MEESE, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. v. KEENE
No. 85-1180
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued December 2, 1986-Decided April 28, 1987
481 U.S. 465
John G. Donhoff, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Stephen R. Barnett.*
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 631-633, as amended in 1942 and 1966,
Appellee, an attorney and a member of the California State Senate, does not want the Department of Justice and the public to regard him as the disseminator of foreign political propaganda, but wishes to exhibit three Canadian motion picture films that have been so identified.1 The films, distrib-
On September 12, 1985, the District Court granted summary judgment for appellee and a permanent injunction against enforcement of any portion of the Act which incorporates the term “political propaganda.” 619 F. Supp. 1111.
*Daniel J. Popeo and George C. Smith filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Daniel Marcus, Susan W. Shaffer, Charles S. Sims, Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, O. Peter Sherwood, Solicitor General, Lawrence S. Kahn, Deputy Solicitor General, and Sanford M. Cohen, Assistant Attorney General; for the Freedom to Read Foundation by Robert Steven Chapman; and for Playboy Enterprises, Inc., et al. by Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., Burton Joseph, and Maxwell J. Lillienstein.
We noted probable jurisdiction of the Attorney General‘s appeal under
Before we discuss the District Court‘s holding on the First Amendment issue, we briefly describe the statutory scheme and determine that appellee has standing to challenge the Act.
I
The statute itself explains the basic purpose of the regulatory scheme. It was enacted:
“[T]o protect the national defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the United States by requiring public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda activities and other activities for or on behalf of foreign governments, foreign political parties, and other foreign principals so that the Government and the people of the United States may be informed of the identity of such persons and may appraise their statements and actions in the light of their associations and activities.” 56 Stat. 248-249.
See Viereck v. United States, 318 U. S. 236, 244 (1943).
The Act requires all agents of foreign principals to file detailed registration statements, describing the nature of their business and their political activities. The registration requirement is comprehensive, applying equally to agents of
When the agent of a foreign principal disseminates any “political propaganda,” § 611(j), in the United States mails or in the channels of interstate commerce, he or she must also provide the Attorney General with a copy of the material and with a report describing the extent of the dissemination.5 In addition, he or she must provide the recipient of the material with a disclosure statement on a form prescribed by the Attorney General.6 When an agent seeks to disseminate
“This material is prepared, edited, issued or circulated by (name and address of registrant) which is registered with the Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. under the Foreign Agents Registration Act as an agent of (name and address of foreign principal). Dissemination reports on this film are filed with the Department of Justice where the required registration statement is available for public inspection. Registration does not indicate approval of the contents of this material by the United States Government.” App. 16, 59.
It should be noted that the term “political propaganda” does not appear on the form.
The statutory definition of that term reads as follows:
“(j) The term ‘political propaganda’ includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or other communica-
tion or expression by any person (1) which is reasonably adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United States with reference to the political or public interests, pоlicies, or relations of a government or a foreign country or a foreign political party or with reference to the foreign policies of the United States or promote in the United States racial, religious, or social dissensions, or (2) which advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political, or religious disorder, civil riot, or other conflict involving the use of force or violence in any other American republic or the overthrow of any government or political subdivision of any other American republic by any means involving the use of force or violence.” § 611(j).
II
In determining whether a litigant has standing to challenge governmental action as a violation of the First Amendment, we have required that the litigant demonstrate “a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.” Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 14 (1972). In Laird, the plaintiffs alleged that the intelligence-gathering operations of the United States Army “chilled” the exercise of their First Amendment rights because they feared that the defendants might, in the future, make unlawful use of the data gathered. We found that plaintiffs lacked standing; the Army‘s intelligence-gathering system did not threaten any cognizable interest of the plaintiffs. While the governmentаl action need not have a direct effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights, we held, it must have caused or must threaten to cause a direct injury to the plaintiffs. Id., at 12-13. The injury must be “‘distinct and palpable.‘” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984) (citations omitted).
We find, however, that appellee has alleged and demonstrated more than a “subjective chill“; he estаblishes that the term “political propaganda” threatens to cause him cognizable injury. He stated that “if he were to exhibit the films while they bore such characterization, his personal, political, and professional reputation would suffer and his ability to obtain re-election and to practice his profession would be impaired.” 569 F. Supp., at 1515. In support of this claim, appellee submitted detailed affidavits, including one describing the results of an opinion poll7 and another containing the
It is, of course, possible that appellee could have minimized these risks by providing the viewers of the films with an appropriate statement concerning the quality of the motion pictures-one of them won an “Oscar” award from the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences as the best foreign documentary in 1983-and his reasons for agreeing with the positions advocated by their Canadian producer concerning nuclear war and acid rain. Even on that assumption, however, the need to take such affirmative steps to avoid the risk of harm to his reputation constitutes a cognizable injury in the course of his communication with the public. This case is similar to Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965), in which we did not question that petitioner had standing to challenge a statute requiring the Postmaster General to hold all “communist political propaganda” originating abroad and not release it to the addressee unless that individual made a written request to the Post Office for deliv-
Our cases recognize that a mere showing of personal injury is not sufficient to establish standing; we have also required that the injury be “fairly traceable to the defendant‘s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S., at 751; see also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 472 (1982). Because the alleged injury stems from the Department of Justice‘s enforcement of a statute that employs the term “political propaganda,” we conclude that the risk of injury to appellee‘s reputation “fairly can be traced” to the defendant‘s conduct. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41 (1976).
Moreover, enjoining the application of the words “political propaganda” to the films would at least partially redress the reputational injury of which appellee complains. The Attorney General argues that an injunction would not provide the
III
We begin our examination of the District Court‘s ruling on the First Amendment issue by noting that the term “political propaganda” has two meanings. In popular parlance many people assume that propaganda is a form of slanted, misleading speech that does not merit serious attention and that proceeds from a concern for advancing the narrow interests of the speaker rather than from a devotion to the truth. See, e. g., Declaration of Edwin Newman, Correspondent for NBC News, App. 107-108. Casualty reports of enemy belligerents, for example, are often dismissed as nothing more than “propaganda.” As defined in the Act, the term political propaganda includes misleading advocacy of that kind. See
Appellee argues that the statute would be unconstitutional even if the broad neutral definition of propaganda were the only recognized meaning of the term because the Act is “a Classic Example of Content-Based Government Regulation of Core-Value Protected Speech.”12 As appellee notes, the Act‘s reporting and disclosure requirements are expressly conditioned upon a finding that speech on behalf of a foreign principal has political or public-policy content.
The District Court did not accept this broad argument. It found that the basic purpose of the statute as a whole was “to inform recipients of advocacy materials produced by or under the aegis of a foreign government of the source of such materials” (emphasis deleted), and that it could not be gainsaid that this kind of disclosure serves rather than disserves the First Amendment.13 The statute itself neither prohibits nor censors the dissemination of advocacy materials by agents of foreign principals.
The argument that the District Court accepted rests not on what the statute actually says, requires, or prohibits, but rather upon a potential misunderstanding of its effect. Simply because the term “political propaganda” is used in the text of the statute to define the regulated materials, the court assumed that the public will attach an “unsavory connotation,”
First, the term “political propaganda” does nothing to place regulated expressive materials “beyond the pale of legitimate discourse.” Ibid. Unlike the scheme in Lamont v. Postmaster General, the Act places no burden on protected expression. We invalidated the statute in Lamont as interfering with the addressee‘s First Amendment rights because it required “an official act (viz., returning the reply card) as a limitation on the unfettered exercise of the addressee‘s First Amendment rights.” 381 U. S., at 305. The physical detention of the materials, not their mere designation as “communist political propaganda,” was the offending element of the statutory scheme. The Act “se[t] administrative officials astride the flow of mail to inspect it, appraise it, write the addressee about it, and await a response before dispatching the mail.” Id., at 306. The Act in this case, on the other hand, does not pose any obstacle to appellee‘s access to the materials he wishes to exhibit. Congress did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of advocacy materials in an ostensible effort to protect the public from conversion, confusion, or deceit.
To the contrary, Congress simply required the disseminators оf such material to make additional disclosures that would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the propaganda.15 The statute does not prohibit appellee from
Ironically, it is the injunction entered by the District Court that withholds information from the public. The suppressed information is the fact that the films fall within the category of materials that Congress has judged to be “political propaganda.” A similar paternalistic strategy of protecting the public from information was followed by the Virginia Assembly, which enacted a ban on the advertising of prescription drug prices by pharmacists. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976). The State sought to justify the ban as a means of
“[O]n close inspection it is seen that the State‘s protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance. The advertising ban does not directly affect professional standards one way or the other. It affects them only through the reactions it is assumed people will have to the free flow of drug price information.” Id., at 769.
Likewise, despite the absence of any direct abridgment of speech, the District Court in this case assumed that the reactions of the public to the label “political propaganda” would be such that the label would interfere with freedom of speech. In Virginia Pharmacy Bd., we squarely held that a zeal to protect the public from “too much information” could not withstand First Amendment scrutiny:
“There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them. . . . It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and thе dangers from its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us.” Id., at 770.
Second, the reasoning of the District Court is contradicted by history. The statutory definition of “political propaganda” has been on the books for over four decades.16 We should presume that the people who have a sufficient understanding of the law to know that the term “political propaganda” is used to describe the regulated category also know that the definition is a broad, neutral one rather than a pejorative one.17 Given this long history, it seems obvious that if the fear of misunderstanding had actually interfered with
Third, Congress’ use of the term “political propaganda” does not lead us to suspend the respect we normally owe to the Legislature‘s power to define the terms that it uses in legislation. We have no occasion here to decide the permissible scope of Congress’ “right to speak“;18 we simply view this particular choice of language, statutorily defined in a neutral and evenhanded manner, as one that no constitutional provision prohibits the Congress from making. Nor do we agree with the District Court‘s assertion that Congress’ use of the term “political propaganda” was “a wholly gratuitous step designed to express the suspicion with which Congress regarded the materials.” 619 F. Supp., at 1125. It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 392, and n. 10 (1979). Congress’ use of the term “propaganda” in this statute, as indeed in other legislation, has no pejorative connotation.19 As judges it is our duty to
construe legislation as it is written, not as it might be read by a layman, or as it might be understood by someone who has not even read it. If the term “political propaganda” is construed consistently with the neutral definition contained in the text of the statute itself, the constitutional concerns voiced by the District Court completely disappear.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting in part.
The Court, in this case today, fails to apply the long-established “principle that the freedoms of expression must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 66 (1963). While I agree with the Court‘s conclusion that appellee has standing, I do not agree that the designation “political propaganda,” imposed by the Department of Justice on three films from Canada about acid rain and nuclear war, pursuant to the Foreign lation“);
Like “propaganda,” the word “lobbying” has negative connotations. See The New Columbia Encyclopedia 1598 (1975) (“The potential for corruption . . . has given lobbying an unsavory connotation“). Although the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act,
I
The Court‘s decision rests upon its conclusion that the term “political propaganda” is neutral and without negative connotation. It reaches this conclusion by limiting its examination to the statutory definition of the term and by ignoring the realities of public reaction to the designation. But even given that confined view of its inquiry, it is difficult to understand how a statutory categorization which includes communication that “instigates . . . civil riot . . . or the overthrow of . . . government . . . by any means involving the use of force or violence,”
The Act grew out of the investigations of the House Un-American Activities Committee, formed in 1934 to investigate Nazi propaganda activities in the United States and the dissemination of subversive propaganda controlled by foreign countries attacking the American form of government. See H. R. Res. 198, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), 78 Cong. Rec. 13-14 (1934).1 The Act mandated disclosure, not direct cen-
In 1942, Congress revised the Act, 56 Stat. 248, ch. 263, at the request of the Department of Justice in order to strengthen the Government‘s “chief instrument . . . for controlling foreign agent activity in the theater of political propaganda.” Hearings on H. R. 6045 before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. No. 9, p. 24 (1941) (1941 Hearings) (statement of Lawrence M. C. Smith, Chief, Special Defense Unit, Department of Justice). The amendments included the definition of propaganda in addition to labeling and reporting requirements virtually identical to those imposed under the current version of the Act. The Department of Justice explained that it sought to counter secret propaganda efforts “[i]n view of the increased attempts by foreign agents at the systematic manipulation of mass attitudes on national and international questions, by adding requirements to keep our Government and people informed of the nature, source, and extent of political propaganda distributed in the United States.” Id., at 25. And, as in the original Act, the amended version furthered Congress’ desire to disable certain types of speech by the use of disclosure requirements designed to bring about that result.2
The meaning of “political propaganda” has not changed in the 45 years since Congress selected those two words. While the Act is currently applied primarily to foreign policy
“[I]t is fair to say that the original act reflected a perceived close connection between political propaganda and subversion. It is this original focus . . . and therefore the pejorative connotations of the phrases ‘foreign agent’ and ‘political propaganda’ which has caused such misunderstanding over the years.” Oversight Hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committeе on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1983) (testimony of D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
Even if Congress had enacted the “propaganda” designation at issue here with a completely neutral purpose, that would not be sufficient for the First Amendment inquiry, for the Court has “long recognized that even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment.” Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm‘r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575, 592 (1983). The Court today, however, fails to undertake this inquiry. It concludes that the statutory definition of “political propaganda” is a “neutral one,” ante, at 479, n. 14, and dismisses the District Court‘s holding as resting on a “potential misunderstanding of [the statute‘s] effect,” ante, at 478.
A definition chosen by Congress is controlling as to the scope of the statute, but the Court has never held that Congress’ choice of a definition precludes an independent determination of a statute‘s constitutionality based upon its actual effect. See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 255 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“The fact that the statute‘s practical effect may be to discourage protected speech is sufficient to characterize [it] as an infringement
“Public officials, like schoolteachers who have no tenure, might think they would invite disaster if they read what the Federal Government says contains the seeds of treason. Apart from them, any addressee is likely to feel some inhibition in sending for literature which federal officials have condemned as ‘communist political propaganda.‘” Ibid.
I do not see why the analysis here should be any different, or why the statutory definition should be given any greater weight, in the case of the elected public official who wishes to exhibit films that the Federal Government has categorized as “political propaganda.”
I can conclude only that the Court has asked, and has answered, the wrong question. Appellee does not argue that his speеch is deterred by the statutory definition of “propaganda.” He argues, instead, that his speech is deterred by the common perception that material so classified is unreliable and not to be trusted, bolstered by the added weight and authority accorded any classification made by the all-pervasive Federal Government. Even if the statutory definition is neutral, it is the common understanding of the Government‘s action that determines the effect on discourse protected by the First Amendment.
II
Because the Court believes that the term “political propaganda” is neutral, it concludes that “the Act places no burden on protected expression.” Ante, at 480. The Court‘s error on neutrality leads it to ignore the practical effects of the classification, which create an indirect burden on expression. As a result, the Court takes an unjustifiably narrow view of the sort of government action that can violate First Amendment protections. Because Congress did “not pose any obstacle to appellee‘s access to the materials he wishes to exhibit” in that it “did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of advocacy materials,” ibid., the Court thinks that the propaganda classification does not burden speech. But there need not be a direct restriction of speech in order to have a First Amendment violation. The Court has recognized that indirect discouragements are fully capable of a coercive effect on speech, American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 402 (1950), and that the First
In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58 (1963), for example, the Court struck down a Rhode Island statute authorizing a commission to designate morally objectionable material. The Court rejected the State‘s argument that the First Amendment was not violated because the Commission did not “regulate or suppress obscenity,” id., at 66, finding that through the use of informal sanctions, “the Commission deliberately set out to achieve the suppression of publications deemed ‘objectionable’ and succeeded in its aim,” id., at 67. There likewise was no overt restraint on speech in Lamont. The Postmaster General argued there that because an addressee had only to return a card in order to receive the publication, “only inconvenience and not an abridgment is involved.” 381 U. S., at 309 (concurring opinion). But, as was stated there, “inhibition as well as prohibition against the exercise of precious First Amendment rights is a power denied to government.” Ibid.3
By ignoring the practical effect of the Act‘s classification scheme, the Court unfortunately permits Congress to accomplish by indirect means what it could not impose directly—a restriction of appellee‘s political speech. Political discourse is burdened by the Act because Congress’ classification scheme inhibits dissemination of classified films. In deciding whether or not to show a film, individuals and institutions are
The Court perceives no burden on First Amendment rights, because “Congress simply required the disseminators of [propaganda] material to make additional disclosures that would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the propaganda.” Ante, at 480. Yet in its discussion of standing, the majority recognizes that the practical effect of the “disclosure” is to place a film exhibitor on the defensive, for this “disclosure” would require the exhibitor to take affirmative steps to avoid harm to his or her reputation. Ante, at 475. Moreover, disclosure requirements are not inherently consistent with the First Amendment and do not necessarily serve to advance discourse. The Court often has struck down disclosure requirements that threatened to have a “deterrent and ‘chilling’ effect on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined rights of free speech, expression, and association.” Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U. S. 539, 557 (1963); see also, Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm., 459 U. S. 87, 100 (1982) (names of campaign contributors and recipients of funds); Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60 (1960) (identification of names and addresses of authors of handbills); N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 462 (1958) (membership lists).
III
Appellants have not even attempted to articulate any justification for saddling the expression of would-be film exhibitors with the classification “political propaganda.” Yet this Court has held consistently that a limitation on First Amendment freedoms can be justified only by a compelling governmental interest. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,
There are two ways in which the purpose of the Act to inform the public is fulfilled. First, the Act requires films transmitted by foreign agents to be “conspicuously marked” with the name and address of the agent and the foreign principal, and, second, the Act requires dissemination reports for the film and the agent‘s registration statement to be placed on file with the Department of Justice, available for public inspection.
Even if appellаnts could assert a compelling interest, the propaganda classification carries a derogatory meaning that is unnecessary to the asserted purpose of the Act. The Department of Justice admitted as much in a letter regarding proposed changes in the legislation:
“We believe Congress should . . . consider replacing the broad definition of ‘political propaganda,’ which currently defines materials that must be labelled, with a more concise definition, more narrowly focused on the United States political process. We would also support the use of a more neutral term like political ‘advocacy’ or ‘information’ to denominate information that must be
labelled.” Letter, dated August 8, 1983, to the Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, of the House Committee on the Judiciary, from Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice. App. 118.6
Given that position, the Court errs in tolerating even the slightest infringement of First Amendment rights by governmental use of a classification deemed unnecessary by those who enforce it. I respectfully dissent.
