Istvan Szonyi v. Matthew Whitaker, 942 F.3d 874

Istvan Szonyi, a Hungarian national admitted as an LPR in 1957, pled guilty in 1981 to four sexual-offense counts from a multi‑victim incident that lasted about five–six hours.
In 2005 DHS charged Szonyi as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having “two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.”
An IJ found Szonyi removable under Ninth Circuit precedent and denied discretionary relief; the BIA initially remanded after issuing Matter of Islam, adopting a narrower definition of “single scheme.”
On remand the IJ and then the BIA concluded Szonyi’s convictions did not arise from a single scheme under the BIA’s Adetiba/Islam standard and denied discretionary relief; Szonyi petitioned for review.
The Ninth Circuit majority upheld the BIA’s interpretation under Chevron deference, rejected Szonyi’s challenges (including retroactivity and misapplication), and denied the petition; a dissent argued the BIA failed to adequately explain whether a “substantial interruption” existed and would remand.

Issue	Szonyi’s Argument	Government’s Argument	Held
Whether Ninth Circuit precedent forecloses the BIA’s narrower interpretation of “single scheme”	Wood/Gonzalez‑Sandoval foreclose BIA; statute requires considering overall plan	BIA interpretation reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference; Wood pre‑dates Chevron and does not unambiguously foreclose agency	BIA interpretation not foreclosed; Chevron applies and deference owed
Whether the BIA’s interpretation is reasonable	Interpretation is inconsistent with statutory text and purposes	Interpretation is a permissible construction of ambiguous text; consistent with other circuits	BIA interpretation is reasonable under Chevron step two
Whether applying the BIA standard to Szonyi was impermissibly retroactive	Retroactive application unfair given prior precedent and reliance when Szonyi pled guilty	Application permissible given BIA’s long‑standing position and immigration uniformity interests	Retroactive application permissible after balancing retroactivity factors
Whether the BIA misapplied its own “single scheme” standard to Szonyi’s facts	Szonyi argued his acts were a single continuous episode without a substantial interruption	Government/BIA: acts were distinct; respondent had opportunity to reflect; not lesser‑included or natural consequences	Court upheld BIA factual application as permissible; dissent would remand for clearer explanation

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes entitled to deference)
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (prior judicial interpretation does not bar reasonable agency view unless statute unambiguous)
Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d 825 (9th Cir.) (earlier Ninth Circuit interpretation of “single scheme” more expansive)
Gonzalez‑Sandoval v. INS, 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir.) (reaffirming Wood’s approach)
Leon‑Hernandez v. INS, 926 F.2d 902 (9th Cir.) (post‑Wood decision noting standards)
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (review of retroactivity and immigration consequences)
Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253 (2d Cir.) (post‑Chevron consideration of BIA deference in this context)