MEMORANDUM OPINION
Thеse matters come before the Court on the motion of Ashley M. Gossett (the “Debtor”) for sanctions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3) and 362(k)(I) against General Motors Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC”) and the Development Group, and on the motions of GMAC to annul the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) and to dismiss the case under 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(h)(1) and 707(a). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court grants GMAC’s motion to dismiss. Because the Court finds the Debtor ineligible for relief in this case, the Court grants the relief requested by GMAC by virtue of the dismissal of the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) whereby the stay terminated as a matter of law under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B). The Court denies the Debtor’s motion for sanctions and GMAC’s motion to annul the stay.
I. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
The Court has jurisdiction to decide these matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and Internal Operating Procedure 15(a) of the United States District Court for the Northern District оf Illinois. They are core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (G), and (0).
II. FACTS AND BACKGROUND
Most of the facts are undisputed and the parties waived their opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. On November 11, 2005, the Debtor executed a retail installment contract for a 2006 Pontiac G6 vehicle. In executing the contract, the Debtor granted GMAC a purchase money security interest in the vehicle which GMAC financed.
The Debtor alleges that on October 30, 2006, Kimberly Haskell (“Haskell”), the Debtor’s step-mother, contacted GMAC to discuss the arrearages owed on the vehicle and to inform GMAC that the Debtor may be preparing to file a bankruptcy petition, GMAC informed Haskell that it intended to repossess the vehicle if the Debtor did not become current on the remaining $21,707.09 balance owed under the vehicle agreement.
On Novembеr 8, 2006, an agent for GMAC contacted the Debtor in regard to her account with GMAC. The Debtor indicated that she was planning to file for bankruptcy. The agent for GMAC informed her that GMAC requires a bankruptcy case number to “put the account in bankruptcy status.” As no petition had been filed, the Debtor did not provide GMAC with a bankruptcy case number at that time.
Subsequently, the Debtor filed a pro se petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on November 8, 2006. As established by the Certificate of Counseling filed with the petition, she also received the credit counseling required under 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) just minutes prior to filing her petition.
*365 The Debtor alleges that she printed two copies of the “Notice of Bankruptcy Case Filing” from the bankruptcy court’s website and kept both notices in the vehicle. One notice was allegedly placed on the dashboard and the other was taped to the steering wheel.
On November 15, 2006, the Development Group, at GMAC’s direction, repossessed the vehicle at the Debtor’s place of employment. Both GMAC and the Development Group claim that the notice of the bankruptcy filing was not on the dashboard or on me steering wheel of the vehicle.
Shortly after learning that the vehicle had been repossessed, Haskell contacted an agent of GMAC to inform it that the Debtor had filed a petition for bankruptcy and to provide GMAC with the case number. Haskell allegedly informed GMAC that it violated the automatic stay and requested that the vehicle be returned immediately.
GMAC alleges that on November 15, 2006, it attempted to contact the Debtor to arrange the return of the vehicle. On November 16, 2006, GMAC contacted Has-kell to discuss the return of the vehicle. Haskell stated that all further discussions regarding the case should be directed to the Debtor’s attorney. Shortly after the conversation with Haskell, GMAC left a voice-mail message with the Debtor’s attorney regarding an attempt to return the vehicle.
Later on November 16, 2006, the Debtor filed the motion for sanctions against + and the Development Group for violating the automatic stay. On November 20, 2006, GMAC filed the motion to annul the automatic stay. Thereafter, on November 28, 2006, GMAC filed the motion to dismiss the case.
The Chapter 7 trustee appointed to the cased filed a no asset report on December 20, 2006. According to the papers filed on December 28, 2006 by the Development Group, thе Debtor has purportedly released the Development Group from any claims in connection with the repossession, transport, and storage of the subject vehicle. Thus, the Court will consider only the remaining disputes between the Debtor and GMAC.
III. DISCUSSION
A. GMAC’s Motion to Dismiss
1. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) Analysis
Resolution of GMAC’s motion to dismiss the case turns on the interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1). It provides, in pertinent part, that “an individual may not be a debtor under this title unless such individual has, during the 180-day period preceding the date of filing of the petition by such individual, received from an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency ... an individual or group briefing ... that outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted such individual in performing a related budget analysis.” 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (emphasis added). This new provision is sometimes referred to as the ticket into consumer bankruptcy for individual debtors, and is an eligibility requirement for relief with certain limited exceptions that are not applicable in the present case.
That some gap of time must exist between the end of the “180-day period” and the filing of the petition is obvious because the credit counseling must “preced[e] the date of filing of the petition.” How much time must there be in the gap is not at all clear and, not surprisingly, has produced different results. Although this provision was enacted by the bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con
*366
sumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) in 2005, there is already a split of authority on the issue of exactly when the pre-petition 180-day period ends. The first line of cases, upon which the Debtor relies, holds that the statute should be interpreted to allow a debtor to obtain the counseling within the 180 days prior to the
moment
the debtor filed the petition.
See In re Spears,
The second line of cases, upon which GMAC relies, holds that the statute requires the debtor to “complete the required counseling briefing on any day within 180 days prior to but not including the date upon which his or her bankruptcy petition is filed.”
In re Cole,
The Court has reviewed the cases on both sides of the issue and finds, as other courts have, that the two sides are diametrically opposed.
See Spears,
For example, the
Warren
court interpreted the phrase “date of filing” in § 109(h)(1) to mean the “specific day, month, year,
and time of day
the petition was filed,” noting that in bankruptcy cases, “the exact time of filing is a critical bright line in determining property rights of debtors and creditors. At the
moment
a petition for relief is filed, the automatic stay goes into effect, affording the debtor an extra measure of protection from the legal maneuvers of his creditors.”
Warren,
Although the
Hudson
court did not find the legislative history to be conclusive, it did agree that the result in
Warren
was persuasive. The court noted that although the word “date” commonly and usually means “day, month, and year,” it cited BlacK’s Law Dictionaey (5th ed.1979) to show that “date” may also include the concept оf time, a concept that may mean a specific “moment in time.”
Hudson,
When this section says “as of the date of filing of the petition,” it means as of the moment of the filing of the petition. It identifies a moment in time. It does not say “any time within twenty-four hours” of the filing of the petition some of the property is property of the estate and some may not be. Such a result would provide uncertainty. A bright line is required to define what is and what is not property of the estate, and that bright line is a moment in time, namely, the filing of the petition.
Id. at 393. The court also looked at 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 549. Section 547 authorizes the trustee tо recover transfers made “on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition,” and § 549 authorizes the trustee to avoid a transfer “that occurs after the commencement of the case.” Id. In the Hudson court’s view:
The failure to observe a bright line rule to identify avoidable transfers under Section 547 would permit a gap to arise between midnight and the actual time the petition was filed. Thus, preferential transfers made during the morning preceding an afternoon petition filing would escape the trustee’s grasp. Absent compelling reasons to the contrary, it should be presumed that Congress intended the term “date” to have the same meaning in one section of the Bankruptcy Code as another. In the context of the Bankruptcy Code, the term “date” appears to identify a moment in time, rather than a span of time.
Id. at 393-94.
In the second line of cases, the courts have also found considerable support for their interpretation of § 109(h). For example, the court in
Cole
relied upon several dictionaries to conclude that the word “date” means “the
day
when an event happened or will happen,” or “refers simply to day, month, and year.”
Cole,
This analysis comports with the notion that “[t]he only method to establish that date would be to count back from the filing of the petition ... [and] the requirement that the insufficiency that existed '90 days before the date of the filing of the petition,’ be calculated, indicates that the code is not concerned with a particular time of day, but rather the entire day.” Belford v. Union Trust Co. *368 (In re Wild Bills, Inc.),206 B.R. 8 , 16 (Bankr.D.Conn.1997)(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1) and calculating the relevant dates concerning a setoff); see also Lester v. S. Mills, Inc. (In re Terry Mfg. Co., Inc.),325 B.R. 638 , 642 (Bankr. M.D.Ala.2005) (holding that the 90-day preference period under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) “is determined by counting backward from the date of the petition, excluding the date of the petition and including the date of the transfer.”).
The Cole court also noted that “common law legal systems have long reckoned periods of legal signifiсance by the calendar, not by the clock,” Id. at 75 (citation omitted). Moreover, the Supreme Court, when analyzing tax assessment statutes, has held:
‘[w]hen the period allowed for doing an act is to be reckoned from the making of a contract, or the happening of any other event, the day on which the event happened may be regarded as an entirety, or a point of time; and so may be excluded from the computation.’ The fiction that a day has no parts is a figurative recognition of the fact that people do not trouble themselves without reason about a nicer division of time.
Id. (quoting Burnet v. Willingham Loan & Trust Co.,
The
Cole
court also found support in Rule 9006 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Although the court did not make a determination that the Rule applied to § 109(h), it did use it to explаin that “many courts have applied the principle of calculating the time period ‘by excluding the day of the event from which the period begins to run and including the final day of the period.’ ”
Id.
at 76
(quoting MBNA Am. v. Locke (In re Greene),
Finally, the Cole court turned to the legislative history to support its conclusion, slating that “ ‘[t]he legislation’s credit counseling provisions are intended to give consumers in financial distress an opportunity to learn about the consequences of bankruptcy — such as the potentially devastating effect it can have on their credit rating — before they decide to file for bankruptcy relief.’ ” Id. at 76-77 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 18 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 104). The “purpose would be thwarted by allowing a debtor to obtain a prepetition counseling briefing on the same day that a bankruptcy petition is filed.” Id. at 77.
The
Mills
and
Murphy
courts similarly held that a debtor who obtained credit counseling on the same date that she filed her petition was ineligible for such relief.
Mills,
The Court agrees with the conclusion reached in
Cole, Mills,
and
Murphy.
However, the Court arrives at this decision for a different reason. Congress did not provide, in the language of § 109(h), the precise meaning of the phrase “during the 180-day period preceding the date of filing of the petition.” Therefore, the Court must turn to the Bankruptcy Rules for guidance in implementing the statutory text. Furthermore, the Rules fill in some of the gaps and
*369
unanswered questions left by the variоus lacunae in the Code. The Bankruptcy Rules were promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 2075
2
and were prescribed to govern the practice and procedure in cases under title 11. These Rules are not to be ignored. The bankruptcy court is bound to follow, without exceptions, the Bankruptcy Rules unless a Rule is inconsistent with § 2075, in which case the Bankruptcy Code controls.
United N.M. Bank v. Wilferth (In re Wilferth),
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) establishes the method of computing “any period of time prescribed or allowed ... by any applicable statute.” 10 Alan N. ResniCK & HenRY J. Sommer, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9006.04, at 9006-10 (15th ed. rev.2006). Specifically, Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) provides in relevant part:
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, or by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure made applicable by these rules, by the local rules, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included ....
Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9006(a) (emphasis added). Taking the language of § 109(h), in conjunction with the above-quoted provision of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a), the Court concludes that in order to comply with § 109(h)(1), a debtor must complete the required counseling briefing on any day within 180 days prior to, but not including, the date upon which the petition is filed. As Congress has not more specifically legislated the time in question, by default the Court looks to the Rule for the applicable answer.
Recently, the court in
Moore
held that Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) does not apply to § 109(h).
The Court respectfully disagrees and rejects the rationale in
Moore
that the application of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) to § 109(h) abridges a substantive right. Congress chose the wording in § 109(h)(1) that “an individual may not be a debtor under this title unless such individual has,
during the 180-day period preceding the date of filing
of the petition by such individual, received from an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency....” 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (emphasis added). Congress easily could have added the additional phrase “at any time, including the dale of filing” to qualify the last pertinent part of § 109(h)(1), and avoid recourse to the Rule, but did not. Some courts have opined that Congress intended § 109(h) to do nothing more than educate debtors about debt management by requiring them to receive debt counseling
before
bankruptcy.
See Warren,
There is little doubt, however, that Congress intended in BAPCPA to make it more difficult to seek and obtain bankruptcy relief.
In re Thompson,
It is true, as
Hudson
points out, that in some dictionaries an alternative definition for the word “date,” along with the definition proposed by
Cole,
may be found.
The Debtor argues in her response to the motion to dismiss, that following the logic of
Cole, Mills,
and
Murphy
“a debtor who obtains [her] credit counseling at 11:59 p.m. would not be prevented from filing a case two minutes later. However, a debtor who received the certificate of credit counseling at 12:01 a.m. could not file for twenty-four hours.” (Resp. at 4.) The Debtor suggests that the holdings in these cases should not be followed because they create more confusion and lead to a harsh result. The Court disagrees. The confusion results from the imprecise statutоry language legislated which the courts are trying to follow and implement. The application of many of the Code’s provisions produces harsh results for various parties in interest, but follows from applying the statute as drafted and legislated. When the imprecise statutory text of § 109(h) is implemented through the mandate of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a), the end result is the Court’s effort to comply with the statute as legislated by Congress. Absent a clear congressional intent stating otherwise, the Court is unwilling to ignore the language used in § 109(h), as applied by Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a), in order to abrogate the period between obtaining the certificate of credit counseling and filing a bankruptcy petition. The judiciary is not licensed “to soften the import of Congress’ chosen words even if we believe the words lead to a harsh outcome.... ”
Lamie v. United States Trustee,
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that the “180-day period preceding the date of filing of the petition” in *371 § 109(h)(1) does not include the date upon which a debtor’s bankruptcy petition is filed. Therefore, a debtor who obtains the required pre-petition counseling briefing on the same day as the date upon which a petition is filed does not comply with § 109(h)(1) and is not eligible to be a debt- or under title 11. The Debtor, having filed her petition on November 8, 2006, the same day that she received her credit counseling briefing, did not comply with the statute, and accordingly, she is not eligible under § 109(h)(1) to be a debtor under any chapter of title 11.
2. Dismiss the Case or Strike the Petition?
GMAC has moved to dismiss the Debtor’s case. Neither § 109(h) nor its legislative history mentions what should happen to the bankruptcy case of a petitioner whо is ineligible to be a debtor.
In re Seaman,
The determination of whether to strike the petition or dismiss the case is important because it may affect the applicability of the automatic stay provision of §§ 362(c)(3) and/or 362(c)(4). Specifically, one court has noted the significance of a dismissal:
The consequences of dismissal include the possibility that the automatic stay will be available only on a limited basis in the event that the petitioner files a subsequent bankruptcy case. That is, if the case is dismissed and the petitioner files another bankruptcy case within one year of the dismissal, then the automatic stay will be in place for only thirty days unless, upon motion by a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court extends the stay.
Seaman,
While § 109(h) is silent as to the appropriate remedy in such circumstances, guidance is available from several cases that have specifically addressed the issue of whether striking the petition or dismissing the case is the appropriate outcome.
3
Several cases have ruled that a bankruptcy petition filed by an individual who is ineligible under § 109(h) should be stricken,
See id.; In re Salazar,
The court in
Salazar
upheld its previous ruling striking the petition in order to prevent the automatic stay from going into effect for an individual who is ineligible under § 109(h), noting that it
“is implausible to believe that Congress specifically identified people to exclude from the bankruptcy process, yet permitted those same people to benefit from bankruptcy’s most powerful protection: the automatic stay.”
Another court viewed the requirements of § 109(h) as jurisdictional and dismissed the ineligible petitioner’s case, but also noted that “[bjecause the petition failed to provide [the debtor] status as a debtor, the Court will not consider this a dismissed case in which the individual was the debt- or, for purposes of denying the imposition of the automatic stay in a subsequently filed case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362.”
In re Valdez,
The majority of courts, however, has disagreed with the above line of cases and ruled that a cаse has been commenced, and the appropriate action is to dismiss the case.
See In re Jones,
Prior to the BAPCPA amendments, an individual could be found to be ineligible for numerous reasons other than failure to сomply with the counseling requirements. For example, § 109(c) sets forth who may be a debtor under Chapter 13 and provides that a debtor must have “regular income” and unsecured and secured debts that do not exceed the prescribed limits. “Courts have, with apparent unanimity, concluded that when a Chapter 13 petitioner is ineligible under Section 109(e), the case should be either voluntary converted or dismissed.”
Seaman,
Likewise, courts have dismissed cases filed by petitioners who are ineligible for
*373
bankruptcy relief because of their corporate or entity status.
Seaman,
Courts have also dismissed cases filed by petitioners who are ineligible under § 109(g).
Seaman,
The BAPCPA amendments to § 362 also support the Court’s conclusion. Section 362(b)(21)(A) provides an exception to the automatic stay with regard to the foreclosure of real property “if the debtor is ineligible under section 109(g).... ” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(21)(A). “If such a filing were void
ab initio
and did not result in an automatic stay under existing law, such an amendment would not have been necessary.”
Ross,
There is no indication that Congress intended to treat § 109(h) ineligibility any different than any other form of ineligibility in § 109; it therefore follows that a filing by a debtor ineligible under § 109(h) commences a case and is not a nullity or void ab initio. This conclusion comports with due process rights that are given to all parties in a bankruptcy case and avoids any uncertainty that may exist with respect to the petitioner’s status and the triggering of the automаtic stay.
Flores,
Moreover, striking a petition as void ab initio does not necessarily prevent the harsh results that the courts in
Rios, Salazar, Valdez,
and
Hubbard
tried to avoid. These courts tried to avoid denying debtors “the full panoply of protections provided by ... § 362 if they choose, after rectifying their error in failing to seek credit counseling, to file for bankruptcy protection in the future.”
Rios,
The Court’s conclusion makes practical sense as well. Dismissing the case avoids the procedural and substantive pitfalls that may occur if the petition is stricken.
Seaman,
questions as to the existence and willfulness of an automatic stay violation ... [2] validity of an action against property taken by a creditor of a petitioner who appears ineligible to be a debtor but later is determined to be eligible ... [3] the prospect of unnecеssary inaction by a cautious creditor where a petitioner proves to be ineligible to be a debtor ... [and][4] whether filing fees should be returned to ineligible petitioners and whether Chapter 7 trustees may be compensated for work on cases that prove to be a nullity or void ab initio.
Id. at 707.
The Court does not accept the notion that the petitioner’s eligibility as a debtor under § 109(h) impacts the determination of whether a case has been commenced or whether the. Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is invoked.
See Tomco,
For all of these reasons, the Court reaches the same conclusion with regard to the effect of § 109(h) ineligibility as the court in Torneo reached. Namely, a petition filed with the bankruptcy court commences a case, and it continues to be a case until the Court determines that the debtor did not have the right to be a debtor. If the Court determines that the individual is ineligible to be a debtor, the Court can dismiss the case and fashion such other relief as may be necessary to protect the rights of creditors. The Debt- or was not eligible under § 109(h)(1) to be a debtor under any chapter of title 11 and, therefore, the Court dismisses her case under § 707(a).
B. The Debtor’s Motion for Sanctions
In the Debtor’s motion for sanctions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3) and 362(k)(l), she claims that GMAC and the Devеlopment Group violated the automatic stay when they repossessed the vehicle and refused to return it upon request.
Section 362 governs the automatic stay. Section 362(a) states that “a petition filed under section 301 ... of this title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities. ...” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). In a voluntary Chapter 7, like the case at hand, the stay takes effect when a petition is filed under § 301. Section 301(a) states that “[a] voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor under such chapter.” 11 U.S.C. § 301(a).
As discussed above, despite her ineligibility as a debtor under § 109(h), this case was commenced upon the filing of the peti *375 tion. The bankruptcy estate was created under 11 U.S.C. § 541 and the automatic stay applied under § 362(a). Therefore, the estate property and the Debtor’s property were protected by § 362’s automatic stay provision at the time the vehicle was repossessed.
Under § 362(a)(3), a creditor is prohibited from taking “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). Section 362(k)(l) provides that “[a]n individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(l).
In order to recover damages under § 362(k)(l), the Debtor has the burden of establishing the following elеments by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a bankruptcy petition was filed; (2) the debtor is an “individual” under the automatic stay provision; (3) the creditor had notice of the petition; (4) the creditor’s actions were in willful violation of the stay; and (5) the debtor suffered damages.
In re Pincombe,
A willful violation under § 362(k)(l) requires knowledge on the part of the violating party that a formal bankruptcy petition has been filed.
In re Fridge,
“What begins as a technical violation of the automatic stay, though, [may turn] into a willful one because a creditor has an affirmative duty to remedy [a] ... violation without court order when it learns of the existence of a ... bankruptcy case and receives a request to return estate property repossessed post-petition.” Id. “[T]he affirmative duty to fix the violation without unreasonable delay would certainly exist when the repossession occurs post-petition and the bankruptcy-filing information is later relayed to the secured creditor.” Id. at 365.
The Court finds that GMAC learned of the bankruptcy filing on the date it had the Development Group repossess the vehicle — November 15, 2006. Thus, the repossession constituted a technical violation of the automatic stay. Nevertheless, the Court finds thаt their actions were not willful. Written notice was not supplied to GMAC by the Debtor or Haskell immediately subsequent to the filing of the petition despite GMAC’s requests to receive a case number if the Debtor chose to file a bankruptcy petition, GMAC’s proffered evidence shows that GMAC and the Development Group did not have actual notice of the bankruptcy case when the vehicle was repossessed. Both GMAC and the Development Group claim that notice of the filing was not on the steering wheel, on the dashboard, or anywhere else in the vehicle. The Debt- or’s contrary allegation that she left two copies of the notice of filing on the dashboard and steering wheel is disputed by GMAC.
*376 The Court also finds that the technical violation of the automatic stay did not turn into a willful violаtion because GMAC fulfilled its affirmative duty to remedy the violation by attempting to return the vehicle to the Debtor. Once GMAC was informed of the bankruptcy filing, its proffers shows that on numerous occasions it attempted to return the vehicle. One day after the vehicle was repossessed, on November 16, 2006, the Debtor’s attorney filed the motion for sanctions. Thereafter, on November 20, 2006, GMAC filed a motion to annul the automatic stay to allow the Court to determine whether retroactive stay relief was appropriate.
Finally, the Debtor failed to proffer any evidence regarding damages. There is no evidence to support the Debtor’s claim of unspecified actual damages or any egregious conduct to support punitive damages, and nothing to serve as a predicate for awarding attorneys’ fees and costs. Damages cannot be awarded in a vacuum. The parties waived their opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. Hence, the Debtor has not established this final element. For all of these reasons, the Court denies the Debtor’s motion for sanctions.
C. GMAC’s Motion to Annul the Automatic Stay
GMAC also seeks to annul the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). GMAC requests an annulment so that its repossession of the Debtor’s vehicle might be retroactively validated.
Section 362(d) provides in pertinent part that “[o]n request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) ..., such as by terminating,
annulling,
modifying, or conditioning such stay....” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). “[A]n order annulling the stay could operate retroactively to the date of the filing of the petition which gave rise to the stay, and thus validate actions taken by the party at a time when he may have been unaware of the existence of the stay.”
In re Behr,
The Court finds that annulment of the stay is not apprоpriate or necessary in this matter. The Debtor is ineligible under § 109(h) to be a debtor and her case will be dismissed, thereby effectively terminating the automatic stay as a matter of law under § 362(c)(2)(B). Moreover, GMAC is in possession of the collateral, and the Debtor’s statement of intention indicated that she intended to surrender the vehicle to GMAC. The Court has determined that GMAC and the Development Group did not commit a willful violation of the slay, and, thus, sanctions will not be awarded against GMAC. Therefore, the Court does not find that the movant, GMAC, is unfairly prejudiced absent a stay annulment. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion for annulment of the stay.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants GMAC’s motions to dismiss the *377 Debtor’s case. The Court denies GMAC’s motion to annul the automatic stay and denies the Debtor’s motion for sanctions.
This Oрinion constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052. A separate order shall be entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9021.
Notes
. The Court notes that Judge Teel, the judge who authored the
Mills
decision, later wrote the
Barbaran
opinion wherein he stated that "my contrary holding on this specific point in
Mills
should no longer be followed in this district....”
Barbaran,
. Section 2075 provides in relevant part that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in cases under title 11. Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2075.
. While only a handful of cases address the issue of whether striking the petition or dismissing the case is most appropriate, the
Seaman
court noted that out of the thirty-four decisions addressing ineligibility under § 109(h) at the time of the opinion, thirty-one resulted in a dismissal.
Seaman,