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Osterberg v. Peca
12 S.W.3d 31
Tex.
2000
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*1 win”); ment that “too case was weak Olga OSTERBERG, v. Cartwright, State S.W.2d 219-20 Robert and ( Tex.App. Petitioners, [14th Dist.] - Houston denied)

writ (ruling sup evidence ported attorney’s award of fees when at torney general delinquency filed notice of PECA, Jr., Respondent. Peter S. alleged support to enforce child order after No. 97-1027. prej notice had been dismissed twice with udice). Texas. Moreover, policy behind the Frivo- Argued Sept. support lous Claims Act does award attorney’s surveyor’s fees this Decided Feb. purpose chapter case. 105 is to “The afford an aggrieved remedy citizen some Concurring Opinion Justice from a governmental agency for the mis- Gonzales, Feb. Black, power.”

use of governmental Here,

S.W.2d at 629 n. 5. the State con- and, defendant,

ducted its survey own as a

disagreed with the results the Landown- survey.

ers’ was within State its

rights to disagree with the Landowners

about the the boundary location of and to

present a ownership defense of claimed

the riverbed. The fact ag- State

gressively defended itself and eventually prevail

did not case is not a misuse governmental power contemplated

the Frivolous Act. Claims

Because the Landowners are not enti-

tled attorney’s surveyor’s fees un- Act,

der the Frivolous Claims we need not

decide whether Frivolous Claims Act is

implicated by the resolution. Due to our case,

disposition of this we also need not

address the Landowners’ conditional chal-

lenge to change the trial court’s of venue

from County Roberts Hutchinson Coun-

ty. part We appeals’ affirm court of

judgment attorney’s denying survey- fees,

or’s reverse in part ap- court of

peals’ judgment, part and reinstate in

trial judgment court’s declaring that survey correctly

Landowners’ marks the

boundary between the State’s riverbed and riparian tracts.

S5 breaking knew were Arriv- law. ing requires at that conclusion us to decide constitutionality of the Election Code imposing reporting requirements sections campaign spenders the Elec- direct providing private tion civil Code sections reporting violations. We remedies that, applied conclude to the Oster- requirements bergs, and the private provisions pass civil enforcement muster, exception: constitutional one require- We hold that the Election Code’s ment that husband and wife Robert Olga Osterberg form a committee acting before concert to make cam- paign unconstitutionally expenditure bur- dens their freedom of association. Accord- ingly, part part we affirm reverse appeals’ *5 judgment court of remand and appeals. to the of court I

FACTS Osterberg Robert his and wife Zinn, Antonio, Larry San L. John Hoes- Olga in litigation were involved in State tenbach, Odessa, for Petitioners. Judge District Peca’s Peter court. The Paso, Michael R. “Mick” Milligan, El for Osterbergs unhappy way were with the Respondent. Peca during litigation. treated them the When ran Peca for re-election in the opinion Justice ABBOTT delivered the opposed Osterbergs candidacy. They his respect the with parts to I-IV $34,200 Biel, contributed to Albert Peca’s VI-XI, HECHT, and which Justice opponent in the primary. Democratic The OWEN, Justice Justice BAKER and also and Osterbergs created funded their join, Justice GONZALES plurality and a own television advertisements about the opinion V, with respect part in which race.1 The advertisements consisted HECHT, OWEN, Justice Justice Justice the following text: join. BAKER CONSIDER THIS: We Osterbergs’ overrule the motion for (cid:127) Judge by peers Peca chosen was his rehearing. opinion We withdraw our dat- El outstanding jurist Paso’s 29, 1999, July ed and substitute the follow- (cid:127) He graduated Summa Cum Laude ing. (cid:127) He worked to reduce his for docket In this case we conclude that candi- years over seven date who seeks to enforce Election Texas reporting requirements Code is not re- ENOUGH, IF VOTE HIM THAT’S FOR quired prove persons making unre- ported expenditures against [next the candidate screen:] ” parties Olga Osterbergs.’ The contest whether made ex- Our advertisement as "the penditures for the For advertisement. sim- label is not intended to be a substantive com- sake, plicity's expenditure we refer and ment. trial,

But, you that he told want who understands: Code. At Biel testified ONE remarks, though about Peca’s Osterberg (cid:127) people, The Courthouse exists for say he did not when. poli- for judges, and not accidents tics, lawyers. and primary Peca won the March 8th elec- later, days (cid:127) against tion. Two he filed suit law, spirit just The Osterbergs seeking damages civil for letter, employed justice must be An violations of the Texas Election Code. people. bring private can opposing candidate (cid:127) expense Efficiency justice against cause of action who “[a] cannot be tolerated. ... knowingly expendi- makes Chapter ture violation of’ 253. Tex. BRING THE BACK COURTHOUSE. § 253.131. Peca claimed that Elec.Code TO THE PEOPLE! Osterbergs Chapter violated 253 of the report the di- by failing Election Code VOTE FOR HIS OPPONENT campaign expenditures they made for rect And years remove HIM in four Chapter advertisements. television people! If he the will fails prohibits campaign expenditures direct paid Osterberg Ad for Bob spender reports over unless the $100 compliance $28,695 Election spent produce Osterbergs Code 254.2 The had money and air the advertisement. reported expenditures by the dead- from was withdrawn a bank account Rob- required lines Election shared, Code ert Olga Olga with checks that 254.124,the Oster- 254.124. Under section signed in her name. Robert testified had bergs file no required were Olga nothing knew about his payment day later than the before the elec- ads, eighth he checks she used *6 a until report tion. Robert did not file signed for use he had had his because 4,May nearly after two months the impaired a right suffered stroke that his 1994— Peca filed Fol- election and after had suit. hand. trial, lowing jury trial a the court held the One month before March Olga jointly severally and and lia- Robert election, primary spoke Peca at an El Paso ble for Election Code violations and Bar Association candidate forum luncheon. $57,390plus Peca interest. awarded the luncheon and heard Peca Biel attended speak. part appeals understood some Peca’s court affirmed Biel 121. It Osterberg part. and reversed 952 S.W.2d remarks be accusations that required prove the held Peca was that violating was somehow Texas Election that 253.002, clearly §§ candi What or defeat of a identified 253.062. election Tex. Elec.Code Chapter campaign cooperation a date which is made without or 253 defines as "direct any or candi expenditure” corresponds with what the Fed consultation with candidate” committee), Campaign agent Act date's or and Colorado Re eral Election and United States publican Campaign "independent expendi call Fed. Comm. v. Federal an Comm’n, §251.001(7), Compare Tex. Election ture.” Elec.Code (1996) (8) (clarifying campaign expenditure” (defining a "direct L.Ed.2d 795 "independent” expenditure expenditure "in a that is an ex an made connection with an penditure campaign a "not coordinated with the candi for elective office or on measure” campaign”). general campaign date See not constitute contri or candidate’s that "does bution”), (di (1996) ly Op. Comm’n No. 336 1 Tex. Admin. Code 20.1 Tex. Ethics campaign expenditure ("Although 'independent the campaign "made without term rect law, expenditure’ is it prior approval the not used in Texas the consent or candidate easily grasped term 'di expendi the often than the officeholder on whose behalf more or made”), expenditure,’ which Texas law uses to Federal Election Cam rect ture was with Act, 431(17) (1997) expenditure (defining campaign with paign describe a made 2 U.S.C. “independent expen prior approval "an or of the can expenditure” as out the consent benefitted.”). person expressly advocating the didate diture Osterbergs expenditures finding. argues knew such a Peca supports their also Ap- attorney’s violated the Election Code. Id. at 126. he is entitled to that fees. standard, that plying it affirmed the trial (1) prove hold need not We that: Peca Robert, against judgment finding court’s subjective knowledge of Osterbergs’ evidence that Robert knew he was violat- (2) laws; pre- Osterbergs election at ing the Election Code. Id. 128. The objections served their constitutional appeals Olga court of reversed as to be- (3) 253; facto Chapter the statute’s de there that cause found was no evidence form a requirement Osterbergs that knowingly she violated the Election Code. political designate committee and a trea- reversal, Id. Because of this the court did making expenditures surer before “in con- Osterbergs’ argument not address the that unconstitutionally cert” burdens their as- there was no evidence or insufficient evi- (4) application rights; sociational Olga dence that made a direct Chapter provisions other 253’s to the Ost- expenditure. 129. The court erbergs speech not violate the free does also that appeals Osterbergs held had provisions association Texas objections their waived constitutional Constitutions; (5) United States the Oster- reporting 253’s requirement bergs did not waive their constitutional provision. civil enforcement Id. at 124-25. objection to the trial court’s definition of appeals The court of held further campaign expenditure, any but error Osterbergs waived them ar- constitutional harm- the trial court its instruction was gument that the trial court should have the Osterbergs’ less because advertise- limited its definition of “campaign expendi- advocacy ment was express as matter of ture” to for communications (6) law; Osterbergs waived de- their “expressly advocate election they substantially complied fense clearly defeat of a identified candidate.” (7) statute; Peca waived claim his Id. at 129-31. And appeals the court of attorney’s holding fees. Our renders held that waived their con- argument irrelevant Peca’s alternative tention that “substantially complied” supports finding the evidence with the Election Code’s re- Osterbergs knowingly violated the statute. quirements by filing May 1994—almost two months after the elec- II *7 tion. Id. at 129. the of Finally, court appeals held that Peca of recovery waived A WHAT VIOLATOR MUST KNOW? attorney’s object fees failing to or make 253.131(a) Texas Election Code section a request jury new when the did not re- provides: turn a finding attorney’s on the fees issue. person A or ac- knowingly who makes Id. at 132. campaign a cepts contribution or makes expenditure a in of campaign violation Osterbergs petitioned Both the and Peca chapter this is hable for as damages Osterbergs this review. The provided by this section. argument produced renew their that Peca 253.131(a) § no evidence that Robert Osterberg (emphasis know- Tex. Elec.Code added). Chapter ingly violated and in question 253 contend The initial this case is that did not requires waive their constitutional whether this section to Peca compliance arguments. prove and substantial In that Osterbergs actually the knew response, argues Peca that the Election that their conduct violated require prove Code does not him to the trial and of held appeals The court court expenditure knew that “knowingly” applies their that the word not Code, the only violated Election and alterna- to of a ex- making campaign the act tively that the Election re- penditure, Code does but also to the fact that the ex- quire law, knowledge of the the Peca penditure evidence violates the Election Code.

38 statute, knowingly make or authorize a ar-

assails this construction wholly partly from “deeply political expenditure that it the rooted” guing violates person rule of the ignorance or mistake law is contribution knows prosecution. Peca chap- a defense to con- been made in violation this have added). ter.”) allowing Legislature or mistake ignorance (emphasis tends of law as a defense would vitiate enforce- clearly require that the actor knew how ment of the Election Code’s fi- knowledge of the Election Code be- have provisions. nance a violation. Be- being charged fore did not include a Legislature cause statute, In our construing pri knowledge requirement similar Legisla mary give aim to effect 253.131, presume we to add that should not v. ture’s intent. Texas Water Comm’n ourselves.3 requirement Dist., Brushy Creek Mun. Util. 917 S.W.2d (Tex.1996). 19, 21 We endeavor to discern contends, a re adding As Peca such from Legislature’s intent the actual quirement hamper section 253.131’s would Energy it language Corp. used. Mitchell enforceability. purpose by undermining its (Tex. Ashworth, v. 943 S.W.2d Progressive v. Ragsdale Voters See 1997). object doing, so we consider (Tex.App. League, 790 S.W.2d attained, circumstances sur —Dallas)(“The remedy enforcement enactment, legisla rounding the statute’s promotes essence of the statute and statutory history, tive and common former compliance provisions with the law, consequences particular and the Code, cer especially proscribe those 311.023; § construction. Tex. Code Gov’t unlawful.”), being part tain acts as aff'd 438; Energy, Mitchell S.W.2d Un part grounds, rev’d on other Shelton, ion Ins. Bankers Co. (Tex.1990). Enforcement S.W.2d (Tex.1994). S.W.2d problematic future cases would be because 253.131(a), on whether the defendant of section would focus language provisions, specific code as of knew language well structure Code, operated whether the defendant under Legis the Election demonstrate legal interpretation. A defendant “knowingly” intent that refer correct lature’s simply by making a contri could avoid civil enforcement accepting to the act of laws. The refusing whether to learn the election expenditure bution or and not to expenditure resulting rule would do violence the contribution violated Legislature general proposition ignorance the Election Code. The made is not a defense. See clear other sections of Election Code law Tex. Pen.Code (“It 8.03(a) prosecution is no specifically require wanted to defense when provi ignorant the actor was being to know the law is violated. 253.003(b) (“A See, law the law has taken any sions of after e.g., Tex. Elec.Code *8 effect.”). neither the politi conclude that knowingly accept a We person not the Election Code’s language nor person cal the knows to have statute’s contribution Legisla an intent the chapter.”) structure reveals made in violation this been of 253.005(a) (“A proposition.4 added); § to from that person ture deviate (emphasis argues construction that this interpretation of The dissent 3. The dissent claims that our defense ignorance the law a for makes of Code pro- 253.131 and other Election candidates, parties. the private To but not for only that "produces the ironic result visions provides contrary, no ratio- our construction protected Judge are candidates like Peca from ignorance allowing for a candidate to use nale they liability are vio- civil when unaware that making illegal- liability law avoid for of the to Code, ordinary lating while citi- the Election Moreover, unreported expenditures. it is ly Osterberg Mrs. can be liable like Mr. and zens ours, province, to Legislature's the not within supplies (emphasis original).” dissent no The knowledge necessary degree of establish the authority support assertion. or for that bald to violate a statute. Instead, we hold that in section ciation clauses of the United States and 258.131, Constitutions,” “knowingly” applies only explained that Texas and “[tjhese whether a making “campaign is burden the exercise of restrictions “campaign narrowly are expenditure.” political speech contribution” construction, in- enough compelling Under this an into focused to serve inquiry whether there is that state.” In their evidence Robert terest of the motion Osterberg they Olga violating modify were and alternative motion judgment knew unnecessary, election is court Osterbergs again laws and the for new trial the raised of appeals making inquiry. issues, erred in stating “Chapter[s] that these that Robert, Code, respect With that error the and 254 of Texas Election appeals’ applied case, narrowly harmless because the court of tai- are overriding conclusion on the issue did not it to cause lored to serve state interest judgment against reverse Peca’s Robert. free therefore violation of the However, at speech 952 S.W.2d the court of and association clauses of the U.S. appeals when it post-ver- committed reversible error and Texas These Constitutions.” Olga time, Peca’s af judgment against reversed also alleged, dict motions the first ter no that finding evidence she knew she phrase “acting that the in concert with one remand, violating was the law. On the persons”5 unconstitutionally or more court appeals vague. should address Oster-

bergs’ argument pro alternative that Peca Osterbergs The asserted these constitu duced no evidence or insufficient evidence points tional defenses four of error on Olga knowingly made a direct cam appeal. appeals court ruled paign expenditure. Osterbergs their waived constitutional arguments they because asserted

Ill “broadly allegations, unsupported stated evidence,” argument which further OF PRESERVATION CONSTITU- spe “were insufficient to call the multiple TIONAL TO CHALLENGES challenges cific constitutional ... THE STATUTE trial attention of the court.” 952 S.W.2d Before considering constitutionality of appeals The court also held that statute, we first consider whether Osterbergs vague could not raise their Osterbergs waived their constitutional post- ness first challenges for the time in arguments. answer, In their amended verdict (citing motions. See id. McCraw v. Osterbergs argued that “allowance dam- Vickers, (Tex.App.— S.W.2d ages sought by Plaintiff ... would violate n.r.e.)). ref'd San Antonio writ speech freedom of and association Osterbergs argue appeals court clauses U.S. and Texas Constitu- in holding erred their waived tions.” their motion directed ver- First arguments. agree. Amendment We dict, “[i]m- reiterated that posing party restrictions has deciding When expenditure requirements of specific po- waived its federal constitutional claims committee, court, litical along accompa- proce state we look first Texas’s nying penalties, your govern Defendants would rules that a party dural when must be a speech violation of the free and asso- raise those claims.6 If we conclude *9 provision 5. The relevant of the Texas Election dates or Tex measures...." Elec.Code added). 253.062(a) § (emphasis actually "Except Code states: as otherwise law, provided by acting an individual in Tex.R.App. ("As 33.1(a) prerequisite 6. See P. a person may concert another make one or presenting complaint appellate to a re for campaign expenditures more direct in an view, the record must show that ... the com property election from the individual's own plaint by timely to the court was made trial a $100 any that exceed on one candi- or more motion...."); Dreyer request, objection, or v. 40 rules, objection lodged be in the trial specific under those we has occurred

waiver procedural the court has then consider whether those court is to ensure that trial issue.”). as matter sub- to on the adequate opportunity a of the rule grounds pro- law to stantive federal constitutional In and their answer their motion the interests at stake. tect constitutional verdict, identi Osterbergs for the directed Comm’n, See, v. Tax e.g., Lawrence State issue and rights fied the constitutional at 276, 282, 556, L.Ed. 52 76 286 U.S. S.Ct. that, statutory ap when provisions the (1932) (“Even the though claimed 1102 plied, Although violate them. allegedly protection denied on non- constitutional pleading in the and motion the statements this province it is the of grounds, federal specificity, were not nev paragons to the inquire whether decision Court for the court the ertheless identified trial upon fair sub- court rests a the state the provided on and trial issue to be ruled basis.”). stantial to rule. We hold opportunity court the rules, we procedural Texas Applying Osterbergs not waive their the did Osterbergs whether the raised consider applica First Amendment defenses speech and association their federal free protect tion of for Concern specificity arguments with sufficient rights supports ing First Amendment also rule give opportunity the trial court an holding. speech is this When freedom of Tex.R.App. 52(a) P. on issues. See issue, Supreme will find waiv Court (Tex. Sup.Ct. Tex.Crim.App.1986, and that are “clear er circumstances 1988, 1989, 1990, superseded amended Publ’g Co. v. compelling.” and Curtis 1997) (“In preserve complaint a order to 130, 1975, Butts, 145, 87 18 388 U.S. S.Ct. review, have appellate party a must does not L.Ed.2d 1094 This case re timely to the trial court a presented provide compelling” “clear and circum motion, stating spe quest, objection that the Oster- justify finding stances to he grounds ruling cific desired arguments are bergs’ First Amendment specific grounds to make if were court waived. context.”);7 apparent from the we extent to Although v. Fire Ins. decide the McKinney National Union (Tex.1989); Co., 72, pro Constitution see also which the United States S.W.2d Shaw, 174, conduct, do not Osterbergs’ tects the we In the Interest 966 S.W.2d 1998, the Texas pet.) Paso the extent to which (Tex.App. no consider - El (“The provides independent basis that a purpose requirement Constitution an Greene, 697, (Tex.1993) ("As proce law own substantive defines its 871 S.W.2d federal claim, rule, including dramatically, a constitu a [federal] liti dural matrix.... More claim, in the tional must have been asserted gant’s comply procedures failure with state appeal."). trial court in order to be raised against cause state court rule Paullin, generally v. See John litigant reaching ever the merits of without (1913) 58 L.Ed. 381 claim.”); litigant’s federal 16B Charles A. ("Without any State doubt it rests with each Edward H. Wright, Cooper, Miller, R. Arthur appellate its prescribe jurisdiction and Procedure: Jurisdiction Federal Practice courts, invoking mode and time of 1996) ("The (2d accepted ed. 4022 at 343 practice to be jurisdiction, the rules state court establishes inde rule is exercise; law and applied in its state ground, barring pendent adequate state practice regard applicable are no less review, by refusing to consid controversy rights are in than when Federal presented by question was er a federal questions entirely on when case turns comply with established means that do not law.”), general quoted local or Wolfe procedures.”). and reasonable state Carolina, 177, 195, North (1960); Tribe, L.Ed.2d 1650 American 52(a) as Rule Rule was rewritten (2d ed. 3-24 at 166 Law Constitutional ap- filed their ("Of 33.1. Because the 1988) de necessity, procedural state law 52(a) preser- peal governs their ques Rule in which federal termines manner court, presented in unless vation. tion is to be state

41 protection Osterbergs complied because the fur- statutes with the First Amend argument nished authority only ment, and under holdings apply equally its to our Though the United States Constitution. inquiry into whether this state statute that the “noting” Texas Constitution complies with the First Amendment as provide speech protections, broader free incorporated through the Fourteenth Osterbergs stated in their brief that Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See judgment “[b]ecause here is unconsti- Marshall, (6th 523, Suster v. 149 F.3d 529 Constitution, tutional under the U.S. is Cir.1998) (“Review constitutionality necessary indepen- determine the spending limits in Buckley was not ground dent of whether it is unconstitu- upon reasoning based the line of that such tional under the Texas Constitution.” The apply only limitations should to federal Osterbergs provide thus no rationale to — denied, political campaigns.”), cert. support a conclusion based on the Texas U.S. -, 890, 119 S.Ct. 142 L.Ed.2d 788 that Constitution differs from what (1999); Cincinnati, Kruse v. City Federal Constitution allows. con- We thus (6th 907, Cir.) F.3d no (finding support only sider the Osterbergs’ First Amend- for the that contention states have more ment arguments. See In re Bay Area latitude than government the federal Against Abuse, Citizens Lawsuit 982 regulating expres the First Amendment (Tex.1998) S.W.2d n. 4 (declining — citizens), denied, sion of its cert. to consider whether the Texas Constitution -, L.Ed.2d 424 provides independent an protec- basis for tion); Tilton v. Moye, 869 S.W.2d (Tex.1994) (same). 2n. In Buckley, the Supreme United States explained Court that expenditure limita-

IV “operate in tions an area of the fun- most damental First Amendment activities. DOES CHAPTER 253 ACT TO PRO- public Discussion of issues and debate on HIBIT INDEPENDENT EXPENDI- qualifications of candidates integral TURES, OR DOES IT REASON- operation to the system govern- REQUIRE ABLY DISCLOSURE ment established our Constitution.” OF THOSE EXPENDITURES? Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96 S.Ct. 612. challenge the constitu- rationale, Following tionality of applying Chapter 253’s stric- ceilings has struck down bans or on tures to their “core First ac- Amendment independent campaign expenditures be- tivity.” They assert that cause erects an prohibition unconstitutional expenditures, direct and that the statute’s significantly impair ability of individ- constitutionality excep- is not saved its groups engage po- uals and in direct tion allowing an individual to make direct litical advocacy “represent substan- expenditures if that individual files the re- tial quantity ... restraints on the quired reports. responds Chap- Peca diversity speech.” And at comports ter 253 with the Constitution in time, the same the Court has concluded imposing requirement that an individual independent expendi- limitations on making a expenditure report direct directly pre- tures are less related to expenditure. agree We with Peca. venting corruption, since “[t]he absence Valeo, of prearrangement

The landmark case and coordination of Buckley v. expenditure with the ... 46 L.Ed.2d 659 candidate (1976), followed, provide only cases that undermines the value of the candidate, principles govern expenditure our constitutional but also analysis. Although Buckley danger addressed alleviates the whether federal given quid pro finance will be as a quo

42 system public to from the candi- es of election view.”

improper [the] commitments 82, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96 S.Ct. 612. date.” Republican Campaign Fed. Colorado However, 424 Buckley, in U.S. at Comm’n, v. Federal Election 518 Comm. 74, 612, McIntyre 96 S.Ct. Ohio 2309, 604, 615, 135 L.Ed.2d U.S. 116 S.Ct. Commission, 334, 514 356 Elections U.S. (1996) (citations omitted). 795 Conse- 21, 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 n. 115 S.Ct. Chapter if 253 is construed as quently, (1995), the noted that while the fed Court - ceiling indepen- on banning placing requirements may be consti reporting eral expenditures, dent it will survive face, they may on their not be tutional scrutiny that the First Amend- heightened applied as disclosure could constitutional 618, id. at 116 S.Ct. requires. ment See threats, reasonably subject spender the- (striking a state ban on inde- down harassment, reprisals government from pendent expenditures by political parties). has private parties. Court officials of contrast to its treatment expendi distinguished independent also independent expenditures, banning laws requirements applied to reporting ture that, Buckley facially, held at least lobbyists from re candidate elections or requirements for inde reporting federal applied to ballot porting requirements in candi pendent expenditures over $100 at n. McIntyre, 514 U.S. 356 & measures. relationship date elections bore a sufficient 20, 115 1511. But Citizens S.Ct. cf. governmental to a substantial interest. City Berkeley, Against Rent Control v. 612. The Buckley, S.Ct. 299-300, 102 S.Ct. 454 U.S. pre in addition to explained (1981) dicta, in (stating in L.Ed.2d 492 require venting corruption, measure, that “[t]he context of a ballot publicity “shed the light ments system will be integrity unambiguously campaign that is spending protected if contributors are adequately report related but would not otherwise revealing the public filing identified in a indepen form of ed because takes the wise, contributed; thought if it is amounts expenditures,” and disclosure ad dent anonymous contribu can outlaw legislation strong “informational interest” vances tions”). Thus, operates if" more, “helps because it voters define requirements on impose reporting Id. at the candidates’ constituencies.” $100, ap independent expenditures over as 612; Grosjean see v. American 96 S.Ct. no in which plied to a candidate election Co., 233, 250, Press 297 U.S. has been dem reprisals fear reasonable (1936) that an (observing L.Ed. 660 onstrated, comport with the con it should potent public opinion “informed the most in Buck- guidelines stitutional established upon misgovernment”); of all restraints leyaxidMcIntyre. Law Buckley v. American Constitutional Found., Inc., 182, 119 mind, principles these we With J„ (1999) (O’Connor, 657, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 whether, applied Oster- consider part) part dissenting concurring sections Election Code bergs, Texas (“Total recognized as disclosure has been on inde act as a ban 253.002 and 253.062 to effective cam the essential cornerstone expenditures or instead pendent impose reform, and finance fundamental paign 253.002, reporting requirement. Section (internal political.system.”) quotations independent expenditure which calls omitted). requirement A and citations provides: campaign expenditure,” “direct and use spender report the amount (a) knowingly make A spent in candidate elections money direct ex- or authorize a minimally restric “a thus reasonable penditure. furthering First Amend tive method (b) apply to: does not process- This section by opening the basic ment values *12 (1) treasurer, expen- or making campaign an individual an candidate section Subchapter pro- construed Subchapter

diture 253.002 with C by authorized following vides the rule: unlimited direct C; as as expenditures long allowed the (2) corporation organization labor reports spender expenditures exceed expenditure an authorized making in an election and one reimburses no $100 D; by Subchapter the spender. See Tex. Elec.Code (§) a making authorizing candidate 253.061, Though §§ complexly 253.062. expenditure an for the candidate’s structured, phrased and the Election Code election; own unambiguous has an effect: an intended (4) committee; political expenditures report individual must direct (5) a campaign treasurer or assistant unreported total over or the $100 campaign acting treasurer an expenditures illegal spend- become and the official capacity. penalties; er civil and criminal may face reports spender expenditures, the the he 253.002(a),(b) (emphasis § Tex. Elec.Code added). penalties. or she faces no As Peca argues, C, Subchapter pro- Under which provisions operate impose these a re- vides for requirements expenditures direct requirement porting campaign on direct individuals, by section 253.062states: expenditures, rather than ban or ceiling (a) Except by otherwise provided expenditures. on those law, an acting individual not in con- cert with another interpreted make Under section 253.062 as Commission, expen- one or more direct the Texas Ethics campaign individu- al cannot receive ditures in an election indi- reimbursement direct from the expenditures, the campaign and individual property vidual’s own exceed report expenditures totaling must over any on one or $100 more candidates a campaign as if individual were $100 or measures if: political of a specific-purpose treasurer (1) complies Chap- the individual with committee. See 1 Tex. Admin. Code ter as if 254[8] the individual were § Chapter 22.5. Election Code 254 and a campaign treasurer of a Chapter subchapter E the Ethics committee; and require- Commission’s rules establish the (2) the individual receives reim- no reports. ments these In this contested expenditures. bursement for the election, judicial Osterbergs9 were re- 253.062(a). § Tex. Elec.Code quired report listing to file a their direct phrase ap- initial section 253.002 expenditures campaign eighth day pears complete abe ban on cam- direct primary before the See Tex. election. (b) paign expenditures. But subsection 254.124; § 1 Tex. Admin. Code Elec.Code clarifies that prohibition section 253.002’s § Because the race was for the 20.325.10 apply does not long spender District, so as the composed only 171st Judicial follows If separate requirements. other County,11 Osterbergs El Paso were spender is an individual who not a to file El required Paso requires reporting 8. day of contribu- of the fortieth tures as before election. provides reporting tions and and 254.124(b). § Election Code Tex. Elec.Code schedules. requires specific-purpose 254.123 also political committees to file semiannual re- sake, simplicity’s For we refer to "the Oster- ports July January 15 and 15. Whether However, bergs.'’ Olga required was to meet Osterbergs required were to file these reporting requirements Election Code's not, reports we and semiannual need thus do knowingly expenditure. if she made an not, decide. required were not to file a report thirty days before the election because 24.266(a). Gov't Code Tex. expendi- had made no direct Because a candidate election the ulti-

County Clerk. See Tex. Elec.Code 252.005(2), 252.006, 254.130; §§ Ad- Tex. requirements burden of these mate is sub- The report 20.5. must be min. Code stantially similar to that of federal sworn,12 placed on the Ethics Commission- requirements,20 they fall into the (1) form,13 prescribed include: must genus requirements Buckleywphélá name, address, telephone number minimally as “a reasonable and restrictive (2) spender;14 type date *13 furthering of method First Amendment filed;15 (3) report election for which the by opening processes the values basic expendi- campaign the amount of direct system public election view.” [the] during tures that in exceed aggregate $50 424 Buckley, at 96 S.Ct. 612. We (4) period;16 the full reporting the name that reporting therefore conclude the re- persons and address the to whom those placed that 253 on the quirements (5) made;17. the dates not their First Osterbergs did violate purposes expenditures;18 and of the and Amendment rights. (6) sought by name of and office the each benefitting candidate or officeholder from expenditure.19 each campaign direct V giye required were also no- in The dissent that argues “knowingly” tice campaign expen- to Biel their direct 253.131(a) modify must than section more supported him. ditures See Tex. Elec. expenditure a making the act of 254.128(a), (b); § Op. Tex. Ethics Code “spending money because on core First generally No. Comm’n 331 See Campaign cannot, itself, in Comm’n, speech Amendment and of Ethics Finance

Texas (1997). be must be against the law —there some- Guide FOR Political Committees Act, 254.036(b); Campaign § 1 Tex. Under Federal Election 20. 12. Tex. Elec.Code Admin. 20.331(24). § person, every than a other commit- Code tee, making independent expenditures exceed- 254.036(a); § 13. Tex. Elec.Code Tex. Admin. ing year year, $250 in an a must: In election Today, Osterbergs may § 20.19. Code report pre-election later twelve file a no than reports have to file Ethics their on Commis- election, any post-general days before file a JSPAC, because the Judicial Cam- sion Form report thirty days no later than after election However, paign apply. Fairness Act would election, general quar- and file additional occurred before the Act election issue 1995, (c). 434(a)(2), § terly reports. 2 U.S.C. See passed apply was in so does not in year, person must file bi- In non-election this case. addition, reports. any id. in- annual See In 254.121(2); § 1 Tex. dependent greater $1000 expenditure than Tex. Elec.Code Admin. 20.331(3), (4), (5). § day any made after the twentieth before Code reported Secretary election must be 254.121(3); § 1 Tex. Tex. Elec.Code Admin. and the the Federal Election Commission 20.331(6). § Code Secretary of 24 hours when State within expenditure is made. See U.S.C. 254.031(a)(3); § 1 Tex. Ad- Tex. Elec.Code 434(c)(2). reports § include: must 22.331(22)(E). Although § indi- Code min. any persons who receive disburse- name report they expenditures if vidual must exceed during period aggre- in an ment reporting period, requirement is $50 in a gate $200 amount within calendar over triggered spent not has until individual amount, date, purpose year; aggregate in $100 over the candidate. Tex. 253.062(a). expen- expenditure; § a statement whether Elec.Code support opposition diture is candidate; or 254.031(a)(3); § 17. Tex. Elec.Code Ad- Tex. sought the name of office 20.331(18). § Code min. candidate; and a certification whether coopera- independent expenditure is made 254.031(a)(3); § 18. Tex. Elec.Code Ad- Tex. with, tion, consultation, at the concert 20.331(18). min. Code# of, any suggestion candidate or request or agent. 254.031(a)(7); See 2 U.S.C. candidate’s committee 19. Tex. Elec.Code Ad- Tex. (c)(2). 20.331(19). 434(b)(6)(B)(iii), min. Code# thing Analogizing they more.” bergs United States knew of the statute were violat- Video, Inc., 253.151(a) such, v. X-Citement 73- ing. As section not does 74, 78, punish L.Ed.2d 372 activity; innocent First Amendment (1994), the dissent states the “some- punishes only the statute those who do not thing required by more” the Constitution engaged have other- “happens to expendi- be the fact that the activity. wise innocent First Amendment had reported.” ture to be 253.131(a) The X-Cite- words, other does not, however, ment decision does support Osterbergs’ violate the First Amendment the dissent’s or the Osterbergs’ argument. pre- because the does rights statute proposition X-Citement stands for the making campaign expen- vent them from must be of engaging aware merely requires diture. The statute certain violating conduct—not aware of they report expenditures, their campaign particular being punished statute —before and, reiterate, reporting requirements for conduct that pro- would otherwise be *14 clearly are Buckley constitutional. See by tected the First Amendment. For ex- Valeo, 1, 84, 424 96 U.S. S.Ct. 46 ample, the in defendants X-Citement could (1976). L.Ed.2d 659 While the statute not prosecuted simply have been trans- may unpalatable, be it is not unconstitu- porting materials, pornographic the sub- tional and should not judicially rewrit- jects adults, of which were all across state by ten as suggested dissent. lines, activity protected because that Another flaw in Osterbergs’ and the under the First Amendment. age “[T]he analysis applies dissent’s is that it a myop- performers pornographic [in the ic view of the First Amendment at interest materials] is the crucial element separat- in stake this case. true that the While is ing legal wrongful innocence from con- Osterbergs have a First right Amendment X-Citement, duct.” at U.S. engage political speech, in it is also true Thus, S.Ct. 464. under the statute that that a requiring promotes law disclosure case, something more than knowing that the ends of the First Amendment. As was transporting one pornographic materi- noted, previously public “[d]iscussion of is- als across state lines proved had to be qualifications sues debate on the order protected for otherwise speech to be integral candidates are operation punished, namely pornographic system government by established materials contained minor children. Constitution,” our Buckley, short, the X-Citement Court held that the disclosure advances defendant had to knowledge have that the strong “informational interest” because it pornographic subjects minors, were “helps voters to define more of the candi- transporting pornography child was dates’ constituencies.” Id. at against the law. Applying the dissent’s 612. The interpretation ap- dissent’s and the Osterbergs’ reasoning, the X-Cite- 253.131(a) plication of likely section would ment defendants would also have to know expenditures result in less like that transporting child pornography violat- made the Osterbergs, thus shield- ed the law. ing vital information about the elective application The correct of X-Cite process public. from the requires only ment the Osterbergs were aware that they made a direct cam VI paign expenditure. Although the statute MUST A AND FILE HUSBAND WIFE so, say does not argument could be A AS POLITICAL COMMITTEE that, made in order for the statute to be BEFORE MAKING DIRECT CAM- constitutional, upheld as the Osterbergs PAIGN “IN EXPENDITURES also had to know that they did not CONCERT”? expenditures. Osterbergs were aware of all of these facts. The statute Election Code section 253.062 al however, require, does not that the Oster- lows individuals campaign to make direct the individual need not form a expenditures save two: expenditures long as those campaign file a treasurer lawfully reported and unreimbursed. committee nor are 253.062; However, § 253.062’sauthorization is appointment. Tex. Elec.Code (c). 22.5(b)(2), acting § in con- limited to “an individual How- 1 Tex. Admin. Code person.” another ever, cert with in concert with if an individual acts Tex. Elec. 253.062(a) added). (emphasis another, politi- must form a the individuals Code limitation contend that committee, appoint treasur- cal “clearly association clause of violates the er, ap- with the appointment and file They Amendment.” cite Citi- the First making direct propriate authority before City Against Rent Control v. zens campaign expenditures that exceed $500. 290, 296, 102 S.Ct. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 252.001,253.002(b), §§ See Tex. Elec.Code (1981), in which the Court 70 L.Ed.2d 22.1; 253.031(b); Tex. Admin. Code stated: Ethics No. 331 Op. Tex. Comm’n are, course, activities, There some to whether the The issue thus boils down one, if yet illegal if legal engaged are uncon- Osterbergs’ rights associational others, performed concert but required stitutionally burdened of them. political expression is not one and file a to form a committee Spartan any limit—or indeed place To they make appointment treasurer before wishing to band to- limit—on individuals in concert. direct *15 views on a ballot gether to advance their measure, placing none on individu- while In Roberts v. United States alone, clearly a restraint on acting als 617-23, 609, 104 S.Ct. Jaycees, 468 U.S. right of association. (1984), 3244, 462 82 L.Ed.2d Though Osterbergs mistakenly refer to of two “distinct senses” Court described clause” in the First an “association freedom of asso constitutionally protected Amendment, they it seek to assert is clear 617, 104 In one S.Ct. 3244. ciation. Id. at associate, which is right freely their to decisions, recognized has line of the Court Amendment’s instrumental to the First petition guar- speech, assembly, free and have personal bonds certain kinds antees. hold that because We culture and role in the played a critical Osterbergs’ lawfully re- 253.062 allows the by cultivating traditions of the Nation expenditures only ported campaign direct be- ideals and transmitting shared wife, husband and are “not they,

when liefs; diversity they thereby foster another, one acting in concert with” the indi- buffers between act as critical their unconstitutionally infringes upon power vidual State. freely associate. right to (citations 618-19, 3244 at 104 S.Ct. imposing requirements Karst, The Free omitted); generally see ex- campaign who make direct individuals Association, Yale L.J. 89 dom Intimate dis- Election Code 253 penditures, (1980). personal affil protected 624 These who tinguishes between those individuals Roberts, 468 marriage. iations include See act in concert with act alone and those who 3244; 619, v. 104 S.Ct. Zablocki U.S. at alone, that If an acts others. individual 383-86, 374, Redhail, 98 S.Ct. 434 U.S. campaign report direct individual need not (1978); v. 673, Griswold 54 L.Ed.2d 618 to or less. expenditures that amount $100 486, Connecticut, 479, 85 S.Ct. U.S. 381 253.061; 1 Tex. Admin. Tex. Elec.Code 1678, The Consti 14 510 L.Ed.2d 22.5(b)(1). acting If an individual Code affiliations for protects these intrin tution campaign expenditures alone makes direct reasons, fundamental element “as a sic $100, comply the individual must exceeding Roberts, 468 U.S. personal liberty.” reporting requirements applicable with all 618, 104 committee, S.Ct. 3244. political specific-purpose for a

47 decisions, ex they agreed, and whether the In a whether second line of sep penditure community from derived recognized has to asso right “the Court provision The in-concert thus arate funds. purpose those engaging ciate for be places squarely on a nexus a burden protected by Amend activities the First Osterbergs’ intrinsic and instru tween the ment,” freedom “[a]n because individual’s rights. This burden mental associational speak, worship, petition to and to if it drawn justified only narrowly can be grievances the redress of government See overriding interest. advance from vigorously protected could not be 25, 424 U.S. at 96 Buckley, S.Ct. a correla interference the State unless effort engage group tive freedom Generally, require disclosure guaran those toward ends were also independent expenditures ments for 618, 622, Id. at teed.” 104 S.Ct. sig may advance two candidate elections This of association is a consti right “basic First, nificant state interests. that, speech, tutional freedom” “like free provide electorate with information “‘the society.” lies at foundation of a free money as to where ” “ Valeo, 25, 1, v. 424 96 Buckley S.Ct. U.S. from,’ alerting thus ‘to comes the voter (1976) 612, 659 (quoting 46 L.Ed.2d Kus to which a most the interests candidate is Pontikes, 57, 414 94 S.Ct. per v. U.S. responsive facili likely to be and thus (1973), L.Ed.2d v. 38 260 and Shelton performance of future tating] predictions Tucker, S.Ct. McIntyre in office.’” Ohio Elections (1960)). upon Infringement L.Ed.2d 334, 354, Comm’n, type of freedom type to associate—the (1995) Buckley, (quoting 131 L.Ed.2d protecting is instrumental First 66-67, 612). Second, U.S. at subject Amendment freedoms—is “[disclosure lessens scrutiny. closest The State must demon money to spend risk that individuals will overriding a compelling strate interest support as a quid pro quo a candidate *16 employ! ] “and drawn to closely means in special after is treatment the candidate unnecessary avoid Buck abridgement.” Thus, at 115 S.Ct. 1511. office.” Id. 612; ley, 424 U.S. see also intended to deter actual cor disclosure is Roberts, 468 U.S. at help ruption appearance and avoid the corruption. implicates types

This case both of asso interests. Applied ciational to the Oster Conceivably, both ad- interests could be Chapter bergs, imposes Chapter require- by general the burdens vanced 253’s political a forming filing group a ment in to acting committee and that a concert expenditures register campaign they political treasurer de make as a designation if merely allowing instead of its cide act in concert committee express to to their report expenditures to individu- members political upon views. These fall burdens seem ally. support may A candidate’s Osterbergs’ expression, trig and report only individually, if spenders broad gered to Osterbergs’ exer decision report those requiring while individuals to First cise their Amendment associational action a group their concerted as Chapter to opens interest. 253 also state expose reality that in more an influence decisions scrutiny communications and concentrated. Indeed, marriage in a relationship. made in husband and concert whether wife acted Chap- may justify While these interests ques jury was a contested fact issue and a in other ter in-concert distinction 253’s Chapter this applied, cases,21 tion in case. As justify cannot they requiring provision importance wife, gives 253’s in-concert form a as husband and to Osterbergs, inquiries and trea- political designate to such as whether husband a committee polit- spend to in expenditure, conferred about an surer in order concert on wife today. need that issue 21. We not and do not decide 253.131, an candi- speech. any opposing

ical Because the value of which allows in information case gained additional this prohibitions date 253’s Chapter to enforce to negligible, justify would be it fails private a action. The through civil Oster- Osterbergs’ concomitant burden on the argue that 253.131 is uncon- bergs rights accompa- First Amendment only op- it furthers an stitutional because Al- nying relationship. intrusion into their interests,” “self-serving posing candidate’s though marriage is “an association that being narrowly to instead of tailored serve causes; life, promotes way a not a har- compelling They interest. assert state faiths,”22 mony not living, political in “opposing the interest candi- surprising would not be to learn that date” be- is not same as state’s spouses in have some manner acted candidate an inter- opposing cause has concert campaign when made direct revenge est financial Peca only gain. or Their expenditures. registration and re- responds purpose private porting as a committee with treasurer revenge pro- civil action is not to allow or supply help would new information to compensation encourage vide en- but public nature of candi- evaluate the forcement, and provides that the statute support. requiring date’s Nor would pri- or disincentive for frivolous malicious spouses register as attorney’s to a by awarding vate suits fees possibil- new on the light committees shine prevailing defendant. quid ity pro quo arrangements. Nei- corruption appearance ther nor the of cor- provides: 253.131 Section ruption any would be more than deterred (a) knowingly makes or A who by simply allowing spouses report as accepts campaign contribution case, Chapter In this in- individuals. 253’s expenditure in makes a vi- concert requirement does further chapter olation of is liable this justify state disclosure re- interests this section. damages provided quirements. hold that the We therefore requirements additional (b) expenditure is If the contribution act in places upon individuals who concert candidate, support op- each of a constitutionally applied cannot Rob- ap- posing whose name candidate remand, and Olga Osterberg.23 ert On ballot pears entitled Olga “acting held cannot be hable under section. damages recover Rather, concert” with Robert. she can (c) expenditure is If the contribution appeals be held liable the court *17 candidate, can- knowing- opposition finds sufficient evidence that she in to a ly campaign made direct damages to recover didate entitled reporting them. without under this section. (d) section, “damages” In this means:

VII (1) unlawful value of the twice the DOES THE PRIVATE CIVIL REME- expenditure; and contribution DY THE VIOLATE OSTER- (2) in- attorney’s fees reasonable FREE AND. BERGS’ SPEECH AS- in curred the suit. SOCIATION RIGHTS? (e) incurred attorney’s fees Reasonable also Osterbergs challenge The be awarded to Code in the suit constitutionality Election section Griswold, 486, acting wife in con- 381 U.S. at 85 S.Ct. 1678. other than a husband and addition, we that Sec- hold cert. In because holding We note our section violates limitation tion 253.062’s in-concert provision 253.062's in-concert is unconstitu- Osterbergs’ rights, we First Amendment of the husband tional is limited context pro- argument that the need not address their relationship. express opinion no and We wife vague. unconstitutionally vision is provision as to is or not con- whether applies persons to the extent it stitutional is coeval statutory requirements in of its judgment defendant if is rendered the defendant’s favor. and the mode in government; enforced, whether at they which shall 253.131. Tex. Elec.Code private party, or at the suit the suit of disagree Osterbergs’ with the We disposition and shall public, what 253.131 does not contention section collected, are of the amounts be made advance a sufficient state interest. When legislative discretion. merely matters of fi campaign an individual breaks Texas’s added). recently, (emphasis More Justice laws, a candidate nance this section allows teaches us explained, “Humes O’Connor by seeking to enforce those laws civil dam recipient of a mon identity that the penalty. agree as a with the ages We purposes irrelevant for etary penalty is Appeals, recognized Fifth Court of which validity of determining the constitutional to “deter designed that section 253.131 is Indus. v. penalty.” Browning-Ferris and encourage violators enforcement Inc., 299, 109 directly participat Disposal, and others Kelco candidates (1989) (O’Con- L.Ed.2d 219 ing process, placing in the rather than the S.Ct. nor, J., govern concurring part dissenting entire enforcement burden on the Ragsdale Progressive part). Regardless ment.” v. Voters of Peca’s motivations action, League, (Tex.App.— 790 S.W.2d private 84-85 cause of bringing Dallas) (construing earlier version as with all of the statute’s other enforce 253.131), part mechanisms, and rev’d in ultimately ment is the affd part grounds, on other 801 S.W.2d 881 court, opposing party, not an who decides (Tex.1990). Because state resources for Osterbergs unlawfully whether acted policing necessarily election laws are limit subject liability. and thus could be Cf. ed, in many likely cases section 253.131 is F.Supp. 676-77 Tompkins Cyr, v. provide only (N.D.Tex.1998) viable means of enforc (deciding whether ing reporting requirements. Preventing jury’s plaintiffs verdict —rather than the important neutral). evasion fi of these content motive—was provisions legitimate nance is a and sub Osterbergs bring a First do Buckley stantial state interest. v. Va Cf. severity challenge Amendment leo, 1, 66-68, 76, damages provides; section 253.131 (1976) L.Ed.2d (preventing evasion of challenge deci- Legislature’s valid contribution limits is a substantial regarding sion who can seek and receive interest). governmental damages.24 have not dem- Furthermore, person enforcing that the allowing private party onstrated how the law receiving damages can be a help enforce the statute adds new and private party rather than the State does free-speech inde- significant constraints not mean that section 253.131 adds addi- pendent already imposed by of those tional restrictions on First Amendment reporting requirements, statute’s which we rights. Railway Missouri Moreover, have held are constitutional. Pacific *18 Humes, 512, 522-23, 110, pri- no that the they submitted evidence (1885), 463 29 L.Ed. the United States provision had chill- any vate enforcement Supreme Court stated that First ing effect on the exercise of their objection rights. Osterbergs’

it is not a valid that the suffer- Amendment The chal- lenge to section 253.131 thus misses the [dam- er instead the State receives power Thornburgh, v. 713 ages] .... The of the State to mark. Alexander Cf. (D.Minn.) (because 1278, impose penalties F.Supp. 1290 fines and for a violation we need the issue in that amounts to an unconstitutional in- Because not address case, open we rights leave the issue of whether fringement of under the First Amend- punishment can violations rise ment. being to the level of so severe and so extreme 50 77,

constitutionality underlying Id. at 96 612. The Court worried obsceni- S.Ct. established, “the de- ty phrase potential statute had been that the had the to en- prosecution assertion that under fendant’s compass general discussion issues unconstitutionally protected RICO chilled advocacy particular politi- of a addition to speech (discussing was unfounded” United 79, If cal result. Id. at 96 S.Ct. 612. 1504, Pryba, F.Supp. States v. 674 1512 issues, only communication discusses (E.D.Va.1987)), dism’d, appeal 881 F.2d groups is funded individuals or are (8th Cir.1989). 1081 committees,” “not candidates or the Court was concerned the “relation

VIII sought purposes of the information to the 80, of the Act be too remote.” Id. at DEFINITION OF “CAMPAIGN 96 S.Ct. 612. To insure that the federal EXPENDITURE” reporting requirements’ scope was not un- Osterbergs argue jury constitutionally vague, or broad Su- charge should have made clear that preme expenditure by Court construed money spent for advertisements that “ex- purpose “for of influenc- an individual pressly the election or defeat of advocate” ing” a candidate nomination or election to expen- a “campaign candidate constitutes include for communica- “only funds used They argue diture.” also their adver- expressly tions that advocate the election express advocacy tisement was not clearly or defeat of a identified candidate.” unreported payments thus their were not (footnote omitted). Responding to simi- expenditures.” “campaign The court of concerns, construed an- Buckley lar also appeals Osterbergs held that waived provision other that used the words “rela- failing object arguments by prop- these express “in tive to” a candidate to mean erly jury charge. S.W.2d or defeat of’ terms advocate the election need not consider whether the We 44, candidate. Id. at S.Ct. jury charge was correct whether properly objected to the of state courts Buckley, Since a number charge we conclude a matter of because statutory narrowly construed their have Osterbergs’ law that advertisement campaign expenditures definitions express advocacy. was vagueness or contributions to avoid the problems Buckley identi- overbreadth

A Proto, See, e.g., v. 203 Conn. fied. State (1987); 1297, Doe v. 526 A.2d 1310-11 IS EXPRESS ADVOCACY (Fla.1998); Mortham, 929, 933 708 So.2d REQUIRED? Keisling, Crumpton ex rel. State Osterbergs argue that under 3, 9, (1999); Or.App. 982 P.2d Vir- Buckley, require the Election Code cannot Inc. v. Life, Human Cald- ginia Soc’yfor reported to be unless well, 817-18 500 S.E.2d 256 Va. expressly for “communications that ad (1998); Brownsburg Area Patrons see also clearly vocate the election or defeat of Baldwin, 137 F.3d Change v. Affecting Valeo, Buckley v. identified candidate.” Cir.1998) (7th (certifying 1, 80, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 Indiana’s definition question of whether Buckley, the United Su States is limited to “political action committee” preme narrowed the definition expen- groups that make contributions “expenditures” that the federal election *19 “in ex- that ditures for communications reported. to federal required laws be election or defeat press terms advocate the “expenditure” defined as the use of statute candidate for office clearly of a identified other valuable assets “for the money or public ques- or defeat of a victory purpose influencing” of ... the nomination tion”). or election of candidates for federal office.

51 “expressly an advocate” Applied making expendi individual communication 248-49, tures, the election of candidates. the Texas Election vulnera Code is 612; see also Federal Election ble to the same constitutional attacks that Women, Org. Comm’n v. National 713 Buckley’s narrowing construction avoided. for (D.D.C.1989) (“From 428, F.Supp. 433 above, As described were MCFL, Buckley through it is clear that required campaign expen “direct ‘in an the standard connection with elec- ditures.” The Election Code states that ‘express tion’ is not distinct from advoca- campaign expenditures” “direct are “cam cy.’”). paign expenditures” that not “cam paign contributions.” Tex. Elec.Code Relying on Massachusetts Citi 251.001(8). The Election Code defines a Life, zens the Texas Ethics Commis for “campaign expenditure” expendi as “an interpreted sion has the Election Code’s by ture made any person connection “campaign expenditure” definition of to be campaign with a for elective office or on expenditures limited to for a communica “ 251.001(7). measure.” Tex. Elec.Code ‘expressly tion that advocates’ the defeat provision’s language Like the federal candidate, or election of an identified construed, Buckley phrase, “in connec by that term has been used the United office,” tion with campaign for elective Supreme Op. States Court.” Tex. Ethics vague.25 It necessarily has different Comm’n No. 198 The Ethics Com meanings depend on whether the mission enforces the Election Code’s ex spender candidate, is a commit penditure reporting requirements. See tee, anor individual. problematical, 253.134, More §§ A 254.042. Tex. Elec.Code it could be read to include general issue reasonable construction of a statute advocacy general or the agency charged discussion of can administrative with its en individual, regard didates. With an forcement is entitled great weight. Comm’n, relation of this State v. Public Util. purposes information to the 883 S.W.2d 190, (Tex.1994); Meno, 196 Dodd v. 870 “may of the Act too Buckley, remote.” (Tex.1994). S.W.2d U.S. at 96 S.Ct. 612. Consistent with United States However, should, possible, we precedent, Court the Ethics Commission’s interpret statutes in a manner to avoid interpretation, reasonable and the rule constitutional infirmities. In re Area Bay are to statutes be construed to avoid Abuse, Against Citizens Lawsuit infirmities, constitutional we hold that a (Tex.1998). S.W.2d And the campaign expenditure” by “direct an indi- phrase “in connection with a only vidual a candidate election includes compel imper- elective office” does not an expenditures “expressly those advo- missibly broad construction. In Federal cate” the or defeat election identified Election Commission v. Massachusetts candidate. therefore We consider whether Inc., Life, Citizens Osterbergs’ “expressly advertisement (1986), S.Ct. 93 L.Ed.2d 539 the Su advocated” Biel’s election or Peca’s defeat. preme narrowly construed similar provision language in a of the Federal B Campaign provision pro Election Act. The DID THE EX- ADVERTISEMENT corporations hibited using from their trea A CANDI- PRESSLY ADVOCATE sury expenditures funds to make “in con DATE’S ELECTION OR DEFEAT? with any nection election.” Id. at 616. The provi Court held that this quarrel applying Peca has no incorporated Buckley’s sion requirement “express advocacy” standard. He in expenditures scope application Because the at issue could definition’s relate to an elective office and not a on a “measure” as defined measure, 251.001(19). petition or ballot we do not consider *20 advocacy contain certain argues “magic that the advertisement meets words” stead Buckley, directly that standard because advocated akin to those listed whether HIS as a judged viewers “VOTE FOR OPPO the communications should be hand, the & NENT.” On the other Oster- whole and context. See Thomas Bow man, bergs Money Stay contend that the advertisement was Here to Under Is Soft Doctrine?, express advocacy “Magic it had con 10 Stan. L. because Words" 33, (1998); tradictory pleas Hayward, for action. If the viewer Pol’y Rev. & Note, agreed proposition, urged Stalking Express with one the ad the Elusive Advo Peca; Standard, 51, 54-55, cacy the viewer to vote for the viewer 10 J.L. & Pol. (1993). the ad agreed proposition, disagreement, different 62-69 This howev er, decision, vote urged against bearing the viewer to Peca. has no on our because Despite contradictory plea, Osterbergs’ we hold the advertisement described screen, as a and then in the advertisement taken whole Peca its first its exhorted, express advocacy using constitutes as a matter second words well screen listed, Buckley of law. within those “VOTE FOR HIS OPPONENT.” express In ad defining what constitutes Buckley that “the vocacy, recognized dis Osterbergs contend the adver tinction between discussion of issues and ambiguous. first screen makes it tisement’s advocacy de candidates and of election or Peca “Judge That screen recites that was often dissolve in feat candidates peers outstanding chosen his El Paso’s practical Buckley, 424 application.” U.S. jurist,” “graduated that he Summa Cum Buckley at therefore S.Ct. 612. Laude,” “worked to reduce his and that he “express advocacy” “spending restricted years,” saying docket over seven before unambiguously that is related to the cam ENOUGH, “IF FOR THAT’S VOTE paign particular of a federal candidate.” argue HIM.” The that this 80, 96 It limited Id. at S.Ct. 612. thus was plea gives action that contradictory for containing express to “communications plausible mean advertisement “several defeat, advocacy words of of election or They Federal Election ings.” rely on for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ such ‘vote ‘cast Organization v. National Commission for for,’ your Congress,’ ballot for ‘vote ‘Smith Women, held, in which the court “Because ” ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’ at 44 against,’ n. plausi suggestive the letters are of several 612. Massachusetts Citizens S.Ct. for there are numerous meanings, ble because Life, message clarified that a the Court action, types pleas for and because than the “marginally can be less direct” clear, entirely varied and not action are examples Buckley long listed in so as its advocacy express fail the NOW’s letters “goes beyond essential nature issue discus (D.D.C.1989). F.Supp. test.” 713 express advocacy.” sion to electoral Mas apply That does not Oster- case Life, 479 at sachusetts Citizens U.S. for Orga the court in National bergs, because 249, 107 S.Ct. 616. concluded nization Women pointed contain ex letters do not Unfortunately, descriptions these “NOW’s against particular hortations to vote for Buckley and Massachusetts Citizens for mailings include no persons. The three give unambiguous answers to “do Life how to explicit directing the reader myriad that arise.” Wiscon words situations Paradise, opposed to at As NOW’s Life, Inc. v. 138 vote.” Id. Right sin (7th denied, 1183, 1186 Cir.), Osterbergs’ advertisement mailings, F.3d cert. discussion regarded as a mere 142 L.Ed.2d 140 “cannot be raise their nature appeals public issues Different federal courts Massa politicians.” names of certain Election Commission have and the Federal Life, 479 U.S. chusetts Citizens disagreed over whether communications advocacy” must 107 S.Ct. 616. “express that constitute *21 “[tjhe spir- politics, lawyers”; their dents of argue The also law, letter, just the must be does not meet the standard advertisement it justice people”; for and the employed that the Ninth Circuit announced “ex for justice can- press advocacy” “[ejfficiency expense Federal Election Com at the (9th This admonishment re- Furgatch, mission v. 807 F.2d 857 not be tolerated.” Cir.), denied, adver- cert. 484 U.S. veals the “essential nature” of the Furgatch, “goes beyond In discussion 98 L.Ed.2d 106 tisement. It issue “express express advocacy.” Massa- the court stated to be advo electoral must, at cacy,” Life, a communication chusetts Citizens for 107 S.Ct. 616. whole, read a and with limited when as events, suscep- reference to external be statement, “IF The first screen’s interpreta- tible of no other reasonable ENOUGH, HIM,” THAT’S VOTE FOR but tion exhortation to vote for or negate does not this “essential nature.” specific against candidate.... essentially The first screen tells voters [Sjpeech “express” pur- present for according that Peca’s standards are — poses message if its is unmistakable and low, and Osterberg the second screen —too unambiguous, only one suggestive urges Osterberg viewers to vote for what plausible [Sjpeech may meaning.... higher by voting considers to be standards only presents “advocacy” be termed it appeals Peca. the court of against As ob- action, plea a clear for speech and thus served, message “The is clear: credentials merely that is informative is not covered ‘enough,’ are not and Peca does not under- by the Act. Finally, it must be clear stand that the courthouse exists for the what Speech action advocated. can- at people.” 952 S.W.2d 131. While the “express advocacy not be of the election strategy efficacy advertisement’s a clearly defeat of identified candi- debatable, the fact that it constitutes ex- date” when reasonable minds could dif- press advocacy is not. Whether the adver- fer as to whether it encourages vote advocacy little tisement is effective is of against for or encourages candidate or consequence to the determination the reader to take some other kind of express advocacy. whether it is action. Osterbergs’ advertisement is no less emphasize any We that if reasonable express advocacy no than the less reading speech sug- alternative can be contradictory messages Massachusetts gested, express it cannot advocacy Life, Citizens which the for subject to the require- Act’s disclosure express advocacy. Court held amounted to ments. case, the advertisement included at special disclaimer that read: “This election Admittedly, the Osterbergs’ represent first screen edition does not an endorsement qualifica- any particular does attribute some favorable candidate.” Massachu then, capitals, Life, tions to Peca. And in all it setts Citizens ENOUGH, says, “IF THAT’S VOTE FOR that “the dis S.Ct. 616. Court held HIM.” But negate” advertisement’s second claimer of endorsement cannot it screen renders “unmistakable and unam- fact that the communication’s na essential 249, 107 biguous, suggestive plausible express advocacy. one ture Id. at was In all meaning.” capitals, directly advo- S.Ct. 616. Like the communication THE Life, cates the viewer to “BRING Massachusetts Citizens the first Osterbergs’ COURTHOUSE BACK THE PEO- in the advertisement TO screen PLE,” express and “VOTE FOR HIS OPPO- does not diminish its essential ad NENT,” if the vocacy viewer wants someone who nature. We therefore hold as that “the of law that adver Osterbergs’ understands Courthouse exists matter people, judges, express advocacy for the and not for acci- and thus tisement was campaign expendi charge nition in the trial court’s as submit- their were jury, tures. than hypo- ted to the rather some *22 charge Osterbergs that the failed thetical IX objection through request. to seek Consultants, Inc., (citing Larson v. Cook SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE (Tex.1985); Allen v. S.W.2d In answering questions four Co., Nat’l American Ins. 380 S.W.2d jury found that Robert and eight, the (Tex.1964)). Reviewing the evidence Olga report expenditures “failed to file a of submitted, support n the the issue day an individual no later than the 8 appeals court of concluded: day before election for the direct found ... to have been undisputed The that Robert evidence appeal, Osterbergs argued made.” On the report Osterberg failed to file a “not they for the first time that need “sub day later than the 8th before election stantially comply” with the Election Code’s inquired. Ac- day” jury charge as the that expenditure reporting provisions, and cordingly, we find the evidence suffi- they They that did so. contended because cient, legally factually, sup- both support there was insufficient evidence to port jury’s finding. the unrequested compliance” the “substantial at 129. 952 S.W.2d issue, legally the evidence was and factual ly support jury’s finding the insufficient arguments vacuity that shroud report their expendi failed to Osterbergs the contend in vagueness, tures. appeals “[t]he court of was appeals

The court of held that the Oster- wrong” because: compliance their bergs waived substantial 1) sufficiency points preserved were explained: argument. The court 2) motions; through post-judgment to, Osterbergs argued prior The never objection not nec- charge an to the was during, compli- trial that substantial objection essary preserve an as to filing requirements ance satisfies the of 3) error; par- sufficiency and where the jury 254.124. The was instruct- Section ty proof with the burden of fails to requires filings on ed the statute present proper proof, standard day 'prior and 8th to the elec- the 30th law, charge, court’s mea- tion without com- mention of substantial sufficiency evidence. sures pliance. question to the The submitted jury inquired Osterberg whether Robert sufficiency The of the evidence as to expenditures by file a “failed to properly preserved. compliance was day an not later than the 8th individual preserved, duty it was the Once ” day [Emphasis .... election proper reviewing apply court to law before object Osterbergs did not added]. The court sufficiency analysis. to that question to the instruction or to the appeals refusing erred in to do so. compliance” grounds. They “substantial authority that Osterbergs legal cite no requested neither an instruction the court actually supports their claim that jury compliance, nor sub- on substantial appeals wrong. was jury question seeking finding mitted substantially 4May filing their Osterbergs’ arguments, Contrary complied statutory require- with the not rule that the appeals the court did ment. preserved. As sufficiency points were not at 129. S.W.2d opinion, appeals’ from the court of is clear points sufficiency the court considered the appeals The court of thus evaluated the was both that the evidence under the defi- and concluded sufficiency of the evidence (Tex.1964). recently factually legally support sufficient to As we stated Stores, Inc., jury’s question answers to four.26 Holland v. Wal-Mart (Tex.1999), if the trial court has S.W.3d 91 To the extent the are con jury legal “to resolve a issue before the tending in this Court that the evidence is perform fact-finding properly could its support legally jury’s sufficient to role[,] objection party lodge ... a must questions eight, answers to four and we in time for the trial court to make an agree appeals with the court of to order support appropriate ruling having without legally evidence is sufficient to reasons, jury’s findings “[t]he because evidence Id. at 94. new trial.” For these *23 undisputed Olga] that Robert [and Oster- Osterbergs’ we need not consider the ar berg failed to file a ‘not later than made, to the extent are guments, day day1 jury the 8th election as the before apply compliance we a substantial should charge inquired.” standard that standard was not sub when jury. mitted to the Osterbergs’ argument The third could be understood to make different one two provides

assertions. no reason to One X appeals’ holding; overturn the court of wrong. other is To the extent the Oster- ATTORNEY’S FEES bergs asserting, again, appellate Finally, complains that courts Peca ability jury have the to review ver- legally appeals holding dicts to ensure that sufficient court of erred in that he evi- verdicts, supports dence agree. recovery attorney’s those we waived fees. Sec noted, appeals As the court of undertook opposing tion 253.131 entitles an candidate such a review and legally concluded that proves who a violation of 253 to sufficient evidence supported the verdict. recover, damages in addition to based on agree We with that conclusion. the value of the unlawful contribution or expenditure, attorney’s “reasonable fees could instead be Eleg.Code in incurred the suit.” Tex. arguing that when a court submits defec 253.131(d)(2). The trial court submitted jury, appellate tive issue to the an court “[f]ind, jury to question asking the should sufficiency review the of the evi cents, dollars and the total amount that dence against question and instruction for attorney’s would be a reasonable fee the trial court should have submit in attorney’ the services ‘Plaintiffs actually ted—not the one submitted —even jury curred this case.” The informed if the brought defect was never to the the trial court that it was deadlocked on question court’s attention or in disclosure, question. After that Peca struction never requested. That assertion object request failed to an answer to his misguided. Even Peca had a burden Instead, attorney’s question. fees Peca proof regard to some substantial accept asked the trial court to the incom compliance standard —an we do not issue verdict, plete and then court asked the to today decide charge, is the court’s —it judgment enter as a matter of law for his law, some other unidentified that measures refused, attorney’s fees. trial court sufficiency of the evidence when the affirmed, appeals holding and the court opposing party object fails to to the appeal. that Peca had waived the issue for 272, 274, 278, 279; charge. Tex.R. P. Civ. Consultants, Inc., argues 952 at 132. Peca that his see also v. S.W.2d Larson Cook (Tex.1985); request jury failure to answer did not S.W.2d Allen v. Co., right attorney’s American Nat’l Ins. waive his to fees because S.W.2d appeals knowingly 26. The court of did not review the was no evidence that she violated Olga report, evidence that failed to file a the statute. already because it had that there concluded him all on his uncontroverted evidence entitled er of benefits based such issues. attorney’s is, law. fees as matter of That unanswered issue can afford judgment ground no basis for a finding In right that Peca waived his made.”). objection appeal timely unless fees, attorney’s appeals the court of relied Peca, by object jury did failing to when the Fleet, on this Court’s decision Fleet v. answer, any not return an waived benefit (Tex.1986). Fleet, we held S.W.2d jury question, any right from the waived a trial court will be reversed supply judge have the trial his own fact- rendering judgment incomplete ver- issue, grant finding a new trial on the party who dict unless the would benefit appeal judgment and waived right his issues from answers to unanswered attorney’s on the issue affirm fees. We objects incomplete verdict before of appeals’ judgment regarding the court jury is Fleet discharged. attorney’s Casualty followed fees. Continental Co.

Street, (Tex.1964), S.W.2d 648 which object plaintiff jury’s did not XI *24 questions regarding failure to answer the above, our discussion accordance with he to amount was entitled under an insur- appeals’ judgment affirm we the court policy. plaintiff ance Because the in Con- Osterberg, affirm against Robert and we Casualty object tinental failed to before judgment Peca appeals’ the court that jury discharged, the was this Court held nothing attorney’s take in his fees daim. that court had alternative “[t]he trial no appeals’ judgment reverse the court of We judg- under the but render jury verdict to nothing Olga that Peca take from Oster- for Casualty], [Continental [the ment and berg, appeals and remand to the court of have plaintiff] any might waived benefit he opin- proceedings consistent with this issues, claimed and under the unanswered ion. to at any right have them answered.”

651; Employers’ see also Lewis v. Texas Ass’n, Tex. Ins. 151 246 S.W.2d concurring Justice GONZALES with (to (1952) appeal, a preserve error for to opinion follow. party object questions must to unanswered dissenting filed a jury discharged); in a verdict the Justice ENOCH before is PHILLIPS, Elliott, Verdict, opinion, 4 Mc- in Jury Trial: which Chief Justice 25:7, HANKINSON, Justice Justice Donald Texas Civil Practice (Allen ed.) (“[E]v- eds., joined. 415-16 al. et O’NEILL ery material must answered question be GONZALES, concurring. Justice cannot, any jury the and the court circumstances, unan- supply findings on concurring my July I withdraw incompletely swered or answered material opinion following. the substitute silently party A who ... questions.... Texas agree I the Court that the with the and the accepted allows verdict to direct-campaign-expendi- Election Code’s to jury discharged right to be the waives the ex- with requirements, ture disclosure complain questions unan- that the provision, survive ception of in-concert the swered, disregard trial court may and the chal- specific the constitutional Osterbergs’ questions and render the unanswered rejects appropriately lenges. Court This party prevail to judgment for the entitled Elec- made.”); argument that the Jones, Osterbergs’ findings under the Waiver regulation approach tion Is- Code’s Conflicting Special Unanswered and —which (“[T]he forbidding (1959) generally sues, begins a rule 38 Tex. L.Rev. makes expenditures but unan- direct failure to effect detect exceptions— specified rule subject call trial court’s that swered issues and facially a complete attention to defect is waiv- is unconstitutional. that nificance of the United States correctly also concludes Court 253.131(a) v. X- decision United States of the Election Code Court’s

section Third, Video, I con Inc.4 while persons civilly allows to be held liable Citement 253.131(a) constitutional, I is reporting requirements with- clude section violating the raises my Chapter that they knew were break- note concern proof out that 253.131(a) not chal face, concerns law. other constitutional ing the On its require lenged It this case. ambiguous.1 could be read proof person making the cam-

paign contributions or knew A. failing them violated the correctly concludes The Court liability Election Code before civil could constitutionally per imposes However, properly attach. as the Court requirements, not a ban missible advises, primary give our aim is to effect enforcing expenditures. But ceiling Legislature’s intent.2 And as reporting requirements also must out, points Legislature demon- Amendment. offend the First When strated in two other sections of the Elec- prove Court states Peca need clearly it tion Code that knew how subjective knowledge of elec Osterbergs’ require knowledge that the actor have laws, necessarily implies toral being charged Election Code before require does not that a Constitution with a violation. The Court’s construction violating know he is the election laws be supported further fact that sec- opinion 253.131(a) being punished. fore The Court’s 253.003(b), 253.005(a), tions *25 253.131(a) that section does not vio states were all amended the 1987 revision of Amendment Osterbergs’ late the First the Election Code.3 pre the does not rights because statute however, separately, I write for three making campaign expendit vent them from First, I reasons. would elaborate on the opinion ures.5 Then the concludes 253.131(a) why reasons section does not merely requires Osterbergs the statute the guarantees offend First Amendment and that re report expenditures, their speech, free even a civil though allows comport with the porting requirements damages suit for for failure to guidelines constitutional established campaign expenditure requiring without McIntyre v. Buckley v. Valeo6 and Ohio plaintiff prove the the defendant knew Elections Commission.7 specific reporting requirement. about the

Second, disagree plurality’s merely I with the and But the issue here is not whether from respective sig Chapter prevents dissent’s of the evaluations ("A it.”) (citations 253.131(a) quotation person writing 1. and internal See Tex. Elec.Code omitted). knowingly accepts campaign who makes marks expendi- expenditure campaign or makes a 30, 1987, R.S., May Leg., ch. Act of 70th See chapter for ture violation of this is liable 2995, 899, 1,§ & 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws section.”). damages provided by this (current version at Tex Elec.Code 253.003(b), 253.005(a), 253.131(a)). §§ 728, Mathews, v. 741- See Heckler 42, 1387, (1984) 104 S.Ct. 79 L.Ed.2d 646 L.Ed.2d 372 4. 513 U.S. 115 S.Ct. ("The favoring constructions of canon statutes (1994). questions avoid constitutional does not ... usurp policy-making license a court to (12 45). S.W.3d legislative duly-elected repre- functions of Although sentatives. this Court will often 46 L.Ed.2d 659 6. 424 U.S. 96 S.Ct. legislation so as to save it strain construe curiam). (1976) (per attack, against constitutional it must not perverting 131 L.Ed.2d carry point 7. 514 U.S. will not this judicially purpose of a statute ... or re- making campaign expenditure. ing Osterbergs solely engaging More that, activity, than the issue is core First Amendment without whether Court’s 253.131(a), more, is unconstitutional. But direct limi- construction of section which speech tations on can constitutional if penalty allows a for a violation of the limitation is content neutral and sur- 253 whether or not an individual knows of appropriate vives the standard of scruti- duty report, is constitutional. While stated, 253.131(a) Supreme ny.12 As Court has directly does not con- “It clear has been since Court’s earli- speech, strain under the construc- Court’s concerning tion, est decisions the freedom of impact speech. it can lia- Imposing speech cur- the state sometimes bility on an unknowing violator has the speech necessary tail when to advance a indirect penalizing effect of core First significant legitimate state inter- speech. Amendment primary est.” Even when the effect of Valeo, Buckley Supreme a content-neutral law to restrict core evaluated constitutionality speech, Supreme First Amendment expenditure reporting require- limits and constitutionality Court has held the of the Court, however, Supreme ments.8 The did govern- restriction “turns on whether the constitutionality not consider the of the mental advanced in [the interests restric- enforcement reporting require- support satisfy exacting tion’s] scruti- Thus, Buckley fully ments. an- does ny applicable to limitations on First core swer whether the Constitution allows this political expres- Amendment rights particular speech. burden on 14 Thus, “something sion.” more” that In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commis apparently the dissent seeks and the Con- sion, Supreme Court considered an in- requires stitution is a substantial state prohibited Ohio statute that the distribu speech. terest in the limitation on But anonymous campaign tion of literature.9 comparing rather than the state interest A was fined under that statute impact speech, here with the the dis- distributing anonymous op leaflets that further simply sent concludes without posed proposal.10 a local tax analysis application un- that this must be *26 un Court concluded that the statute was constitutional. constitutional, however, it noted that these Although the current Federal Election requirements disclosure on differ rested Campaign reporting Act and several state powerful ent and less state interests than impose liability failing for to re statutes in campaign expendi state interests port campaign expenditures, whether such Thus, ture reporting.11 McIntyre, like liability in the of can be enforced absence Buckley, dispose does not of fully knowledge appears to be an actor’s question us. before impression. of first The federal re issue analysis imposes liability The for both porting dissent’s is likewise incom- statute plete. knowing unknowing The that failures to dissent contends statute, application punish- campaign expenditures.15 Court’s of the Thirteen states 12-13, 60, 789, 804, 8. 424 U.S. at 96 S.Ct. 612. 104 S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d States, (1984); accord Schenck v. United 9. U.S. at 115 S.Ct. 1511. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919). 337-38, 10. See id. at 115 S.Ct. 1511. 44-45, Buckley, 14. 424 U.S. at S.Ct. 612. 11. See id. at 115 S.Ct. 1511. However, (B). 434g(a)(5)(A), § 15. 2 44-45, U.S.C. Buckley, 12. See 424 U.S. at in the version of the federal statute construed knowing Buckley any express did not have 76-77, City City Buckley requirement. See 424 U.S. at Members Council of of of Vincent, Angeles Taxpayers Los n. 96 S.Ct. 612. of chapter guilty of require provisions addition to Texas individuals this A court re- re- class misdemeanor.”20 One making campaign to file require cently provision to ports construed this impose with the state. Seven states prove pur- to the state defendant non-reporting liability for under statutes statute, merely not posely violated express require- that contain no scienter engaged purposeful he acts violated states ment.16 The other six have an ex- four remaining the statute.21 The states press knowing reporting term in their knowing requirement that have a their six, those statute.17 Of Missouri reporting require proof statute of know- closely statutes most Delaware resemble requirement, 258.131(a). ing reporting violation of the section Delaware statute merely proof knowing act that states, “Any person knowingly who ac- violates statute.22 cepts makes an knowingly unlawful con- expenditure any tribution or in violation of I Although any unaware of am decision provision subchapter II or III this liability upholding imposing statute title of a class guilty shall be A misde- of a re- unknowing violation 18 But any meanor.” we unaware of quirement, entirely are not without we construing provision. this decision guidance. has articu- lated that a statute is constitutional unless provides The Missouri statute every application statute violates who “[a]ny person knowingly accepts or First Amendment or unless the statute is expendi- makes a contribution or makes an substantially overbroad so as to create a any ture in provision violation of of this danger realistic that the statute itself will chapter may ... be held liable state significantly compromise recognized First penalties civil in twice the amount of protections.23 Amendment any expenditure, such contribution or exceed total amount five thousand I would whether evaluate 253.131(a) provides The statute application, dollars.”19 also has a constitutional “any person purposely who by turning principles violates the articulated in Alaska, (1998); § any provision chapter shall 15.13.125 this be Alaska Stat. Florida, fined....”); (1992); § ("Any § 106.085 56.16 Fla. Stat. Ann. Iowa Code Ann. Massachusetts, provisions willfully any § Mass. Gen. L. who ch. violates Nebraska, conviction, (1991); chapter upon guilty be § this shall 49-1467 Neb. Rev. Stat. Carolina, misdemeanor.”); (1998); of a serious North N.C. Gen. La.Rev.Stat. Ann. Stat. (1999); Ohio, ("[Any knowingly § § person] 1505.4 who fails 163-278.27 Ohio Rev.Code 3517.99(M) (1995); timely knowingly file or Virginia, who fails file Ann. Va.Code any reports required by Chap- such as are 24.2-929 Ann. penalty....”); ter assessed a civil *27 Connecticut, (“Any § 9-333y 23-15-811 candidate § 17. Miss.Code Ann. Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. (1989); Delaware, person willfully and § or other who shall delib- Del.Code. Ann. Iowa, (1999); (1999); provisions erately substantially § violate the 56.16 Code Iowa Ann. prohibitions Mississippi, guilty this article shall be § of 23-15-811 Miss.Code. Ann. Missouri, (1999); ”). a § Mo. Ann. of misdemeanor.... 130.072 Stat. (1997); Louisiana, § 1505.4 La.Rev.Stat. Ann. City Angles 23. See Los Members Council Vincent, Taxpayers 466 U.S. 797- 98, 801, 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 8043. 18. Ann. Del.Code. (1984) municipal (upholding a rule that for- posting signs public property, bade the on 19. Mo. Ann. Stat. 130.072. political prevent where the a effect was campaign signs posting candidate on from poles); utility State see also New York Club 1, 11, Owen, York, City Ass'n v. New See State v. S.W.2d 1999). (1988) (rejecting a (Mo.Ct.App. 101 L.Ed.2d 1 First Amendment freedom of association chal- lenge forbidding § 9-333y ("Any city of a discrimi- See Conn. Gen.Stat. ordinance Ann. clubs). person knowingly willfully private nation in who violates certain ease, Supreme In that

Buckley. government by Court these substantial interests 253.131(a)’s explained expenditures that campaign op- impact considering section on in an area of the erate most fundamental so, speech. doing recognize I the diffi- First Amendment activities.24 Discussion 253.131(a) in culty ascertaining how section public qualifi- issues and debate on the impacts speech differently impact from the cations of integral candidates are requirements the reporting themselves operation system of government speech. Supreme have on As the Court Thus, established our a Constitution.25 Buckley, noted in reporting requirements limitation on this core First Amendment are constitutional even when they deter speech only will be constitutional might some who otherwise contribute.28 passes exacting limitation artic- scrutiny as liability Potential for an unknowing viola- words, Buckley. ulated in In other impacts speech. tion has additional on limitation must bear a sufficient relation- First, person may a found liable be less ship to a substantial state interest.26 political willing re-enter the discussion Buckley recognized three substantial they penalized prior since were for their governmental in requiring interests disclo- Second, person may actions. be less campaign expenditures.27 sure of The willing in large undertake in enforcing state’s interest its disclosure light penalty of the double that section First, requirements are the same here. imposes. 253.131 are troubling These con- independent expenditure fur- disclosure cerns because as the noted Court thers the state’s effort to achieve total Buckley, participation effective in the by reaching every politi- disclosure kind of public may require large expendi- arena activity cal order to ensure voters are Third, potential liability tures.29 for an fully informed. This informational interest unknowing violation deter activism helps voters to ascertain more of the can- different contexts for fear of some Second, didates’ constituencies. disclosure liability. other unknown part plays attempt the state’s to deter corruption through and undue influence impacts speech While on are not these Third, publicity. responds provision to insignificant, competing state interests legitimate fear that efforts would be It might argued are substantial. made, past, have in the to avoid imposing requirement individual requirements by financially the disclosure knowingly violates the law is a less re- supporting through candidates avenues not mitigating strictive means of the evils of explicitly provisions covered the other corruption lack of in- and voters’ Thus, independent expen- of the statute. But formation. the cost to statute’s compliments general diture disclosure reasonably effectiveness is clear. As the requirements by shedding disclosure argues, proving contributor knew cam- light publicity unambiguously reporting requirements yet about paign-related spending that would not oth- them would be inordinate- chose violate reported. erwise be Also, ly difficult in most cases.

I determined to violate the laws would determine whether 253.131(a) relationship learning regula- bears a sufficient to need avoid what the *28 Valeo, 1, 14, 68, ("It Buckley 612. is un- 24. See v. 424 U.S. 96 28. See id. at 96 S.Ct. 612, (1976) (per public S.Ct. 46 L.Ed.2d 659 cu doubtedly disclosure of con- true that riam). political parties tributions to candidates and will deter some individuals who otherwise id.; Shrink, 25. See see also Nixon v. - U.S. contribute.”). might - - -, 897, 903, 120 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (2000). 19-20, 29. at 96 S.Ct. 612. See id. Buckley, 26. See 424 U.S. at 96 S.Ct. 612. 66-67, 76, 81, 27. See id. at 96 S.Ct. 612. hand, B. the other en-

tions On required. requirements re- forcing the part plurality’s I do not V of the join provides gardless knowledge of incentive I it misconstrues opinion because believe regulations require learn what Video, v. X-Citement Inc.32 United States Consequently, them. I believe abide plurali responding to the dissent. 253.131(a) that section bears a sufficient ty concludes that X-Citement “stands for in- relationship to the state’s substantial person a must be proposition that exacting scrutiny meet re- terest conduct —not aware of in certain engaging Buckley. quired under Because particular statute— violating aware of constitutional, can- application Court’s is for conduct being punished before application every not be of sec- said by the First protected otherwise is 253.131(a) tion violates the Amend- First the case Amendment.”33 I believe has 253.131(a) Thus, ment. I conclude section more to do notice of essential part of the satisfies the first test articulat- elements of crime. City Council Supreme ed Court Angeles.30 Los of X-Citement opinion primarily I part then turn to the of would second X- statutory concerns construction. 253.131(a) section test: whether is sub Citement Supreme Court reviewed a stantially overbroad so as to create real the Protection conviction under Chil- istic danger sig that the statute itself will Exploitation Against dren Sexual Act of compromise recognized nificantly First (1) 1977,34which criminalized acts of know- protections. Liability Amendment can shipping visual de- ingly transporting 253.131(a) arise under section for either sexually ex- pictions engaged minors knowing unknowing violation. Both the (2) plicit knowingly receiving, conduct and agree Court and the dissent seem to distributing reproducing such de- 253.131(a) liability under section would be was pictions.35 The defendant there con- when a knowingly constitutional vi selling tapes involving victed for video olates the statute. I believe they right she actress who was a minor when made the state interests because are not sub the films.36 The States Court of United outweighed by the stantially chilling ef reversed, Appeals for Ninth Circuit fects the statute would free have on holding the unconstitutional statute Second, above, speech. I concluded containing requirement scienter 253.131(a) section when constitutional performers was defendant knew one liability is enforced on an unknowing viola reversed, Supreme a minor.37 The Court 253.131(a) Thus, tor. uncon section holding requirement that a scienter could stitutionally overbroad and satisfies implied in the federal statute.38 The City part second of the test announced in acknowledged under Angeles.31 Los Therefore, Council of I 253.131(a) grammatical the statute’s most natural passes conclude that modify scrutiny. reading, “knowingly” constitutional did not City Angles Council 33. 12 Members Los S.W.3d 45. Vincent, 789, 798, Taxpayers (1984); (1988 V). Supp. S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d 772 also see 34. 18 U.S.C. ed. York, City New York State Club Ass’n v. Newof 1, 11, 66-68, X-Citement, 101 L.Ed.2d 1 513 U.S. at City Angles, 466 31. Members Council 36. See id. at 115 S.Ct. 464. Los S.Ct. 2118. U.S. at 37. See id. S.Ct. 464. *29 64, 464, 115 S.Ct. 130 L.Ed.2d 78-79, (1994). 38. See id. at 115 S.Ct. element regarding ment was whether the statute satisfied the age perform- of the Supreme ers.39 But the Court found an notice and fairness concerns underpinning implied scienter requirement for several the long-standing principle criminal law First, reasons.40 if the statute not did requirements that mens rea must ap- require knowing violation it would lead plied every fact element of a crime.45 results, to absurd example, criminaliz- The First Amendment conduct was rele- ing the conduct druggist of a retail who X-Citement vant analysis because unknowingly returns an uninspected roll of without a knowing requirement in the developed film containing pictures of mi- criminal statute an individual could be en- engaged nors in sexually explicit conduct41 gaged in perceived protected what he Second, the Supreme Court acknowledged speech First Amendment without suffi- the strong presumption that criminal stat- cient notice that his conduct was longer no require utes scienter for each of the statu- permitted. significant This is a concern tory elements that criminalize otherwise public because the is entitled to notice Third, innocent Supreme conduct.42 generally whenever legal believed conduct Court looked at the federal legis- statute’s illegal. Supreme has been made history lative and concluded that because Court’s construction of a knowing require- reports committee and floor debates ment satisfied these notice and fairness indicated that Congress intended that the concerns. term “knowingly” modify part another While X-Citement may impor- articulate containing subsection the term “mi- statutory tant principles, they construction nor”, it was difficult to conclude that First, do not have force here. the Court’s “knowingly” modify did not also the re- 253.131(a) interpretation of section does mainder of the subsection.43 Finally, the produce the odd or absurd results that Supreme Court concluded that a statute Court X-Cite- Supreme concerned the completely bereft of a scienter require- Here, 253.131(a) punishes ment. section regarding ment age of the actors only those individuals fail who doubts; would raise serious constitutional Second, knowing campaign expenditures. therefore, construction, as a rule of there nothing legislative history Supreme Court read the statute so as to Legislature pun- show that the intended to eliminate those doubts.44 only knowing ish violations of section While X-Citement be instructive 253.131(a). above, Finally, as I conclude purposes construction, statutory require the Constitution does know- guide does not the constitutional evalua- ing violation statute. 253.131(a). tion of Thus, there is no need to construe Court in X-Citement construed an addi- statute to include a knowing requirement tional mens rea element the criminal in order to make it constitutional. statute to avoid serious constitutional Nevertheless, problems. the plurality’s C. respective opinions the dissent’s erro- 253.131(a) I neously presume While conclude that section the constitutional problems provision, to be is a constitutional I primarily avoided related enforcement to the First arising Amendment. But the note other from Su- concerns preme Court’s main concern in X-Cite- 253 that were not raised the Oster- 68, 39. See id. at 115 S.Ct. 464. 44. See id. at S.Ct. 464. 68-78, 40. See id. at 115 S.Ct. 464. X-Citement, 464; 513 U.S. at 115 S.Ct. States, Staples see also v. United

41. See id. at 115 S.Ct. 464. 128 L.Ed.2d 608 70-73, 42. See id. at 115 S.Ct. 464. 73-78, 43. See id. at 115 S.Ct. 464. *30 or candidate the I am it determines who—the

bergs. particular, concerned person expenditure the require- making the Election Code’s disclosure —has ordinary ordinary it. an may be so cumbersome for of So ments burden they unduly free the Texas Ethics citizens that burden citizen consult must (or complexity re- speech. lawyer) clarify The sheer a Rules Commission quirements, coupled expenditure with the severe conse- campaign “A ambiguity: non-compliance, quences may of chill person from the mak- is not a contribution ordinary of individuals who lack activism expenditure if ... it is made with- ing the experience sophistication or needed prior approval or out consent comply with the Election understand whose candidate or officeholder on behalf Code. expenditure made.”50 was difficulty The first one encounters with “expen- An clear. thing At least one coping the Election Code is with its defini- broadly very diture” is defined include tions, scope spell regu- which out the of its money any other payment thing “a A latory provisions.46 campaign “direct as value.”51 An as minor expenditure expenditure” as campaign is defined “a an issue-orient- drafting copying cost of expenditure that does not a constitute may mailing trigger ed handbill or a letter campaign by person contribution mak- requirements.52 the Election Code’s ing A expenditure.”47 “campaign ex- Texas’s scheme for direct regulatory turn, penditure,” in is “an expenditure campaign expenditures begins Chap- by any person made with a connection 253 of Election Code. ter the Texas Sec- for an elective campaign office or on a prohibits tion 253.002 from contribution,” A “campaign measure.”48 knowingly authorizing a making or direct contrast, is “a contribution a candi- expendi- campaign expenditure unless political date or committee that is offered Subchapter ture is authorized C.53This or given with the intent that it be used prohibition apply does not to cor- general campaign with a connection for elective candidates, porations, organizations, labor on a office or measure.” committees, campaign treasur- These are not very definitions lucid. capacity, acting ers in an official whose ex- For thing, may apparent, one penditures regulated under other perspective citizen, from of an ordinary provisions.54 Election Code “in connection with a re- campaign” C, comprised of Subchapter Sections solely expressly fers to communications 253.063, election, through 253.061 describes cir- advocating passage, or defeat ordinary clearly identified candidate or mea- cumstances under which citi- expendi- campaign sure. It is also not clear zen can whether a coordi- make direct expenditure coopera- provides nated made in ture. that an Section 253.061 —one campaign tion with a individual make direct ex- or consultation candidate —is penditures up contribution or a cam- he or she is direct $100 another paign expenditure. acting per- How ex- “not in concert with coordinated penditure characterized is no reimbursement important, son” receives See Tex. Elec.Code 52. See Op. § 46. 251.001. No. Tex. Ethics Comm’n (1993) (stating include "the 251.001(8). Id. § 47. plus any producing dis- cost ... brochures costs, postage”). tribution such 251.001(7). Id. § 251.001(3). § 53. See § Tex Elec.Code 253.002. (1999)(Tex. 20.1. 1 Tex. Admin. Code Eth- 253.002(b) (listing exceptions). id. 54. See Comm'n,Definitions). ics 251.001(6). 51. Tex. Elec.Code *31 compliance made ly, 253.062 allows the Commission has expenditures.55 Section campaign and fi- by making concert with easier forms acting

an individual “not available over the Internet.61 person” campaign guides another to make direct nance guides and exceeding if “the indi- But the fact that those forms $100 committees, Chapter political are tailored for complies vidual with 254 as individuals, ordinary citizen’s campaign treasurer of a makes an individual were task of the forms that much political completing committee.”56 complicated. more spells out the detailed rec- and written-no- ord-keeping, report-filing, ordinary Even after an citizen divines requirements campaign tice with which a reported information must be and what “[ejach First, comply. treasurer must it, proper determining how to political of a commit- campaign treasurer to file the re- filing authority with whom reporta- all tee shall maintain record of Elec- ports easy is no task. Because the activity” containing ble “the information clear,62 does not make this tion Code itself necessary filing reports for one turn to the Ethics Commission must required by chapter” “preserve and instruct guidance. Rules for These Rules years.”57 the record for at least two Sec- campaign a direct making an individual ond, must, campaign treasurer under file expenditure under 253.062 to Section A pain committing a Class misdemean- were a cam- reports as if the individual or, [any political “deliver written notice of politi- paign specific-purpose treasurer of a expenditure] to the affected candidate or filing cal committee.63 There are different officeholder not later than the end of the sought the office depending authorities report in period by covered which the opposed or supported the candidate Third, reportable activity occurs.”58 specific-purpose political committee. Election details the contents re- Code opposing candi- supporting or Committees reports, the entities to which quired legislature or dates for a seat the state sent, report- must be and the various or for of education on the state board ing periods apply.59 multi-county district other statewide illustrates, with the Texas reports offices must file As the Court seeking Committees requirements are not trivial.60 Fortunate- Ethics Commission.64 filingin- chttp:// § Id. 253.061. www.ethics.state.tx.us/ 55. & in.htm>. fo/forms 253.062(a)(1). §Id. 56. requires individual to 62. Section 253.062 campaign treasur- if he or she were the file as 254.001(b),(c),(d). § Id. 57. See Tex. er of a committee. Elec. however, Code, § Election 253.062. The Code 254.128; Op. § accord Tex. Ethics depend- requirements provides filing different (1996) ("An 'not Comm’n No. 331 individual special- ing the committee on whether acting person’ id, with another who in concert § general-purpose. Compare 254.130 expenditure sup- campaign makes direct filing (specifying § different with id. 254.163 give porting required to a candidate is also types); the different committee authorities for candidate.”); 251.001(13) (14) see also Tex. Penal (defining notice §§ & see also id. up (providing punishment committees). § 12.21 special- general-purpose Code $4,000 one-year’s jail confinement simply does not indi- the Election Code And misdemeanor). committing a Class A general- two cate which of these committees— individual purpose specific-purpose —an supposed to model. under Section 253.062 is §§ 254.121—254.184. See Tex. Elec.Code 999) 22.5(b)(2)(l 1 Tex 63. See Code Admin. many (discussing S.W.3d 42 See 12 Campaign Expen- Direct (Tex Comm'n, Ethics provided reports). in the details that must be ditures). Commission, (Reports filed with 20.3. Forms & 64. See id. 61. See Texas Ethics 2, 2000) Commission). (last revised Feb. Instructions be so district, requirements can county, a set of disclosure to influence elections Amend- they violate the First onerous that precinct campaign must file their offices appointments county ment.74 treasurer administrator, clerk, elections or tax asses- Legislature’s prerogative It is the sor-collector, by the designated particu- finance structure this State’s *32 authority county.65 filing for com-

lar subject prerogative is laws. But seeking influence elections for mittees This State’s limitations. constitutional If, because com- other offices varies.66 the unduly must not campaign finance laws more supporting opposing mittee is ordinary of citi- political speech burden candidate, must filed reports than one be in be cases could future zens. There authorities, the multiple then commit- with are of Chapter which provisions other may reports choose the the tee to file challenged speech is constitutionally only.67 commission as to render significantly so constrained un- provisions of the Election Code those complexity And the does not end there. however, not, has That constitutional. just file expect An individual cannot one I Accordingly, this case. been done in and be it. The report done with Election concur. reporting periods sets forth several Code reports required,

in which are even no ENOCH, joined Chief Justice Justice expenditures Reports made.68 must HANKINSON, PHILLIPS, Justice thirty days semi-annually,69 be filed before O’NEILL, dissenting. Justice election,70 eight days before Also, Osterbergs argu- a made expenditures election.71 above Because rehearing in the ments motion for specified days threshold made nine their discussion, July reported my in merit I withdraw preceding the election must be opinion and reports.72 Only by filing dissenting a disso- 1999 substitute telegram report following. lution with a statement sworn reportable expenditures

no further are ex- statutory case. This a construction pected filing individual relieved of Ironically, chosen construction the Court’s reports.73 additional 253.131(a) of the Code of section Election en- summary, citizens report- gives protection the Election Code’s less Texas activi- First Amendment requirements gaged are cumbersome and the core ing result, about an election than complicated. ty speaking a the Election As Supreme chosen ordinary from United Court’s Code deter citizens States obscenity disseminating construction of the federal child their own views. This rais- peddlers pornog- question, yet given unanswered act has child es Court, no raphy. there is evidence States of whether Because United county § § (Reports filed with 72. See id. 254.038. 65. See id. 20.5 authority). filing § 73. See 254.126. id. §§ 66. See id. 20.3—20.7. Lawyer Discipline v. (Filing opinion § Commission

67. See id. 20.9 for certain Cf. for 425, (su committees). Benton, (Tex.1998) gge specific-purpose 980 S.W.2d sting permissible speech free restric " 254.031(b) ("If § no 68. See Tex. Elec.Code that the tions 'set out terms should during reporting reportable activity occurs exercising ordinary ordinary common person person period, required to file a comply sufficiently understand and sense can report.”). in the shall indicate that fact ”) Serv. (quoting with’ United States Civil Carriers, Ass'n Comm’n v. National Letter See id. 254.123. 548, 579, 37 L.Ed.2d 254.124(b). (1973)). 70. See id. 254.124(c). §id. 71. See they violating knew were in sections 254.031 and 254.121 of the Elec-

Election when timely Code failed to tion Code.5 comply with its I requirements, To facilitate enforcement respectfully dissent. 253.002, section 253.131 the Election creates a private Code cause of action Section 253.002 of the Election Code “person against knowingly who makes or makes campaign expenditures direct un- accepts campaign contribution or makes lawful unless the making the ex- campaign expenditure violation of penditure complies with Subchapter C to [Chapter 253 Election To Code].”6 Subchapter 253.1 two C contains case, decide this must we determine sections concerning —253.061 “knowingly” whether word in section these, and 253.062. Of because Mr. Oster- 253.131(a) succeeding modifies the entire *33 berg spent more than on the televi- $100 including phrase clause “in violation of ad, only sion section 253.062 relevant. Code],” [the Election whether it only provides: It phrase modifies “makes campaign (a) Except as provided by otherwise expenditure.” I agree with the court of law, an individual not in acting concert appeals’ Mr. conclusion that for and Mrs. with another one or make Osterberg to be Judge liable to Peca for more campaign expenditures direct in an Code, violating the Judge Election Peca prop- election from the individual’s own present had to some evidence erty that exceed on one or any $100 Osterbergs were aware their actions vio- more candidates measures if: Code.7 lated the (1) complies Chap- the individual I we obliged give believe are if ter 254 as the individual were a 253.131(a) this construction. We have campaign political treasurer of a com- that “it duty stated is our as a court to 2 .... mittee statutes in a which construe manner avoids 254, Under committee’s doubt constitutionality.”8 serious of their required treasurer is file two unequivocal We followed United States Su- reports, days one no later than be- thirty preme precedent in making this fore day,3 election and the other no later surprisingly, statement.9 Not other state day than the eighth day.4 before election uniformly courts adhere to this rule of The reports specified here, contents these statutory are And construction.10 253.002(b)(1). Co., 383, § 1. See Tex. Camp Elec.Code v. 122 Tex. Prod. 61 Gulf 773, (Tex. 1933). S.W.2d 777 § 2. Id. 253.062. I, Ridge (citing 9. Glen at 759 See 750 S.W.2d 254.154(b). § 3. Id. Schor, Commodity Trading Comm’n Futures v. 833, 841, 3245, U.S. 106 S.Ct. 92 478 L.Ed.2d 254.154(c). (1986)); § 4. Id. Pipe 675 see also Concrete & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension 254.031, -.121; Cal., 602, 628-29, §§ see also 1 Admin. Trust S. 508 Tex. 113 for 2264, (1993); 124 Code L.Ed.2d Edward 22.5. 539 Corp. Bldg. J. DeBartolo v. Coast Florida Gulf 568, 575, Council, 253.131(a) & Constr. 485 U.S. Trades 1392, (emphasis 6. Tex. Elec.Code add- (1988); ed). 108 S.Ct. 99 L.Ed.2d 645 Cro Benson, 22, 62, 285, well v. 598 76 L.Ed. 7. 952 S.W.2d at 126-27. See, 87, Corp. Ridge e.g., Slayton Shumway, Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. v. Glen v. 166 Ariz. Condominiums, Ltd., 757, 590, (Ariz. 1990); People I Supe 750 S.W.2d 759 800 P.2d 595 v. Edmond, Court, (Tex.1988); 497, 789, Cal.Rptr.2d also State see v. 933 rior 13 Cal.4th 1996); 1996); (Cal. S.W.2d (Tex.Crim.App. Miami 917 P.2d State v. Globe Moses, Indep. v. Corp., Sch. Dist. 989 S.W.2d So.2d Communications denied); Petersilie, (Fla.1994); (Tex.App. pet. 334 N.C. State - Austin cf. knew punish persons who implications imposing lia- the act would constitutional protected only they engaged were persons engaging protected bility having An activity. act man- First Amendment the First Amendment speech under per- constitutionally an effect is conclusion that section such date 253.131(a), “knowingly” modifies the entire missible.17 clause, including [the “in violation of compelling is even more analysis Code].”11 First, Rob- for at two reasons. here least expenditure Osterberg, making ads that Robert Oster- ert television sought Peca to hold him designed produced Judge aired for which berg had liable, was his fundamental political speech. exercising As such were speaking out Be- First Amendment freedom protected by the First Amendment.12 A public officials.18 independent campaign cause about election concerns, solely punished engag- him implicate First Amendment statute that activity, disclosing in this core First Amendment requires reporting ing law that more, would unconstitutional.19 campaign expenditures passes constitu- without con- precisely that is what Court’s only tional muster it “bears sufficient Yet says “knowing- governmental The Court relationship to substantial struction does. spending the act of mon- ly” interest.”13 modifies *34 First ey. spending money But on core Moreover, with- bring such law cannot cannot, itself, in and speech Amendment sweep any in its “innocent” violations. has to some- against be the law—there be construing a statute in somewhat similar punished thing And a statute that more. 253.131(a), structure to section the United knew that he had en- person who Supreme held that word States in First Amendment activi- gaged innocent obscenity in child “knowingly” the federal ty would be unconstitutional —the Consti- to apply perform- act had to the of the age requires something tution that he know sexually er and explicit nature X-Citement, something more.20 In that material, not merely element per- be happened age more transporting such materials.14 The Su- explicit nature of sexually former and the preme Court indicated that this construc- Here, more something the materials. tion of act was its natural not “most happens expendi- the fact that the reading,”15 grammatical but because it is reported. ture had to be presumed Congress did intend act, Second, grammatically give unconstitutional sound to construction it Otherwise, reading must be case the the one intended.16 the statute at issue 832, Video, (N.C.1993); 68. Baptist 432 S.E.2d 838 Med. U.S. at 15. X-Citement 513 Okla., 213, Aguirre, v. 219 Ctr. (Okla.1996); Inc. 930 P.2d 176, see also 16A Am.Jur.2d at Id. at 68-69. 16. (1998). 56-57 72-73; Enters., at Inc. 17. see also Manual 253.131(a). 11. Tex. Elec.Code 478, 492-93, 1432, Day, 8 v. 370 U.S. 82 S.Ct. (1962); v. California, 12. See F.E.C. Massachusetts Citizens L.Ed.2d v. 361 639 Smith 238, 251, 616, Inc., Life, U.S. 107 93 479 S.Ct. 147, 150-53, 215, 80 4 205 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (1986) ("Independent expendi- L.Ed.2d 539 (1959); Updegraff, v. 344 Wieman U.S. expression ... at core of tures constitute (1952). 97 216 S.Ct. L.Ed. process electoral and of the First Amend- our freedoms.”). ment F.E.C., 18. See at 251. Valeo, 1, Buckley 424 U.S. 13. See, X-Citement, e.g., at (1976) curiam). 513 U.S. 72-73. (per L.Ed.2d Video, Inc., See States v. X-Citement United See id. 64, 78, 115 L.Ed.2d Constitution, compelled by noted, piction. whereas it And again, as the dissent was not for the in X- contained, statute issue word ‘knowingly’ “[t]he Citement. The Court’s observa- in a merely phrase, distant but in an en- tion that its construction of that statute tirely separate clause from the one into was not grammatical “[t]he most natural opinion which [the inserts it.”24 Court’s] was, reading”21 the dissenting opinion as Nonetheless, Court, preserve out, pointed an “understatement statute’s constitutionality, chose the un point of like saying distortion —rather grammatical construction “knowingly” ordinarily preferred plus total two modify must the element engaging “minor two is four.”22 That statute reads: in sexual conduct.” (a) Any who— Here, phrase we must construe cre- (1) knowingly transports ships in in- private ates a cause of against action or foreign by any terstate commerce “person knowingly who accepts makes or mails, including by computer means contribution or makes a cam- any depiction, visual if— paign expenditure [Chapter in violation of (A) the producing of such visual de- 253 of the Election The word Code].”25 piction involves the use of a minor en- “knowingly” phrase modifies the contain-

gaging conduct; sexually explicit Code],” ing “in violation of [the Election (B) such visual depiction is of such con- and these words are nowhere near re- duct; mote from one another as the relevant (2) receives, distributes, words are the X-Citement statute. And knowingly while it be “natural” any depiction give visual the stat- that has been mailed, reading ute the shipped today, or has Court does it is been or trans- “natural,” no less ported gram- and indeed it is foreign interstate or com- *35 merce, sound, matically or to take the which contains materials Constitution into account and “knowingly” which have been mailed construe shipped or so or modify phrase, the' entire in- transported, by succeeding any including by means cluding “in computer, violation of Election knowingly reproduces any [the depiction Code].” visual for distribution in inter- foreign state or commerce or through statutory X-Citement’s method of con- mails, the if— particularly struction instructive. (A) producing the of such visual de- There, obscenity the federal child act ei- piction involves the use of a minor en- transporting ther criminalized material conduct;

gaging in sexually explicit and person doing when the so knew the mate- (B) such visual depiction is of such con- rial sexually involved minors and was ex- ... duct. plicit, in which case it would have been indicates, emphasized As the in language exactly constitutional. And that’s what the (a)(1) (a)(2) Or, sections the word “know- majority X-Citement concluded. the ingly” very remote the phrase from act criminalized transporting such material engaging sexually explicit “minor in merely person con- when the it transporting appear duct”—the words do not even in knew it being transported, was in which subsection, they separat- the same are case it would have been unconstitutional. involving ed clauses elements And that’s what the X-Citement dissent transport or distribution and of visual de- concluded. J., X-Citement, (Scalia, Id. at 68. at 81 dis- senting). (Scalia, J., dissenting). Id. at 81 253.131(a) (emphasis § 25. Tex. Elec.Code X-Citement, (quoted §

23. 18 U.S.C. in added). 68) added). (emphasis 513 U.S. at in made clear other sec- Legislature here, says the Election Code Likewise it spe- when the Election Code says a tions of one two Either it that things. require person a cifically simply be wanted person punished can because See, e.g., expendi- being the law is violated. person knowingly that made an know (“A 253.003(b) person ture, unconstitu- in which it would be case Elec.Code Tex. political Or, accept can be says person knowingly that not may tional. expendi- to have person person if that an knows punished makes contribution the chapter”) expenditure ture that the this knowledge been made violation of 253.005(a) (“A Code, added); case per- violates the Election which (emphasis other the statute is free of con- autho- (assuming knowingly not make or son defects) be constitu- wholly stitutional it would expenditure political rize tional. from a contribution partly made in have person knows to been despite compelling reasons for But these (emphasis chapter.”) violation of construction, my and the plurality con- added). clearly Legislature knew currence26 misconstrue X-Citement actor require that have how to Peca’s adopt Judge argument instead before knowledge the Election Code 253.131(a) modifies “knowingly” section Because being charged with violation. only spending, act of contributing a similar Legislature did include Code; is, violating person all a requirement knowledge “know” can be needs to before that (a) ], presume to we should not 253.131[ held is the fact of a contribution or hable requirement ourselves.30 add expenditure, not that contribution or expenditure As violated Election Code. the Court’s only I Not does disagree. so, accepts its doing reason Court27 Act unconstitution- construction render any claim that other Judge Peca’s con- al, produces the ironic result it also 253.131(a) struction of section would make Judge pro- Peca are candidates like “ignorance of the law” defense.28 liability civil unaware tected from when short, Judge the Court chooses Peca’s con- Code, violating Election struction, concept, supporting abstract ordinary like Mr. and Mrs. while citizens supporting rather than a construction can liable twice the Osterberg Thus, First con- Amendment. the Court *36 the they expend for most amount even (a) ], “in 253.131[ cludes that section ‘know- unknowing Nei- innocuous of violations. is ingly’ applies only to whether one mak- nor ther Election structure sec- the Code’s ing ‘campaign ‘campaign a contribution’ or 253.131(a)’s compels this un- language tion ” expenditure’ by as defined the statute.29 Rather, the constitutional construction. provisions on which the Court relies justifies Code divorcing “knowing-

The Court intent that all equally suggest legislative ly” the violation from Election Code alike, are persons, candidates and citizens claiming provisions in the two other protected liability from civil for unlawful Legisla- demonstrate the Election Code contributions, whether how a require ture knew to defendant received, knew the they unless knowledge conduct was made or have actual his violated the expenditures or contributions illegal requirement. it such a when wanted 253.003(b) liability imposes argument: I the Code. Section reiterate Court’s part join V of 28. See 12 S.W.3d at 38 Gonzales does not (citing Tex Penal Code Justice opinion, in Justice Ab- Justice Abbott’s which 8.03(a)). responds my reading bott to of X-Citement. at 38. does, however, join part 27. Justice Gonzales II, opinion; part the II Justice Abbott’s of requirement "knowingly” Court construes the 30. Id. at 38. 253.331(a). in section accepting only a argument contribution when the Court considered an similar to person rejected the it: knows the contribution violated Court’s 253.005(a) imposes Code. Section liability argued It that unless the scienter making with, an expenditure requirement from contri- is dispensed regula- bution person when the knows tion of the of distribution obscene mate- ineffective, rial Likewise, contribution will be as will violated the Code. booksellers 253.131(a) falsely knowledge disclaim their person section shields a from falsely deny books’ contents or reason to liability for an making expenditure or a suspect obscenity. might their We ob- contribution that violates the Code unless serve that it has been some time now person expenditure knows the or con- impotent since the law viewed itself as tribution provi- violates the Code. All three explore the actual state of a man’s sions underpinning— share common Eyewitness testimony mind. a book- liability is no there unless seller’s perusal hardly a book need be knows the or expenditure contribution vio- necessary proving element his lated Code.31 awareness of its contents. circum- my But Court criticizes construction stances warrant inference that the Election arguing Code it contained, he was aware of what a book 253.131(a)’s hamper “would pur- despite his denial.34 pose by undermining its enforceability. Second, knowledge even if a requirement problematic Enforcement would be- problematic, Legis- it’s the standard the cause future cases would focus on whether acknowledges, lature chose. As the Court the defendant specific pro- knew the code “it Legislature’s province, is within the visions, operat- whether defendant ours, degree knowledge establish ed legal interpretation.”32 under correct necessary Finally, violate a statute.”35 The Court contends that it would undercut the Court’s construction suffers from the legislative intent construe the statute to it problems same so-called identifies with “[a] allow defendant civil en- [to] avoid fact, my compounds construction. simply by refusing forcement learn by adding irony them further election laws.”33 Osterberg citizens like Mr. can be held First, parties prove This is absurd. can liable under the Election Code without “knowing” violations of the Election it, Code they knowing violated while candidates way the same they prove other claims with Judge like Peca can violate Code “knowing” primarily through impunity long so follow the Court’s element— proof circumstantial from blueprint which infer- “refusing to learn the election knowledge ence of can be made. Over 40 laws.” The approach, more sensible years ago. doubts, United States the one that avoids constitutional ("A *37 provisions person § 31.Other knowingly Election Code em- 253.133 who makes 253.131(a) accepts political a ploy same or contribution makes a structure as section or political expenditure chap- in violation of this to a focus whether knew contri- damages ter to is liable the state in the expenditure or bution violated the Code. See triple amount of the value of the 253.0341(d) unlawful ("A person who Tex. Elec.Code expenditure.”). contribution knowingly accepts makes or a contribution legislative [to caucus] violation of this (citations omitted). 32. 12 S.W.3d at 38 damages is section liable for state in triple amount of value of the unlawful contribution.”); 253.132(a) 33. ("A Id. at corpora- 38. Id. organization knowingly tion or labor campaign California, 34. makes contribution to Smith v. (1959) (citations expenditure L.Ed.2d 205 committee a direct omitted). Subchapter D violation is liable for dam- ages provided by politi- this section each as interest....”); opposing cal committee of 35. 12 at n. S.W.3d consis- is to construe the Election Code COMPANY, knowing violations be-

tently requiring as PETROLEUM DUBAI liability Industries, civil attaches. Conoco, fore Inc., Dresser Company, Dresser-Rand Inc. appeals’ the court of conclu- agree I with d/b/a Corporation, Tur Olga Aeroquip is no evidence Oster- Solar sion that there Energy the Election berg knowingly violated Incorporated Ser bines Peca cites Judge Code.36 evidence ESI, International, Ltd. vice a/k/a knowing of a vio- support the existence Petitioners, Inc., Osterberg that Albert lation Robert at Judge Peca’s remarks Biel heard February 1994 bar luncheon about Mr. KAZI, individually Alimuddin Sabiha compliance Osterberg’s lack of representative of the estate of Code, Mr. point Election and that some Sirajuddin Kazi, deceased, Alimuddin Osterberg about these com- Biel told Mr. guardian Alimud for Mumtaz and as is no that Mr.

ments. This evidence Ost- Alimuddin Kazi and Shehnaz din violating erberg he was the Election knew children, Sirajuddin Najmuddin Kazi, report failed make no Code when he Sirajuddin Kazi, Kazi, father, Farida days eight later than before the election. mother, Respondents. does that he Osterberg dispute Mr. making Election Code

violated the No. 97-1068. report timely Judge in a fashion. But showing no presented Peca evidence when Court of Texas. Osterberg Judge Mr. found out about timing Peca’s comments. The of the viola- Sept. Argued important knowledge require- tion is ment. violation occurred on date Feb. Decided report when the was to be filed. There is

no in this record that Mr. Oster- evidence

berg was aware on that date that before required report the Election Code Judge presented Had filed. Peca some supporting

evidence inference reasonable reported Judge

that Mr. Biel Peca’s com- to Mr. Osterberg

ments before due, my was conclusion would be different. Judge

But Peca offered no such evidence.

Accordingly, there no Mr. evidence Ost- knowingly the Election

erberg violated

Code.

The Court misconstrues

258.131(a). proper, Under the constitu- 253.131(a), reading Judge of section

tional prove had burden to Mr. Oster-

Peca Code.

berg knowingly violated Election Peca failed to meet that burden.

Judge I

Accordingly, dissent. *38 at 128.

36. 952 S.W.2d

Case Details

Case Name: Osterberg v. Peca
Court Name: Texas Supreme Court
Date Published: Feb 8, 2000
Citation: 12 S.W.3d 31
Docket Number: 97-1027
Court Abbreviation: Tex.
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