In re the Detention of Nicholas Wygle
910 N.W.2d 599
| Iowa | 2018Background
- Nicholas Wygle was convicted of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse and completed his underlying prison sentence in August 2015.
- After release he began serving a ten-year "special sentence" under Iowa Code chapter 903B and resided at the Curt Forbes Residential Facility (a community residential program).
- The State filed a petition under Iowa Code chapter 229A to commit Wygle as a sexually violent predator (SVP) without alleging a recent overt act.
- The district court found probable cause and denied Wygle’s motion to dismiss; Wygle obtained interlocutory review.
- The Iowa Supreme Court held Wygle was not "presently confined" under Iowa Code § 229A.4(1) while serving a 903B special sentence at Curt Forbes, so the State could not proceed under § 229A.4(1) absent a recent overt act; the petition was ordered dismissed and the district court judgment reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wygle) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether residency at Curt Forbes while serving a 903B special sentence qualifies as being "presently confined" under Iowa Code § 229A.4(1) | Curt Forbes residency under a special sentence is not equivalent to "presently confined" for purposes of § 229A.4(1); absent a recent overt act the State cannot proceed. | "Presently confined" is broad and should include custody short of prison (e.g., parole, residential programs); legislature used different words elsewhere by choice. | Court: "Presently confined" requires total confinement for the underlying sexual offense; residency under a 903B special sentence at Curt Forbes is not "presently confined." |
| Whether a 903B special sentence is part of the original "sentence imposed for the offense" for triggering § 229A.4(2) (recent-overt-act track) | The special sentence is distinct from the underlying sentence and does not make a discharged person "presently confined" under § 229A.4(1). | Because supervisory programs and parole are encompassed by other statutory provisions, the SVP statute should be read broadly to capture persons under supervision. | Court: 903B special sentence is separate from the original sentence; thus a person who has discharged the original sentence but is serving a special sentence is not "presently confined" under § 229A.4(1) and the recent-overt-act requirement of § 229A.4(2) applies. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Det. of Gonzales, 658 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 2003) ("presently confined" meaning and overt-act constitutional concerns)
- In re Det. of Shaffer, 769 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 2009) (refusing a hypertechnical definition of "presently confined")
- In re Det. of Stenzel, 827 N.W.2d 690 (Iowa 2013) (construing continuous confinement and the role of overt-act requirement)
- State v. Willis, 691 N.W.2d 726 (Iowa 2005) (holding incarceration for sexual offense can substitute for recent overt act)
- In re Mohr, 383 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1986) (recent overt act requirement for dangerousness in civil commitment)
- In re Foster, 426 N.W.2d 374 (Iowa 1988) (same principle on overt acts)
- Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976) (due process critique of commitment without overt-act requirement)
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (U.S. 1997) (upholding Kansas SVP statute; discussion of mental abnormality)
- Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (U.S. 2002) (narrowing SVP commitment to distinguish true predators from ordinary recidivists)
- In re Det. of Lewis, 177 P.3d 708 (Wash. 2008) (interpreting "total confinement" in Washington and related SVP holdings)