In Re Smith, 333 S.W.3d 582

Background

Smith was wrongfully imprisoned for robbery (1970) and later convicted of aggravated sexual assault (1986), with parole revocation tied to the wrongful conviction.
He was exonerated in 2006 after DNA testing showed actual innocence and was released from custody, while his prior sentence continued.
Under the Tim Cole Act, he could receive compensation, computed as $80,000 per year for wrongful imprisonment, with deductions for concurrent sentences.
Smith was on parole at the time of the wrongful conviction, creating a dispute whether the concurrent-sentence restriction applies to parolees under §103.001(b).
The Comptroller reduced Smith’s award applying the concurrent-sentence restriction, reducing compensation to a period between June 12, 1987 and July 7, 2006; Smith sought mandamus to compel payment for an earlier period.
This opinion holds that the concurrent-sentence restriction does not apply when the wrongful conviction causes the parole revocation, entitling Smith to compensation for August 7, 1986 to August 7, 1987.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the concurrent-sentence restriction applies to parolees.	Smith argues the restriction applies only to in-prison concurrent sentences, not parole.	Comptroller argues the restriction applies regardless of parole status, as it governs concurrent sentences.	No; restriction does not apply when wrongful conviction causes parole revocation.
Scope of compensation period when parole is revoked due to wrongful conviction.	Smith seeks compensation for the time his parole was revoked and he would have served on parole.	Comptroller argues only time actually served in prison counts, subject to the restriction.	Entitled to compensation for Aug. 7, 1986 to Aug. 7, 1987 due to wrongful conviction causing parole revocation.
Role of Tulia Attorney General Opinion in construction of §103.001(b).	AG opinion supports Smith's view that concurrency cannot bar compensation when caused by wrongful conviction.	Tulia opinion is persuasive but distinguishable; parole/probation difference matters.	Tulia reasoning persuasive; supports exception to the concurrent-sentence restriction.
Impact of sovereign immunity on mandamus action to compel payment.			Proceeding seeks ministerial duty; no sovereign-immunity bar; mandamus to compel compliance is appropriate.
Proper construction approach for ambiguous statutory text.	Text supports interpretation that prevents award denial when wrongful conviction causes concurrency.	Text supports restriction; agency construction merits deference but not overruled where liberty interests implicated.	Ambiguity resolved in favor of Smith; the restriction does not apply in this scenario.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Oakley, 227 S.W.3d 58 (Tex. 2007) (historical background of wrongful-imprisonment statutes)
A&T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp, 904 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.1995) (mandamus scope; agency authority)
Jessen Assocs., Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593 (Tex.1975) (statutory interpretation and mandamus)
Gordon v. Lake, 356 S.W.2d 138 (Tex.1962) (mandamus and ministerial duties)
Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Pollard, 12 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.1929) (original proceeding remedy)
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex.2009) (sovereign-immunity-related mandamus)
Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31 (Tex.2000) (constructive consideration in statutory interpretation)
Flores v. Employees Retirement Sys. of Tex., 74 S.W.3d 532 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002) (administrative construction guidance)