321 Conn. 172
Conn.2016Background
- Plaintiff Barbara Izzarelli, a longtime smoker of R.J. Reynolds’ Salem menthol cigarettes, sued under Connecticut’s Product Liability Act alleging design defect and negligent design after developing laryngeal cancer.
- Evidence at trial showed RJR engineered Salem to increase addictive nicotine (e.g., additives, ammonia to freebase nicotine) while maintaining/adjusting tar levels, leading to greater cigarette consumption and higher carcinogen exposure.
- District Court instructed the jury on both the ordinary consumer expectation test (derived from Restatement (Second) §402A comment i) and the modified consumer expectation / risk-utility balancing test; jury returned verdict for plaintiff.
- RJR appealed; Second Circuit certified to the Connecticut Supreme Court the question whether comment (i)’s “good tobacco” exception bars strict products liability claims against unadulterated cigarettes designed to increase consumption.
- Connecticut Supreme Court revisited Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., clarified the roles of the ordinary consumer expectation test and the modified consumer expectation (risk-utility) test, and answered the certified question.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether comment (i) ("good tobacco" exception) bars strict liability for unadulterated cigarettes whose design increases consumption and carcinogen exposure | Izzarelli: comment i exceptions are not controlling; modified consumer-expectation test applies and permits recovery for brand-specific engineering that increases risk | RJR: comment i precludes recovery for ordinary (unadulterated) cigarettes under the ordinary consumer-expectation test | No—comment i does not per se bar recovery under the modified consumer-expectation test |
| Which test governs design-defect claims in Connecticut: ordinary consumer expectation or modified consumer expectation (risk-utility) | Izzarelli: modified test is primary; ordinary test limited to res ipsa-like cases | RJR: ordinary test governs generic/unadulterated cigarettes; modified test limited to complex products | Court: modified consumer-expectation test is the primary test; ordinary test reserved for products that fail minimum consumer safety expectations |
| Whether comment (i) exceptions (open/obvious dangers, "good tobacco") are dispositive under modified test | Izzarelli: comment i factors are only one input; open/obvious danger does not automatically preclude liability | RJR: widely known risks of smoking should preclude liability under comment i | Held: comment i factors are relevant but not dispositive; open/obvious knowledge is one factor in the multifactor balancing |
| Whether applying the modified test to cigarettes would conflict with legislative or federal policy (e.g., effectively banning cigarettes or preemption) | Izzarelli: public policy supports permitting claims where manufacturer engineered greater danger | RJR: application would sub silentio ban lawful products and may be preempted by federal law | Court: speculative; not a basis to bar application of modified test here; preemption/evidentiary federal issues left to federal court to decide |
Key Cases Cited
- Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199 (Conn. 1997) (adopted modified consumer-expectation test; discussed limits of ordinary consumer-expectation test)
- Giglio v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 180 Conn. 230 (Conn. 1980) (earlier adoption of §402A-derived consumer-expectation definition)
- Slepski v. Williams Ford, Inc., 170 Conn. 18 (Conn. 1976) (cited comment (i) definition of "unreasonably dangerous")
- Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413 (Cal. 1978) (illustrative authority adopting risk-utility balancing for design-defect claims)
- Food & Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (U.S. 2000) (federal law context on tobacco regulation cited regarding policy and preemption concerns)
- Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 465 Mass. 411 (Mass. 2013) (example of upholding design-defect theory against cigarette manufacturer when product is shown to be highly engineered)