previously counted under the residual clause and may no longer qualify post‑Johnson	Government relies on prior precedent treating Kentucky wanton endangerment as a residual‑clause offense	Held: Sargent made a prima facie showing that wanton endangerment may no longer qualify (residual‑clause issue exists)
Whether first‑degree rape conviction qualifies as a violent felony and whether Shepard documents exist to show which statutory alternative applied	Rape may have been a non‑force variant (statutory alternatives), so it may not qualify under the force clause	Government could show by Shepard documents which alternative was the basis; absent such documents, the conviction may not qualify	Held: The rape statute is likely divisible; absence of Shepard documents makes Sargent’s prima facie showing sufficient (cannot determine qualification on current record)

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (holding Johnson is retroactive to cases on collateral review)
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (describing modified categorical approach and limits on consulting Shepard documents)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (identifying the limited class of documents courts may consult to determine the basis of a prior conviction)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishing indivisible statutes from divisible ones for categorical analysis)
United States v. Denson, 728 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining divisibility and application of modified categorical approach)
In re Watkins, 810 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying Johnson retroactivity in ACCA context)
In re McDonald, 514 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2008) (low threshold for making a prima facie showing for successive petitions)