Damon Montez Willis, a convicted sex offender, appeals from orders in a subsequent civil proceeding finding him to be a sexually violent predator and committing him as such. He asserts on appeal that (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction to impose a civil commitment because the State failed to follow necessary statutory procedures, (2) the civil commitment proceeding could not be brought against him at the time it was commenced because he had not yet been convicted of a sexually violent offense, (3) he could not be found to be a sexual predator in'the absence of a recent overt act, and (4) he was denied effective assistance of counsel with respect to the commitment proceedings. After reviewing the record and considering the arguments presented, we find that none of these claims have merit and affirm the orders of the district court.
In 1987 Willis was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five years. On January 26, 1997, while still incarcerated for the 1987 conviction, Willis sexually assault *728 ed another inmate in the prison. He was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse with regard to that offense. That conviction was reversed by the court of appeals, and a new trial was ordered. On retrial of the third-degree sexual-abuse charge, the jury found Willis guilty of the lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. That verdict was returned on December 6, 2000. Sentencing was scheduled for December 26, 2000.
The Henry County Sheriff in whose custody Willis resided determined that Willis’s sentence for his 1987 conviction had been discharged and that credit for time served on the 1997 charge of sexual abuse would exhaust any sentence that might be imposed for the lesser included offense of which he was ultimately convicted. Based on these circumstances, the sheriff concluded that Willis would likely be released from confinement on the date of his sentencing and notified the attorney general suggesting review of the situation for a potential commitment as a sexually violent predator.
On December 21, 2000, the State filed a petition alleging Willis was a sexually violent predator and recommending that he be committed as such. The district court held a probable-cause hearing on December 27, 2000, and determined that probable cause existed. On June 26, 2001, a jury returned a verdict finding Willis to be a sexually violent predator. That determination was reversed by the court of appeals, but on retrial another jury found that Willis was a sexually violent predator. That resulted in the order of commitment that is the subject of this appeal.
I. Standard of Review.
Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed for correction of errors of law.
Iowa Dep’t of Transp. v. Soward,
II. Alleged Lack of Jurisdiction.
A.
Untimely notice.
Willis asserts that the district court lacked both jurisdiction and authority to consider the petition filed by the attorney general for his commitment as a sexually violent predator because the notice given to the attorney general by the Henry County Sheriff pursuant to Iowa Code section 229A.3(1) (1999) was given less than ninety days prior to Willis’s anticipated discharge. This same contention was considered by this court in the recent case of
In re Detention of Huss,
The facts of the present case illustrate the wisdom of the holding in Huss. Because of the protracted trial proceedings on Willis’s third-degree sexual-abuse prosecution and the ultimate verdict convicting *729 him of only a lesser included offense, there was no opportunity to give ninety-days notice to the attorney general prior to the anticipated date of discharge. It is apparent, however, that notice was given as soon as reasonably possible.
B. Lack of conviction. Willis’s next contention is that he was not confined as a sexually violent predatop at the time the attorney general filed the petition for his commitment. He bases this contention on the fact that the attorney general’s petition was filed on December 19, 2000, and sentence on Willis’s conviction for assault with intent to commit sexual abuse was not imposed until December 26, 2000. The gist of Willis’s, argument is that he must have been convicted of the sexually violent offense for which he was being held prior to the filing of a petition by the attorney general. He argues that the jury verdict was not a conviction and that his conviction did not occur until his sentencing on December 26.
We are convinced that the gap between the verdict and sentencing does not provide any basis for granting Willis relief from his commitment as a sexually violent predator. Neither the language of section 229A.4(1), nor our interpretation of that statute in
In re Detention of Gonzales,
III. Absence of a Recent Overt Act.
Willis argues that, in order to restrict his liberty based on a prediction of his future behavior, due process requires proof of a recent overt act. He contends that such showing is absent, with respect to his commitment. In
Gonzales,
Determining whether a past act of sexual violence has become too stale to serve as a predictor of future acts of a similar nature is not a precise task. The signifi-cánce of a recent overt act in predicting future conduct is not the act but the inference against a particular propensity that arises from the absence of an overt act. The absence of sexually .predatory acts in a setting of secure confinement, does not paint the same picture as the absence of such acts in a normal life situation. We have generally upheld the statutory scheme presented by Iowa Code chapter 229A against substantive due process challenges.
See In re Detention of Garren,
Under principles of substantive due process, the State is prohibited from engaging in arbitrary or wrongful actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them. Id. at 284. A person’s liberty interest is constitution *730 ally protected against arbitrary governmental action, but is not absolute. Id. The government may detain a mentally unstable individual who presents a danger to the public. Id. In not expressly requiring a recent overt act for petitions for commitment filed under section 229A.4(1), the legislature could reasonably'conclude that the filing of a civil commitment petition must necessarily be delayed during the period of confinement under a criminal judgment and therefore allow a petition to be filed at the conclusion of that confinement notwithstanding the absence of an additional overt act.
IV. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Willis , contends that he re: ceived ineffective, assistance of counsel in resisting the State’s efforts to commit him. His right to counsel in the present proceeding is conferred by an Iowa statute, Iowa Code § 229A.6(1). It does not flow from the Sixth Amendment' to the federal constitution, which, by its éxpress terms, refers only to “criminal prosecutions.” Even if we assume that he may posit an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on some source of entitlement other than the Sixth Amendment, that effort fails in the present case. -
His attempt to obtain relief on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel grounds is premised on the success of his jurisdictional claims or alleged violations of due process. Because we have considered those claims on the merits and rejected them, the premise for his ineffective-assistance claim does not exist. We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.