In re S.M., 403 P.3d 324

Background

S.M. expressed suicidal intent, was found with a noose and taken to hospital; medical examiner concluded outpatient treatment was inadequate and the State filed a petition for involuntary civil commitment.
At the initial hearing S.M. sought to waive appointed counsel and proceed pro se; the court initially designated counsel as standby but then, after counsel filed a notice citing § 53-21-119(1), MCA and In re N.A., the court informed S.M. he could not waive counsel and counsel remained appointed.
A certified mental health professional reported S.M. posed a high risk of suicide and recommended court-ordered, community-based outpatient treatment.
During a recess, S.M., his appointed counsel, and the prosecutor negotiated and signed a stipulation that S.M. suffered from a mental disorder and needed commitment to community-based outpatient treatment; the District Court approved and ordered commitment.
S.M. appealed, mounting a facial constitutional challenge to § 53-21-119(1), MCA ("the right to counsel may not be waived"), arguing violation of the Sixth Amendment (self-representation) and the Fourteenth Amendment (substantive due process).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation applies to civil commitment proceedings	S.M.: Faretta right to represent oneself extends to involuntary civil commitment	State: Sixth Amendment applies only to "criminal prosecutions" and not civil commitment	Court: Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil commitment; Faretta is inapplicable
Whether § 53-21-119(1), MCA (no waiver of counsel) violates substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment	S.M.: Right to self-representation is a fundamental liberty interest deeply rooted in history	State: No historical tradition of pro se in commitment proceedings; statute furthers legitimate interests in fairness and accuracy	Court: Right is not "deeply rooted"; statute is rationally related to legitimate state interests and is constitutional
Whether the statute’s prohibition on waiver fails a facial challenge	S.M.: Statute unlawfully denies autonomy to proceed pro se in all cases	State: Legislature reasonably limited waiver to protect due process and integrity of commitments	Court: Facial challenge fails; statute has a plainly legitimate sweep and survives rational-basis review
Whether respondent can nonetheless meaningfully participate in proceedings	S.M.: Pro se participation is core autonomy interest	State: Counsel requirement need not foreclose respondent participation	Court: Respondents retain robust participatory rights; counsel must consult and permit client involvement when appropriate (citing professional conduct rules and prior cases)

Key Cases Cited

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (recognized Sixth Amendment right to self-representation in criminal trials)
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000) (Sixth Amendment rights are confined to criminal prosecutions)
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (competency and limits on self-representation where mental illness impairs capacity)
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (civil commitment requires due process protections because of significant deprivation of liberty)
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (facial challenge standard; statute must have a plainly legitimate sweep)
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (due process core emphasizes fairness between State and individual)
In re N.A., 309 P.3d 27 (Mont. 2013) (interpreting participation of respondent and the insufficiency of mere standby counsel in Montana proceedings)
In re J.S., 401 P.3d 197 (Mont. 2017) (civil-commitment counsel rights grounded in due process, not Sixth Amendment)
In re K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001) (recognizing different constitutional protections in civil commitment contexts)