2019 Ohio 412
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Three former students (Jane Doe 1–3) sued several Ashtabula Area City School District employees individually, alleging sexual abuse by bus driver Virgil Murphy between 2005–2011 and that district employees failed to investigate, hire improperly, supervise, or report.
- Plaintiffs allege school officials received BCI/background information showing prior arrests and a 1995 domestic violence conviction, plus later incident reports and complaints involving Murphy.
- Murphy was indicted in late 2011 on multiple sexual-offense counts involving these plaintiffs but died before trial.
- Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings asserting statutory immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744; trial court denied those motions and allowed a late interlineation adding two defendants to a paragraph.
- On appeal, the court considered whether defendants were sued in their individual or official capacities and whether the pleadings overcame employee immunity for negligence or for malicious/wanton/reckless conduct.
- Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: negligence claims were barred by employee immunity; claims alleging malicious purpose/bad faith/wanton or reckless conduct could proceed (except as to alleged acts after Feb. 2010 directed at Jane Doe 1, who stopped riding the bus then).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants (employees) are immune from negligence claims under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) | Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to defeat immunity and permit negligence claims | Defendants argued employee immunity bars negligence claims absent allegations meeting statutory exceptions | Held: immunity bars negligence claims; judgment on pleadings should have been granted for negligence |
| Whether plaintiffs pleaded sufficient facts to overcome immunity for malicious purpose, bad faith, or wanton/reckless conduct | Plaintiffs pleaded or alleged mental state (malice/bad faith/wanton or reckless) and Civ.R. 9(B)/8(A) permit general averment of state of mind | Defendants argued pleadings were insufficient to show mental state needed to overcome immunity | Held: pleadings sufficient at this stage to permit those claims to proceed (not dismissed) |
| Capacity in which Farver was sued (individual v. official) and applicable immunity framework | Plaintiffs treated Farver as an individual employee responsible for personal acts | Farver argued he was sued in his official capacity and R.C. 2744.02 analysis should apply | Held: complaint sued Farver individually; R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) (employee immunity) governs; trial court did not err on this point |
| Whether amendment by interlineation denying Farver immunity was appealable | Plaintiffs sought leave to amend; Farver argued the grant was erroneous and appealable | Defendants argued the amendment order denied immunity and was appealable | Held: appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review the amendment order because it did not itself deny R.C. 2744 immunity; cannot review that assignment of error here |
Key Cases Cited
- Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St.3d 351 (Ohio 1994) (employee immunity: negligence insufficient to overcome R.C. 2744.03(A)(6))
- O’Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374 (Ohio 2008) (discussion of employee immunity and statutory exceptions)
- Lambert v. Clancy, 125 Ohio St.3d 231 (Ohio 2010) (analysis whether defendant sued in official capacity and applicability of R.C. 2744.02 three-tier test)
- Elston v. Howland Local Schools, 113 Ohio St.3d 314 (Ohio 2007) (framework for R.C. 2744 immunity tiers)
- Preston v. Murty, 32 Ohio St.3d 334 (Ohio 1987) (definition of malice and punitive damages standard)
- Hawkins v. Ivy, 50 Ohio St.2d 114 (Ohio 1977) (definition of wanton misconduct)
- Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380 (Ohio 2012) (definition and standard for reckless conduct)