in Re R.B. and J.B.
02-16-00387-CV
| Tex. App. | Nov 17, 2016Background
- J.B. (born 2003) was adopted by her maternal grandparents (Relators) in 2006; adoption terminated biological mother E.B.’s parental rights.
- E.B. later married S.B.; J.B. lived with E.B. and S.B. at various times (special powers of attorney were executed in 2014 and 2015 authorizing temporary custody and school enrollment).
- In summer 2016 J.B. returned to live with the Relators in Floresville; shortly after, E.B. and S.B. filed a SAPCR seeking joint managing conservatorship and primary-residence authority.
- Relators filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing E.B. and S.B. lacked statutory standing under Tex. Fam. Code §102.006(a); the trial court denied the plea and entered temporary orders allowing limited E.B. access.
- The court of appeals reviewed whether §102.006(a) (which limits filing by certain persons after termination of parent-child relationship) divested E.B. and S.B. of standing despite §102.003(a)(9) (actual care, control, and possession).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (E.B./S.B.) | Defendant's Argument (Relators) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §102.006(a) bars E.B. and S.B. from filing SAPCR after E.B.'s parental rights were terminated | Best-interest of child and §102.003(a)(9) (six months' possession) allow E.B. and S.B. to invoke jurisdiction; S.B. became family later and should not be barred | §102.006(a) expressly limits standing of former parents and relatives of former parents; it divests E.B. and S.B. of standing despite §102.003 | Court: §102.006(a) limits standing here; E.B. (former parent) and S.B. (relative by marriage) lack standing; plea to jurisdiction should have been granted |
| Whether the trial court may use §153.002 (best interest) to override §102.006 jurisdictional bar | The court can consider best interest to allow jurisdiction despite §102.006 | §153.002 is substantive and cannot override a jurisdictional standing limitation; specific statute (§102.006) controls | Court: §153.002 does not displace §102.006's jurisdictional limit |
| Whether Relators consented under §102.006(b) (consent exception) via military power of attorney | The power of attorney granted temporary custody and therefore consented to suit | Power of attorney only authorized temporary custody/school/medical decisions and did not consent to filing suit; Relators challenged the suit | Court: Power of attorney did not constitute consent to this SAPCR; exception inapplicable |
| Whether §102.006 is unconstitutional under Texas open-courts provision as applied | Denying access is arbitrary when nonparents in similar circumstances would have standing | Legislature’s finality/permanency interests justify limiting standing; not arbitrary or unreasonable | Court: No open-courts violation; statute is a permissible limitation on standing |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. 2010) (mandamus relief standard and clear abuse of discretion)
- Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (standards for mandamus and interlocutory review)
- Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) (standing as component of subject-matter jurisdiction)
- M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. 2001) (court lacks authority if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction)
- In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013) (statutory specificity can limit application of general best-interest provision)
- In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2009) (deference to trial-court factual findings in jurisdictional context)