555 S.W.3d 301
Tex. App.2018Background
- Mother (G.S.) filed for divorce in Collin County, Texas; the parties’ daughter D.S. was born in Massachusetts in Jan. 2015 and lived in both MA and TX during 2015.
- On Oct 2, 2015 Father (A.G.) signed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment and a mediated settlement agreement; the trial court entered an agreed order terminating Father’s parental rights and later a nunc pro tunc termination order.
- The trial court also entered an agreed final decree of divorce that incorporated the termination and divided marital property, including payments to Mother and trust contributions for D.S.
- Father filed bills of review challenging (1) the termination order as void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and (2) the property division in the divorce decree; trial court denied both petitions after a combined trial and made factual findings about D.S.’s residences.
- On appeal, the court held the trial court erred in refusing to consider extrinsic evidence on jurisdiction for the termination (because Texas’s UCCJEA withdrawal of jurisdiction fits the “no possible power” exception), found Texas lacked UCCJEA jurisdiction when suit was filed, rendered the termination order void, but affirmed denial of bill of review as to the divorce decree (property division not void).
Issues
| Issue | Father’s Argument | Mother’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the agreed termination order is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA | Texas was not D.S.’s home state when divorce was filed; termination therefore void | §161.211(c) limits collateral attacks on termination based on affidavits to fraud/duress/coercion; trial court properly barred extrinsic evidence | Court: Trial court erred to bar extrinsic evidence; after considering it, Texas lacked UCCJEA jurisdiction when suit filed; termination order is void (rendered judgment voiding it) |
| Whether extrinsic evidence may be used in collateral attack to show lack of jurisdiction | Father: yes—UCCJEA withdrawal creates “no possible power” exception to no-extrinsic-evidence rule | Mother: no—§161.211(c) and collateral-attack limits prohibit extrinsic challenge except for fraud/duress/coercion | Court: Extrinsic evidence permitted under the no-possible-power exception; UCCJEA withdrawal fits that exception; court considered extrinsic evidence |
| Whether §161.211(c) precludes collateral jurisdictional attacks on termination based on affidavit relinquishment | Father: §161.211(c) should not override UCCJEA subject-matter rule | Mother: §161.211(c) bars collateral attacks except for fraud/duress/coercion | Court: §161.211(c) does not strip courts of obligation to have UCCJEA jurisdiction; parties must file termination where UCCJEA permits; once in proper forum §161.211(c) limits attacks to fraud/duress/coercion |
| Whether vacation of termination requires re-evaluating agreed divorce property division | Father: property division depended on termination; voiding termination should affect property division | Mother: divorce decree jurisdiction was proper; property division is not void and cannot be collaterally attacked | Court: Trial court had jurisdiction over divorce; property division not void; bill of review was properly denied as to divorce decree |
Key Cases Cited
- Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. 2004) (bill of review is an equitable proceeding with exacting requirements)
- PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. 2012) (standards for when record affirmatively shows lack of jurisdiction for collateral attack)
- Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2005) (only void judgments may be collaterally attacked)
- York v. State, 373 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2012) (discussing limits on extrinsic evidence in collateral attacks and the “no possible power” exception)
- Alfonso v. Skadden, 251 S.W.3d 52 (Tex. 2008) (presumption of jurisdiction when record does not affirmatively show defect)
- In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. 2017) (public interest in finality of parental-termination judgments)