J. Gilliam v. Kenneth Sealey, 932 F.3d 216

Background

In 1983, 11-year-old Sabrina Buie was raped and murdered in Red Springs, NC; police recovered physical evidence including a Newport cigarette butt.
Henry McCollum (19) and Leon Brown (15), both with severe intellectual disabilities, were interrogated late-night; each signed written confessions drafted by investigators and were convicted (sentenced to death; Brown later life).
Decades later the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission tested DNA on the cigarette butt and linked it to Roscoe Artis, a known local offender; Appellees’ convictions were vacated and they received full pardons in 2015.
Appellees sued investigators (SBI agents and county detectives) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, Brady/due process violations, and fabrication/coercion of confessions and witness testimony.
The district court denied defendants’ summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, finding genuine disputes of material fact about coercion, suppression of exculpatory evidence (including a witness who implicated Artis), and investigators’ bad faith.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding the facts (viewed for plaintiffs) could show violations of clearly established Fourth Amendment and due process rights, so qualified immunity was inappropriate at summary judgment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were Appellees arrested/prosecuted without probable cause based on coerced/fabricated confessions?	Confessions were coerced/fabricated given age, low IQ, late-night interrogation, threats/promises and inconsistencies; thus no probable cause.	Confessions and subsequent statements provided probable cause as a matter of law.	Trial issues exist: a coerced/fabricated confession known to police cannot supply probable cause; material factual disputes preclude summary judgment.
Do collateral/judicial estoppel or prior state rulings preclude § 1983 claims about voluntariness and probable cause?	Vacated convictions and later pardons mean no preclusive effect; suppression of evidence/fraud exception applies.	State-court convictions and suppression rulings foreclose relitigation.	Collateral estoppel does not bar § 1983 claims here because convictions were vacated and plaintiffs allege the convictions were obtained improperly.
Did investigators violate Brady/due process by suppressing/explaining away evidence pointing to Artis and a Richards eyewitness statement?	Officers hid/obscured witness Richards’s statement and failed to disclose that Artis was treated as a suspect; suppression was material and in bad faith.	Artis’s record was public and known to prosecutors/defense; interview of Richards was disclosed and initially unhelpful.	A reasonable jury could find the withheld/mischaracterized evidence material and that officers acted in bad faith; denial of immunity affirmed.
Were plaintiffs’ due-process rights violated by fabrication/coercion of confessions and witness testimony, and were those rights clearly established in 1983?	Fabrication/coercion and intentional suppression caused deprivation of liberty; case law established that such conduct violates due process.	Rights were not "clearly established" in 1983 for these fact-specific claims; qualified immunity applies.	It was clearly established that fabrication, coercion, and bad-faith suppression of exculpatory evidence violate constitutional rights; factual disputes preclude qualified immunity.

Key Cases Cited

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (U.S. 1982) (qualified immunity standard for governmental officials)
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (U.S. 1986) (scope of qualified immunity)
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (U.S. 1985) (immunity from suit and appealability of immunity denials)
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (U.S. 1944) (extreme-length interrogation can be inherently coercive)
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (U.S. 1948) (youth and late-night interrogation can render confession involuntary)
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (U.S. 1978) (false statements or omissions by law enforcement can invalidate probable cause)
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (U.S. 1959) (conviction cannot stand where the prosecution uses known false evidence)
Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000) (bad-faith withholding/destroying evidence violates due process)
Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2005) (fabrication of evidence by an officer violates clearly established due process rights)
United States v. Wertz, 625 F.2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1980) (voluntariness of statement depends on totality of circumstances)
Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2014) (but-for and proximate causation for fabricated-evidence due process claims)