502 B.R. 324
Bankr. N.D. Ill.2013Background
- Debtor Charles Walker filed a chapter 13 petition on Oct. 29, 2013, and obtained credit counseling on that same day.
- Trustee Marilyn O. Marshall sought to dismiss under 11 U.S.C. § 1307 for ineligibility based on allegedly untimely counseling.
- Debtor is unrepresented; a hearing was held in November 2013.
- Court considered arguments about timing of counseling under § 109(h)(1) and related subsections.
- Court issued a Memorandum Decision denying the Motion to Dismiss and later entered an Order denying it.
- Decision rests on whether counseling completed on the petition date satisfies the statutory requirement under § 109(h)(1).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 109(h)(1) require prepetition counseling before filing? | Trustee argues counseling must precede filing. | Walker & court consider counseling on filing date as within period. | Counseling on the filing date satisfies § 109(h)(1). |
| What is the plain meaning of the 180-day period ending on filing? | Textually requires prepetition timing. | Plain language includes the filing date as end of period. | 180-day period includes the filing date; counseling on that date is compliant. |
| How do amendments and related provisions affect interpretation? | Amendments indicate prepetition focus. | Plain language controls despite amendments. | Amendment does not override plain language; counseling on filing date still valid. |
| Does the petition form affect interpretation of § 109(h)(1)? | Form suggests prepetition counseling. | Form conflicts with statute; statute controls. | Statutory text governs; form does not compel prepetition only counseling. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (Supreme Court 1940) (liberal construction of bankruptcy relief needed to avoid narrow readings)
- In re Gossett, 369 B.R. 361 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2007) (pre-amendment timing and counseling requirements discussed)
- In re Koo, 2012 WL 692578 (Bankr.D.D.C.2012) (cited for timing arguments (not included in official reporter list))
- In re Draiman, 714 F.3d 462 (7th Cir.2013) (statutory interpretation of timing in § 109(h))
- United States v. Lorenzetti, 467 U.S. 167 (Supreme Court 1984) (congressional intent vs. plain statutory text)
- Burnet v. Willingham Loan & Trust Co., 282 U.S. 437 (Supreme Court 1931) (time-period indivisibility in dates and days)
- Pioneer Invest. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380 (Supreme Court 1993) (emphasizes plain meaning of statute timing over intent)