Israel Ramirez v. United States, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15005

Background

Ramirez pleaded guilty (2008) to federal possession with intent to distribute marijuana; his PSR classified him as a career offender based on two prior Texas assault convictions.
The Texas statute criminalized assault "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly"; the PSR and district court treated those convictions as "crimes of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause, raising Ramirez’s Guidelines range and producing a 300‑month sentence.
Trial counsel did not object to the career‑offender designation; on direct appeal this court found the Texas statute divisible and affirmed under plain‑error review because Ramirez failed to prove he was convicted under the reckless branch.
New counsel filed a § 2255 motion claiming ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel for failing to object; the district court denied relief. Postconviction counsel then failed to inform Ramirez of the denial and failed to appeal, leading to an untimely pro se appeal and dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Ramirez filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion arguing postconviction counsel’s abandonment was an extraordinary circumstance warranting reopening; the district court denied it, relying on Coleman’s rule that there is no right to counsel in collateral review.
The Seventh Circuit held the Rule 60(b) filing was proper, the district court committed legal error by relying on Coleman instead of the intervening Supreme Court decisions (Martinez, Maples, Trevino), and remanded with instructions to reopen the § 2255 proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Ramirez's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was a disguised successive § 2255	Motion sought reopening of the existing § 2255 proceeding to cure procedural default caused by counsel’s abandonment, not a new substantive attack	Characterize the filing as an unauthorized second/successive collateral attack	Not successive; Rule 60(b) permissible to seek reopening under Gonzalez framework
Whether abandonment of postconviction counsel can be an "extraordinary circumstance" under Rule 60(b)(6)	Counsel’s failure to notify, file post‑judgment motions, or appeal deprived Ramirez of any realistic avenue to vindicate his ineffective‑assistance claim	Intervening changes in law (Martinez/Trevino) alone are insufficient; rule limited to §2254 context	Abandonment here is extraordinary; district court erred by ignoring Martinez/Maples/Trevino and denying relief
Whether Martinez/Maples/Trevino apply to federal §2255 proceedings	Federal procedural reality makes collateral review the typical first chance to develop ineffective‑assistance claims, so the principles should extend to §2255	Those Supreme Court cases addressed §2254 state‑prisoner context and should not be imported wholesale to §2255	Principles apply to §2255; Seventh Circuit had already indicated they apply and the court affirms applying them here
Whether sentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to object to career‑offender status	Counsel performed deficiently by not obtaining Texas records and not objecting after Begay; prejudice is likely because government had no Shepard/Descamps‑type evidence to show convictions required intentional/knowing mental state	Government points to victim statements and plea stipulations describing violent conduct as proof of violent conviction	Counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudiced Ramirez because the record lacked the required proof of the mental‑state element; objection would likely have succeeded

Key Cases Cited

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default rule/bar to ineffective‑assistance claims when counsel was available but failed to raise them)
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (Rule 60(b) has a limited role in habeas; extraordinary‑circumstances standard)
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can excuse procedural default in §2254 where initial‑review collateral proceeding was first forum to bring claim)
Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012) (attorney abandonment can constitute extraordinary circumstances excusing procedural default)
Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (extending Martinez where state procedure made it virtually impossible to raise ineffective‑assistance claim on direct review)
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (ineffective‑assistance claims are properly raised in collateral proceedings under §2255)
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (narrowing the scope of crimes that qualify as violent felonies under a categorical approach)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (court must presume a conviction rests on the least serious conduct when a statute is divisible and the government does not prove otherwise)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits on the documents courts may consult to determine the facts underlying a prior conviction)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (clarified use of categorical approach and limitations on using charging documents to identify a prior conviction’s elements)