909 F.3d 983
8th Cir.2018Background
- On Nov. 7, 2015, Arkansas trooper Anthony Quick initiated a traffic stop of Jerica Moore-Jones for expired registration; dash-cam recorded the stop and pursuit.
- Quick activated lights, siren, and spotlight; Moore-Jones initially slowed onto the shoulder then accelerated and refused to stop, traveling ~35–38 mph on a service road (speed limit 55 mph).
- Quick executed a PIT maneuver from the right side, striking Moore-Jones’s right-rear fender; her car spun into a ditch and hit a culvert; Moore-Jones and her daughter were treated and released from the hospital.
- Moore-Jones was cited for expired tags and failure to yield to an emergency vehicle; she sued Quick under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force) and state law (assault/battery).
- The district court denied Quick qualified and statutory immunity; Quick appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
- The Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo and examined whether the Fourth Amendment right violated by the PIT maneuver was clearly established such that a reasonable officer would have known it was unlawful.
Issues
| Issue | Moore-Jones’s Argument | Quick’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Quick’s PIT maneuver violated the Fourth Amendment (excessive force) | PIT constituted excessive force against a nonviolent misdemeanant who posed little/no threat | PIT was a reasonable use of force to secure compliance from a noncompliant driver and to protect public safety | Trial court erred; not clearly established that PIT was unconstitutional in these circumstances; qualified immunity granted |
| Whether the right was clearly established at time of incident | Precedent (e.g., Brown line) shows force is least justified against nonviolent misdemeanants | Existing case law permitted PITs against fleeing or noncompliant drivers; no controlling case put this question beyond debate | Right was not clearly established; officers lacked fair warning that PIT here violated the Fourth Amendment |
| Effect on state-law excessive-force claims (statutory immunity) | State immunity should not shield wrongful use of force | Arkansas statutory immunity parallels federal qualified immunity for nonmalicious acts | Federal qualified immunity ruling resolves state statutory-immunity claims in favor of Quick |
| Whether assault/battery claims (malice-based) survive immunity ruling | Allegations of malice may overcome state statutory immunity | Quick argued immunity should bar tort claims too | Assault/battery claims not resolved; remanded for district court to consider supplemental jurisdiction and malice allegations |
Key Cases Cited
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (clearly established prong requires precedent placing constitutional question beyond debate)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (plaintiff must identify a case with sufficiently similar facts to clearly establish a right)
- Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491 (8th Cir. 2009) (use-of-force less justified against nonviolent misdemeanants who pose little/no threat)
- Marshall v. West, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (PIT against nonviolent misdemeanant held excessive where officers failed to adequately identify themselves)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (high-speed pursuit facts can justify use-of-force maneuvers to end dangerous flight)
- Helseth v. Burch, 258 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2001) (unsuccessful PITs during high-speed chase did not show conscience-shocking intent for due-process violation)
- Sharp v. Fisher, 532 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2008) (PIT reasonable against high-speed, erratic fleeing suspect)
- Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412 (4th Cir. 2007) (PIT reasonable when fleeing motorist endangered public on narrow, winding roads)