In Re World Imports, Ltd.
862 F.3d 338
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Two Chinese sellers (Haining and Fujian) shipped furniture to debtor World Imports under FOB terms from ports in China shortly before World Imports filed Chapter 11 on July 3, 2013.
- Goods were shipped more than 20 days before the petition but physical possession in the U.S. occurred within 20 days of the petition date for at least some shipments.
- Sellers sought administrative-expense priority under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) for goods “received by the debtor within 20 days before” the petition.
- Bankruptcy and District Courts ruled that FOB delivery to a common carrier in China constituted constructive receipt (so sellers were not entitled to § 503(b)(9) priority).
- Third Circuit reviewed whether “received” under § 503(b)(9) requires physical possession or can be satisfied by FOB delivery to a carrier; it affirmed that physical possession is required and reversed the lower-court rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “received” in 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) means physical possession or includes constructive receipt upon FOB delivery to a common carrier | Sellers: receipt occurred when goods were shipped/FOB at origin (constructive receipt when risk/title passed) | Debtor: receipt is when goods were physically accepted in U.S.; lower courts said FOB to carrier was constructive receipt | Court held “received” requires physical possession by the buyer or its agent; delivery to a common carrier (FOB) is not constructive receipt because carriers are not agents |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Marin Motor Oil, 740 F.2d 220 (3d Cir. 1984) (receipt under § 546(c) means taking physical possession; delivery to common carrier is not receipt)
- Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (Congress does not legislate on a clean slate when amending bankruptcy laws)
- Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (undefined statutory terms are construed by ordinary meaning)
- Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (words with well-known legal meanings are presumed used in that sense absent contrary context)
- FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (statutory words must be read in context and with regard to overall statutory scheme)
