Jennifer Glass v. Ken Paxton, 900 F.3d 233

Background

Texas enacted S.B. 11 ("Campus Carry Law") in 2015 permitting licensed concealed handguns on public college campuses while allowing only limited, reasonable regulations that do not amount to a general prohibition.
UT Austin formed a working group and adopted a policy implementing the law that prohibits professors from banning concealed carry in classrooms; faculty who try to ban carry face discipline.
Three UT Austin professors (led by Dr. Jennifer Glass) sued, alleging the law and University policy violate the First Amendment (academic freedom / chilled speech), the Second Amendment (insufficiently "well-regulated"), and the Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection).
The district court dismissed all claims without prejudice, providing analysis only for dismissal of the First Amendment claim for lack of Article III standing; Glass appealed.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed: it held Glass lacked standing to pursue her First Amendment claim, and it resolved on the merits the remaining Second and Fourteenth Amendment issues.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) First Amendment standing to challenge campus-carry policy	Glass: policy forces self-censorship; disciplinary consequences make the injury "certainly impending."	Texas: the alleged chill depends on speculative third‑party student conduct (a chain of contingencies), so injury is not certainly impending.	No standing. Injury rests on independent student actions and is not "certainly impending," so the First Amendment claim fails.
2) Second Amendment — does prefatory clause impose a right to "well-regulated" gun-free presence?	Glass: the prefatory clause supports a right not to be forced to accept guns in her professional presence unless gun use is well-regulated.	Texas: Heller treats the prefatory clause as purpose only; it does not limit/expand operative individual right to bear arms.	Dismissed. Plaintiff's novel reading of the prefatory clause is foreclosed by Heller; no Second Amendment claim.
3) Equal Protection — rational basis for permitted/prohibited concealed-carry zones	Glass: the campus carry scheme is an "inexplicable hodge-podge" and lacks rational basis (public vs. private and location distinctions are arbitrary).	Texas: distinctions respect private property rights and are plausibly related to public safety and self-defense; banning in limited areas can still serve safety goals.	Dismissed. Under rational-basis review, Texas's justifications are at least arguable; plaintiff failed to negate every conceivable rational basis.
4) Whether appellate court should address district court's unreviewed dismissals	Glass: panel should remand so district court can address Second and Fourteenth Amendment claims.	Texas: appellate court may resolve purely legal claims to conserve resources.	Court exercised discretion to reach and resolve the remaining legal claims on appeal.

Key Cases Cited

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (government surveillance-chill standing; “certainly impending” standard)
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (government action that chills speech can be actionable, but subjective chill insufficient)
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (Second Amendment protects individual right; prefatory clause is purpose, not a limit)
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (Second Amendment applies to the states; individual self-defense central)
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (standing where plaintiff alleged certainly impending reputational harm supported by evidence)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (plaintiff bears burden to establish Article III standing)
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (standards for pleading legal conclusions vs. factual allegations)
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for pleading)
FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307 (rational-basis review: courts may hypothesize any conceivable legitimate purpose)