344 F.3d 550 | 6th Cir. | 2003
File Name: 03a0340p.06 Before: BATCHELDER and ROGERS, Circuit Judges;
RUSSELL, District Judge. [*] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________ FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COUNSEL _________________ ARGUED: Ronald B. Noga, WELTMAN, WEINBERG & REIS, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants. Steven Lee Smith,
S TEWART B ANKS ; B AMBI (cid:88) SMITH & COLNER, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. (cid:45) M OTEL , I NC .; R ICHARD H. ON BRIEF: Ronald B. Noga, WELTMAN, WEINBERG & (cid:45) T URNER ; P.T. P ROPERTIES , REIS, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants. Steven Lee Smith, (cid:45) No. 01-4155 I NC ., SMITH & COLNER, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. (cid:45) > Plaintiffs-Appellants, (cid:44) _________________ (cid:45) v. (cid:45) OPINION (cid:45) _________________ (cid:45) C ITY OF W HITEHALL ; D ENN IS (cid:45) ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs J. F ENNESSEY ; J OHN W OLF ; (cid:45) appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment C HARLES D. U NDERWOOD ; (cid:45) to the defendants in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. C ATHY C RANDALL ; T IM (cid:45) § 1983, claiming that the defendants, in the course of strictly T ILTON , (cid:45) enforcing local building and fire codes in the city, took the (cid:45) plaintiffs’ property for public use without just compensation Defendants-Appellees. (cid:45) and enforced the law selectively in violation of the Fifth and (cid:78) Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on several Appeal from the United States District Court alternative grounds. First, that the plaintiffs’ claims are for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus. barred by a two-year statute of limitations; second, that their No. 99-01082—James L. Graham, District Judge. claims are barred by both claim preclusion and issue preclusion; third, that their inverse condemnation and takings
Argued: August 7, 2003 claims are not ripe for review pursuant to principles set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Decided and Filed: September 24, 2003 Hamilton Bank of Johnson City , 473 U.S. 172 (1985); fourth, closed pending demolition or sale. Eventually, after two
ripe, and we need not address those claims on appeal. contempt motions and several hearings, the court found that Ewolski v. City of Brunswick , 287 F.3d 492, 516-17 (6th Cir. Banks and the motel were in contempt and ordered the motel 2002). Because we conclude that the remaining claims are all razed. The appellate court held that Banks and the motel barred by the applicable statute of limitations, we affirm the were bound by their stipulations, and the motel was then judgment of the district court without reaching the alternative demolished. bases of the district court’s ruling.
After finding the Robinwood Trailer Park and one of the Factual Background P.T. Properties buildings in violation of various code provisions, the City filed an action against Turner and P.T. The plaintiffs in this action are the Bambi Motel, Inc. and Properties on November 22, 1996, in the Environmental its owner, Stewart Banks, and P.T. Properties, Inc. and Division of the Franklin County Municipal Court, seeking to Richard Turner, the owner and operator, respectively, of close the trailer park and to demolish the building. Turner Robinwood Trailer Park and two other commercial buildings. made the repairs necessary to bring both properties into All of these properties are located in the City of Whitehall, compliance, and, on August 29, 1997, the action was Ohio. The allegations in this § 1983 action have their genesis dismissed. in the city’s campaign of strict enforcement of its fire and building codes in order to force certain businesses that were The plaintiffs filed this action in the district court on in violation of those codes to shut down, either until the October 18, 1999, against the City of Whitehall and various violations could be remedied, or permanently. The Bambi of its officials, in their official and individual capacities, Motel, Robinwood Trailer Park and the P.T. Properties complaining that their actions had been undertaken in an commercial buildings were targets of this campaign.
effort to drive the plaintiffs out of business; that these actions constituted inverse condemnation and takings without just
The City filed an action in the Environmental Division of compensation; that the defendants had selectively enforced the Municipal Court in Franklin County, Ohio, on November the building and fire codes against these plaintiffs and thereby 22, 1995, against Banks and the Bambi Motel, alleging worked a taking without just compensation and a violation of numerous building code, fire code and licensing law the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; violations, as well as seeking an injunction to abate a public and that the plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief. The nuisance allegedly resulting from drug trafficking, district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, prostitution and other criminal activity occurring at the motel. and this timely appeal followed. On April 10, 1996, Banks and the Bambi Motel stipulated to a permanent injunction, based on stipulated findings of Analysis violations of the law, requiring that by July 9, 1996, Banks would have either (1) razed the structures comprising the We review de novo the district court’s holding that the motel or contracted to have it razed, or (2) sold the property plaintiffs’ claims were filed outside of the applicable statute No. 01-4155 Banks, et al. v. City of Whitehall, et al. 5 6 Banks, et al. v. City of Whitehall, et al. No. 01-4155 of limitations. Tolbert v. Ohio Dep’t of Transp. , 172 F.3d Not only did we determine en banc in Browning that a two- 934, 938 (6th Cir. 1999). year statute of limitations applies to section 1983 actions, but
in two later cases, LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Housing In this appeal, the plaintiffs do not contend that they filed Authority , 55 F.3d 1097, 1105 (6th Cir. 1995), and Kuhnle this section 1983 action within two years of the defendants’ Brothers, Inc. v. County of Geauga , 103 F.3d 516, 519-20 allegedly unconstitutional conduct. The plaintiffs’ sole (6th Cir. 1997), we squarely rejected attempts to get around argument pertaining to the statute of limitations is that Browning . As we noted in LRL Properties , “[i]t is the “ Browning v. Pendleton , . . . which establishes a two-year (2) well-settled law of this Circuit that ‘[a] panel of this Court statute of limitations for 42 USC § 1983 claims is contrary to cannot overrule the decision of another panel. The prior Ohio law and should be overruled with respect to § 1983 decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent claims arising in Ohio.” The plaintiffs have no legal basis decision of the United States Supreme Court requires whatsoever for advancing this argument in this court. modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc
overrules the prior decision.’” 55 F.3d at 1105 n.2 (quoting In 1985, the Supreme Court held that section 1983 claims Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. , 774 F.2d 685, 689 were best characterized as tort actions for the recovery of (6th Cir. 1985)). There is no such inconsistent decision of damages for personal injuries and federal courts must borrow either the Supreme Court or this court. the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state in which the section 1983 action was brought. The plaintiffs’ brief includes in its statement of Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 275-76 (1985). Four years facts—although not as a distinct legal argument—the claim later, in Owens v. Okure , 488 U.S. 235 (1989), the Supreme that a recent deposition of one of the defendants in this case, Court refined its Wilson holding, and declared that in a state taken in an unrelated lawsuit, brought to light evidence that with more than one statute of limitations for personal injury the City’s actions were designed to take the plaintiffs’ actions, the state’s residual or general statute of limitations property “without Due Process or Just Compensation to governing personal injury actions is to be applied to all
facilitate the redevelopment of East Main Street for the section 1983 actions brought in that state. Id. at 249-50. The political and personal advancement of the individual ink was hardly dry on Okure when this circuit, sitting en Defendants,” and upon discovery of this evidence, the banc, decided Browning v. Pendleton , 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. plaintiffs were left with no vehicle to redress these 1989). Noting that in Okure , the Supreme Court had constitutional violations except this section 1983 action. “unanimously held that when a state, like Ohio, has multiple Such a discovery, if true, might enable the plaintiffs to avoid statutes of limitation for personal injury actions, the the application of the statute of limitations to bar their claims. appropriate state statute of limitations to borrow for claims But we find no evidence in this record that the plaintiffs’ brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the residual or general
claim is true. We have thoroughly reviewed the record, personal injury statute of limitations,” id. at 991, we held that including the portions of the deposition that supposedly “the appropriate statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 produced “new” evidence, as well as newspaper accounts civil rights actions arising in Ohio is contained in Ohio Rev. from the mid-1990s that contained as much inculpatory Code Ann. § 2305.10, which requires that actions for bodily evidence as the deposition, and we conclude that the injury be filed within two years after their accrual.” Id. at deposition did not alert the plaintiffs to any evidence that they 992. could not have easily discovered prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitations. No. 01-4155 Banks, et al. v. City of Whitehall, et al. 7 8 Banks, et al. v. City of Whitehall, et al. No. 01-4155 We think it is prudent, however, in light of this allegation, regulations with impunity, and the conduct of Whitehall to note briefly that even if the record contained some officials in enforcing those codes and regulations was neither indication that the plaintiffs could not have discovered this “arbitrary” nor “conscience-shocking” in the constitutional evidence sooner, there is no basis whatever for their claim sense. See Bowers v. City of Flint , 325 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. that their substantive due process rights were violated when 2003) (majority and concurring opinions). In fact, the the defendants rigorously enforced Whitehall’s building and government regularly uses the civil law to address problems fire codes in a specific area of town in order to shut down that it could, perhaps more directly, address with the criminal businesses around which drug dealers and prostitutes often law. See , e.g. , 21 U.S.C. § 881 (authorizing civil forfeiture congregated. The plaintiffs argue that there is a so-called proceedings against property acquired in or associated with “middle ground” protected by substantive due process the illegal drug trade). Finally, the plaintiffs cannot prevail wherein the government cannot act arbitrarily or capriciously on a claim of selective enforcement because they have not with respect to property even if its actions do not rise to the shown that they “belong[] to an identifiable group, such as . . . level of a taking. They pursue this argument notwithstanding a particular race or religion, or a group exercising their admission that Stewart Banks and the Bambi Motel constitutional rights,” and who were targeted for law voluntarily entered into an order before the state enforcement action as a result of that group status. environmental court admitting to the existence of various Gardenhire v. Schubert , 205 F.3d 303, 318-19 (6th Cir. code violations and agreeing to take specified remedial 2000). measures, and Richard Turner and P.T. Properties, Inc. made None of the defendants’ actions which the plaintiffs necessary repairs to their facilities, which enabled Whitehall complain of occurred within two years of the filing of this to lift its condemnation order and dismiss any pending legal
lawsuit, nor were the plaintiffs prevented from timely actions against them. discovering any actions of the defendants that could As an initial matter, we note that the Fifth Amendment, and conceivably be redressed by a lawsuit brought under section not substantive due process, is the basis upon which a 1983. Because this action is wholly barred by the applicable plaintiff may challenge the government’s actions with respect statute of limitations, we need not reach any of the alternative to his property: “ Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 395 bases upon which the district court granted summary (1989), precludes the use of substantive due process analysis judgment to the defendants. when a more specific constitutional provision governs.” City The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. , 123 S. Ct. 1389, 1397 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, to the extent that the plaintiffs attempt to avoid the dictates of Graham by claiming that their challenge is not to the “quasi-taking” of their property but is instead to the conduct of Whitehall officials—namely, the rigorous and allegedly selective enforcement of city regulations with the purpose of shutting down businesses suspected of contributing to a culture of crime—that challenge is wholly without foundation. There exists no “fundamental” right in our legal system to violate a municipality’s codes and
NOTES
[*] The Honorable Thomas B. Russell, United States District Judge for the Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation. 1 No. 01-4155 Banks, et al. v. City of Whitehall, et al. 3 4 Banks, et al. v. City of Whitehall, et al. No. 01-4155 that the individual defendants are entitled to immunity; and or entered into a binding contract with a real estate broker in finally, that all of their claims are without merit. a good faith effort to sell the property. The stipulated injunction required that on July 9, 1996, if the structures The plaintiffs do not challenge the district court’s holding comprising the motel were still standing, they would be that their takings and inverse condemnation claims are not
