In re: Warren Lee Hill, Jr., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 8153

Hill, a Georgia death-row inmate, filed a second or successive federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(A) alleging mental retardation, challenging his death sentence rather than guilt.
The court determined Hill’s mental retardation claim in the successive petition was identical to a claim raised in his first petition, barred by §2244(b)(1).
Hill’s claim centers on Atkins v. Virginia’s prohibition on executing mentally retarded individuals, invoked as a sentencing issue, not a guilt issue.
Georgia law at the time of Hill’s trial (1991) prohibited execution of mentally retarded defendants, but Hill did not raise the issue at trial or on direct appeal.
In 2000–2001 state habeas proceedings, Hill’s mental retardation claim was denied; in 2012–2013, new affidavits from experts recanted prior opinions supporting retardation.
The Eleventh Circuit denied authorization to file a successive petition, holding §2244(b)(1) barred the claim and §2244(b)(2) lacked satisfied exceptions; it also rejected applying Sawyer as a basis for relief; the stay of execution was vacated.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the claim is barred by §2244(b)(1).	Hill contends new affidavits create a new claim.	Court should treat as the same prior claim; barred.	Barred under §2244(b)(1).
Whether §2244(b)(2) exceptions apply.	New facts could show innocence or new rules.	No applicable exception; not a new rule or truly newly discovered innocence.	No §2244(b)(2) exceptions satisfied.
Whether Sawyer actual-innocence exception survives AEDPA.	Sawyer should apply to permit relief for actual innocence of the death penalty.	Sawyer does not survive AEDPA for sentencing claims.	Sawyer exception does not apply.
Whether Hill’s claim challenges guilt of the underlying offense.	Claim relates to eligibility for death sentence based on mental retardation.	Sentence-based claim not about guilt of the offense; not within exceptions.	Claim is a sentencing issue, not a challenge to guilt; barred.

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (definition of ‘claim’ under §2244(b)(2) and the bar on second petitions)
Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001) (AEDPA finality and limits on second petitions; guidance on ‘claim’ vs. evidence)
In re Medina, 109 F.3d 1556 (11th Cir. 1997) (plain terms limit §2244(b)(2) to guilt of the offense; sentencing claims barred)
In re Schwab, 506 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir. 2007) (denied new-sentence-based/innocence claims for successive petitions)
In re Diaz, 471 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam; further limits on new-sentencing-evidence claims)
Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc decision addressing mental retardation claims in AEDPA context)
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (actual innocence exception to pre-AEDPA bar; not codified in AEDPA)
Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010) (equitable tolling and habeas review principles within AEDPA framework)
Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998) (Ford claim exceptions to AEDPA’s bar; equity considerations in ripe claims)
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (acknowledges exceptions to second/successive bar for ripe claims)