Jeremiah Hunley v. Detroit Diesel Corp.
680 F. App'x 447
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- In December 2007 Jeremiah Hunley suffered catastrophic injuries driving a Sandvik-manufactured dump truck in a Tennessee mine; the truck contained a Detroit Diesel engine.
- Hunley filed multiple suits: federal (Hunley I, Sept. 2008), state (Hunley II, Dec. 2008), then voluntarily dismissed Hunley I and later dismissed Hunley II via a notice filed Oct. 25, 2010; the state court entered a dismissal order Nov. 8, 2010 (with a nunc pro tunc reference to Oct. 25).
- On Oct. 25, 2010 (before the dismissal order was entered), Hunley filed a new federal action (Hunley III) naming Detroit Diesel, Sandvik USA, and Sandvik OY; the district court dismissed claims as time-barred and for lack of complete diversity; this court remanded for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the district court dismissed on July 6, 2015.
- Hunley filed the present state action (Hunley IV) on Sept. 3, 2015; Detroit Diesel removed to federal court; defendants moved to dismiss as barred by Tennessee’s one-year personal-injury limitations period.
- The district court applied Tennessee substantive law, concluded Hunley IV was time-barred because Hunley III was not saved by Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105(a) (the savings statute), and rejected giving effect to the state-court order’s nunc pro tunc date; the district court also held § 28-1-115 could not rescue Hunley IV.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding the savings period began on the date the state-court dismissal order was signed and entered (Nov. 8, 2010), so the Oct. 25, 2010 federal filing (Hunley III) was untimely and Hunley IV is barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105(a) saved Hunley III | Hunley: the voluntary dismissal + nunc pro tunc entry relates back to Oct. 25, 2010, so savings year began then and Hunley III is timely | Defendants: Rule 41 requires a dismissal order signed by the court and entered by clerk; savings year begins on entry (Nov. 8), so federal filing on Oct. 25 was too early | Held: Savings period begins only when the court signs and clerk enters the dismissal order; Hunley III was filed before entry and is not saved |
| Effect of the state-court nunc pro tunc language | Hunley: the nunc pro tunc language makes the dismissal effective Oct. 25, 2010 | Defendants: Tennessee law limits nunc pro tunc to correcting clerical omission of an action previously taken by the court; no clear-and-convincing evidence the court previously announced entry on Oct. 25 | Held: Nunc pro tunc not available here; trial court would not give effect to an earlier nunc pro tunc date absent proof the court previously rendered the order |
| Whether district court improperly reviewed / reversed state-court order (Rooker–Feldman) | Hunley: district court effectively appealed the state dismissal order and should have deferred | Defendants: district court merely interpreted the legal effect of the state order for application of Tennessee law; Rooker–Feldman does not apply | Held: No Rooker–Feldman problem—federal court was not reviewing a state-court judgment rendered against a state-court loser; it interpreted state law effect for statute-of-limitations purposes |
| Whether § 28-1-115 can be stacked with § 28-1-105 to save Hunley IV | Hunley: alternatively, § 28-1-115 might salvage the claim even if § 28-1-105 fails | Defendants: § 28-1-115 applies only if the original federal action was brought timely (Hunley III was not) | Held: Court did not reach full § 28-1-115 analysis because § 28-1-105 fails and § 28-1-115 requires a timely federal original action |
Key Cases Cited
- Banks v. City of Whitehall, 344 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2003) (standard of review for statute-of-limitations dismissal)
- Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (U.S. 1938) (federal courts apply forum state substantive law in diversity cases)
- Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. 1995) (savings statute grants plaintiff benefits available in original timely action)
- Stewart v. Cottrell, 255 S.W.3d 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (savings year begins only after dismissal order is signed and entered)
- Blackburn v. Blackburn, 270 S.W.3d 42 (Tenn. 2008) (nunc pro tunc relief requires clear-and-convincing proof that court announced judgment earlier)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (U.S. 2005) (limits scope of Rooker–Feldman doctrine)
- Henley v. Cobb, 916 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn. 1996) (Tennessee favors liberal construction of savings statute)
- Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (federal courts in diversity should not endorse novel state-law policy shifts)