Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff's Department
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 19018
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- On Feb 18, 2013, Deputies Sean Barry and Corbin Gray responded to domestic-disturbance calls about Paul Tereschenko, who exhibited possible mental illness and methamphetamine use and had yelled about voices and killing a family member.
- Tereschenko (6'+, >250 lbs) was unarmed; after 7–10 minutes of interaction he became agitated, said “you’re gonna have to shoot or kill me,” and resisted when deputies attempted to detain him under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150.
- A brief physical struggle ensued; deputies attempted control holds, Tereschenko resisted and shoved the officers, and Deputy Barry deployed a taser in drive‑stun mode for one five‑second cycle.
- The tasing provoked an escalated brawl: Tereschenko allegedly struck both deputies, shoved Barry into a wall/bed, and pummelled Barry until Barry began to lose consciousness; Gray attempted a carotid/choke hold but failed to restrain Tereschenko.
- While officers were grappling, Deputy Barry yelled (or at least called out) “Shoot him”; Barry then fired three shots, killing Tereschenko. Isayeva (the decedent’s wife) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force; district court denied Barry qualified immunity at summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appellate jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal of denied qualified immunity | Denial of summary judgment was reviewable because claim raises qualified immunity | Denial was interlocutory; appellate review limited but allowed to consider legal questions about qualified immunity | Court has jurisdiction to decide qualified immunity questions when facts construed for plaintiff and legal prong (clearly established law) is at issue |
| Use of taser (drive‑stun) | Isayeva: tasing was excessive and unconstitutional (no adequate warning; mental illness; nonviolent/unarmed) | Barry: tasing was reasonable given active resistance, size disparity, suspected drug use, and immediate threat to officers | Barry entitled to qualified immunity for the tasing—existing Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent did not clearly establish that tasing here was unconstitutional |
| Use of deadly force (shooting) | Isayeva: Garner prohibits deadly force absent probable cause that suspect poses significant threat of death/serious injury; no such threat existed here | Barry: he was being beaten, losing consciousness, at risk of being disarmed or killed; circumstances justified belief of imminent serious harm | Barry entitled to qualified immunity for the shooting—circumstances (size disparity, successful resistance, injuries to deputy, drug influence, threat of incapacitation) did not render unlawfulness "beyond debate" |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment excessive‑force reasonableness standard)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force permissible only if officer has probable cause to believe suspect poses significant threat of death or serious physical injury)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity prong sequencing and framework)
- Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (existing precedent must place question beyond debate to deny qualified immunity)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (qualified immunity protects all but plainly incompetent or knowing violators)
- Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (use of general standards may not clearly establish law absent analogous facts or an "obvious case")
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (requires close factual analogy to clearly establish right)
- Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. en banc 2011) (taser precedents and excessive‑force analysis)
- Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2010) (dart‑mode tasing held unconstitutional under facts)
- Hughes v. Kisela, 862 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2017) (example of an "obvious case" where deadly force was not protected by qualified immunity)
- Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (consideration of suspect’s mental state in force analysis)
- Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1992) (hand‑to‑hand combat case where shooting was excessive under those facts)
