Jacqueline Conners v. Gusano's Chicago Style Pizzeri, 779 F.3d 835

Conners, a former server, filed an FLSA collective action alleging illegal tip pooling; other former employees opted in.
After suit began, Gusano’s Pizza implemented identical arbitration agreements for current employees, including an opt-out procedure and a memorandum explaining arbitration would prevent joining Conners’ collective action if not opted out.
Former-employee plaintiffs moved to enjoin defendants from enforcing the arbitration agreements against potential opt-in employees and sought other relief; the district court held a hearing and entered a temporary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the agreements against any employees who chose to join the action.
Gusano’s Pizza appealed the injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), challenging the district court’s authority to enjoin agreements that bind only current employees.
On appeal the Eighth Circuit considered (1) whether the injunction was immediately appealable and (2) whether the former-employee plaintiffs had Article III standing to seek an injunction against agreements that did not bind them.
The Eighth Circuit concluded the order was appealable as an injunction but that the former employees lacked Article III standing to enjoin arbitration agreements that covered only current employees; it vacated the injunction and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)	District court’s order was a temporary injunction preventing arbitration and thus immediately appealable	Order merely controlled litigation conduct and was nonappealable	Court: Order had injunctive effect and was immediately appealable under § 1292(a)(1) (Nordin/Gulfstream framework)
Article III standing to enjoin arbitration covering only current employees	Conners and other former employees suffered a concrete injury: increased litigation costs and curtailed collective-action rights if current employees are forced into individual arbitration	Former employees lack a personal, imminent injury traceable to the arbitration agreements that apply only to current employees	Court: Former employees lacked standing because no current employees had joined or were shown likely to join at the time; they cannot assert putative plaintiffs’ rights (following Summers and Genesis Healthcare)

Kreditverein der Bank Austria Creditanstalt fur Nieder-oesterreich und Bergenland v. Nejezchleba, 477 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing appellate jurisdiction questions)
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988) (orders with practical injunctive effect are immediately appealable)
Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981) (same principle on injunctive effect and appealability)
Nordin v. Nutri/System, Inc., 897 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1990) (orders denying arbitration treated as injunctive and immediately appealable)
McLaughlin Gormley King Co. v. Terminix Int’l Co., 105 F.3d 1192 (8th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing nonappealable orders controlling litigation conduct)
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (standing requires concrete, imminent injury traceable to defendant and redressable by court)
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing requires personal stake in the outcome)
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (prospective-injury standing requires injury that is real and immediate)
Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2000) (standing assessed as of complaint filing)
Park v. Forest Serv. of U.S., 205 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2000) (standing for injunctive relief requires showing of real and immediate threat)
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (2013) (plaintiff in FLSA collective action may not assert unnamed putative plaintiffs’ claims to overcome mootness or standing)