In re: Steven Jackson
826 F.3d 1343
11th Cir.2016Background
- Steven Jackson, previously filed a § 2255 motion, seeks permission under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C) to file a second/successive § 2255 motion based on Johnson v. United States.
- Jackson was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on prior convictions; the PSI listed four potential ACCA predicates (two 1971 Florida assault-related convictions, a 1975 Florida robbery, and a 1986 federal drug conviction).
- The 1986 federal drug conviction clearly qualifies as an ACCA predicate; the record and sentencing hearing do not show which convictions the sentencing court relied on or which ACCA clause was applied to each.
- Binding precedent does not unequivocally show the pre-1975 assault or pre-2000 Florida robbery convictions necessarily qualify under ACCA’s elements or enumerated clauses after Johnson struck the residual clause.
- The Eleventh Circuit therefore examined whether Jackson made a prima facie showing under § 2244(b)(3)(C) and addressed whether the district court or the court of appeals should decide timeliness when a limitations defense has not been presented.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jackson may be authorized to file a successive § 2255 invoking Johnson | Jackson argues Johnson retroactively invalidates ACCA’s residual clause and his predicates may have relied on that clause | Government had not yet argued timeliness or that predicates categorically qualify under valid ACCA clauses | Authorized: Jackson made a prima facie showing because record does not clearly show sentencing relied only on valid ACCA clauses |
| Whether Jackson’s specific prior Florida convictions categorically qualify as ACCA predicates post-Johnson | Jackson contends at least one of the convictions may have depended on the residual clause, so relief may be available | Government would argue some convictions (e.g., robbery or assaults) may still qualify under elements/enumerated clauses | Unresolved merits: court found binding precedent does not make it undeniably clear that the Florida assault/robbery convictions qualify, so prima facie Johnson claim exists |
| Whether the court of appeals should deny permission based on the one-year § 2255 limitations period (timeliness) sua sponte | Jackson had not had opportunity to address tolling; equitable tolling may apply, especially pro se and circuit timing issues | Government might assert statute of limitations defense; court of appeals could raise timeliness in exceptional cases | Denied sua sponte dismissal: court grants permission and leaves timeliness (statute of limitations, equitable tolling, mailbox rule) for the district court to decide with fair notice to parties |
Key Cases Cited
- Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI, 709 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir.) (addressed Florida aggravated assault and ACCA elements clause)
- Lockley v. United States, 632 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir.) (analyzed Florida robbery and elements-clause application under Guidelines)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (U.S.) (held Johnson’s rule applies retroactively on collateral review)
- Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (U.S. 2006) (requires fair notice and opportunity before a court raises statute-of-limitations defense sua sponte)
- Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir.) (statute of limitations is not jurisdictional; subject to equitable tolling)
- Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (U.S.) (equitable tolling available in habeas context; fact-specific inquiry)
- Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (U.S.) (appellate courts should reserve sua sponte timeliness rulings for exceptional cases)
- Jordan v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 485 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir.) (explains limits on appellate prima facie review for successive petitions)