49 F.4th 231
3rd Cir.2022Background
- Jarvin Lopez, a Salvadoran national, entered the U.S. without authorization in 2001, conceded removability in 2009, and applied for relief under NACARA.
- In 2015 Lopez pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana; DHS charged him inadmissible under INA § 1182(a)(2) for a controlled-substance offense.
- NACARA § 203(b) imposes stricter eligibility for cancellation of removal when an applicant committed an INA-listed offense (e.g., extends continuous-presence requirement and restarts the clock); Lopez conceded this made him ineligible for NACARA relief.
- Lopez sought an INA § 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility (which applies to visa, admission, or adjustment-of-status applicants) to overcome the drug-offense ground and qualify for NACARA cancellation.
- The BIA denied relief, holding § 212(h) waivers are not available for NACARA cancellation-of-removal applications; the Third Circuit reviewed the legal question de novo and affirmed the BIA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an INA § 212(h) waiver may be used to cure INA § 1182(a)(2) inadmissibility in an application for NACARA cancellation of removal | Lopez: NACARA cancellation that results in adjustment to lawful permanent resident status is, for § 212(h) purposes, an "adjustment of status," so the § 212(h) waiver applies | Govt/BIA: § 212(h) authorizes waivers only for visa, admission, or adjustment-of-status applications as historically understood; cancellation of removal is distinct and NACARA did not amend § 212(h) to include it | The court held § 212(h) waiver does not apply to NACARA cancellation of removal; petition denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (establishes agency deference framework for statutory interpretation)
- Myrie v. Att'y Gen., 855 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2017) (de novo review of legal questions in immigration appeals)
- Raleigh & G.R. Co. v. Reid, 80 U.S. 269 (negative-implication canon: specifying modes excludes others)
- Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (use of ordinary/public meaning in statutory interpretation)
- Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (specialized legal terms carry legal meaning over ordinary meaning)
- Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (surplusage canon discourages constructions that render statutes redundant)
- Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Becerra, 142 S. Ct. 1896 (2022) (recent Supreme Court guidance on courts' duty to independently interpret statutory text)
