The issue presented by this appeal is whether punitive damages were properly awarded against Gold Circle. Gold Circle contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the submission of punitive damages to the jury and that the court erroneously instructed the jury as to what conduct would support an award of punitive damages.
Ohio courts, since as early as 1859, have allowed punitive damages to be awarded in tort actions which involve fraud, malice, or insult. Roberts v. Mason (1859), 10 Ohio St. 277, paragraph one of the syllabus. The standards for imposing and assessing punitive damages, however, have remained frustratingly vague. Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach (1980), 31 Hastings L.J. 639, 642.
In this case, there is no allegation of fraud or insult and thus the punitive-damages award must necessarily rest
In this case, it is clear that plaintiffs based their claim for punitive damages on the second concept of extremely reckless behavior. Furthermore, a review of the case law reveals that this is the type of malice which has remained frustratingly vague. Mallor & Roberts, supra. Such malice has been described as “negligence * * * so gross as to show a reckless indifference to the rights and safety of other persons,”
An analysis of the definitions, coupled with a consideration of the policy reasons for awarding punitive damages, provides some common elements from which a general definition can be stated. The policy for awarding punitive damages in Ohio “* * * has been recognized * * * as that of punishing the offending party and setting him up as an example to others that they might be deterred from similar conduct.” Detling v. Chockley, supra, at 136, 24 O.O. 3d at 240, 436 N.E. 2d at 209, and citations therein. Since punitive damages are assessed for punishment and not compensation, a positive element of conscious wrongdoing is always required. This element has been termed conscious, deliberate or intentional. It requires the party to possess knowledge of the harm that might be caused by his behavior.
A second principle inherent in the award of punitive damages is that something more than mere negligence is always required. Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp. (1981), 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 472, 21 O.O. 3d 285, 295, 424 N.E. 2d 568, 580; Detling v. Chockley, supra, at 138, 24 O.O. 3d at 242, 436 N.E. 2d at 211. This concept
We therefore hold that actual malice, necessary for an award of punitive damages, is (1) that state of mind under which a person’s conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge, or (2) a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing substantial harm. In the latter case, before submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury, a trial court must review the evidence to determine if reasonable minds can' differ as to whether the party was aware his or her act had a great probability of causing substantial harm. Furthermore, the court must determine that sufficient evidence is presented revealing that the party consciously disregarded the injured party’s rights or safety. If submitted to the jury, the trial court should give an instruction in accordance with the law we announce today.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Gearhart v. Angeloff (1969), 17 Ohio App. 2d 143, 46 O.O. 2d 207, 244 N.E. 2d 802, syllabus.
Smithhisler v. Dutter (1952), 157 Ohio St. 454, 47 O.O. 334, 105 N.E. 2d 868, paragraph two of the syllabus.
Columbus Finance v. Howard (1975), 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 71 O.O. 2d 174, 327 N.E. 2d 654.
Smithhisler v. Dutter, supra.
Detling v. Chockley, supra.
Locafrance United States Corp. v. Interstate Dist. Serv., Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 198, 6 OBR 252, 451 N.E. 2d 1222.
Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp. (1981), 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 21 O.O. 3d 285, 424 N.E. 2d 568.