In re Michael D.
2015 IL 119178
Ill.2016Background
- Minor Michael D. was found guilty after a bench trial on two misdemeanor theft counts; one count was later acquitted. The trial court then entered a continuance under supervision (one year) post‑guilt, ordered TASC evaluation and $160 restitution, and did not adjudge him a ward.
- The supervision/conditions were recorded in both a “Supervision Order” and a “Sentencing Order” that checked "No finding or judgment of guilty entered." The court advised of appeal rights and appointed counsel.
- Michael appealed; the appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that supervision orders are not final and no Supreme Court rule authorizes interlocutory appeals of juvenile post‑guilt supervision orders.
- The question presented to the Illinois Supreme Court was whether (under the Constitution or court rules) a juvenile may appeal a continuance under supervision entered after a delinquency finding, and whether the Court should amend rules to permit such appeals.
- The Supreme Court held the post‑guilt continuance under supervision is not a final, appealable order and no supreme court rule currently authorizes appeal of such juvenile interlocutory orders; it declined to amend the rules in this opinion and affirmed dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a post‑delinquency continuance under supervision is a final, appealable order | Michael: post‑guilt supervision is a final, appealable order analogous to adult supervision | State: supervision is a continuance, not a final dispositional order; juvenile supervision is not a final judgment | Held: Not a final judgment; supervision occurs before adjudication/disposition and thus is not appealable as final |
| Whether Supreme Court rules make juvenile post‑guilt supervision orders appealable | Michael: rules should be read or construed to permit appeal; if unclear, interpret to avoid unconstitutional result | State: existing rules do not apply; Rule 604(b) governs adult supervision only and Rule 662 does not include supervision orders | Held: No supreme court rule currently provides for appeal of juvenile post‑guilt supervision orders |
| Constitutional challenge — denial of right to appeal (Art. VI, §6) | Michael: denying appeals violates constitutional right to appeal and equal protection compared to adults | State: Art. VI §6 guarantees appeals only from final judgments; rulemaking power to allow interlocutory appeals rests with the Court; juveniles not similarly situated to adults | Held: No constitutional violation — the constitutional appeal right is limited to final judgments and rulemaking power is exclusive to the Court; equal protection claim fails because juveniles are not similarly situated to adults |
| Whether the Court should amend rules sua sponte (bypass Rule 3 process) to permit appeals | Michael: Court should amend rules now (as it did in B.C.P.) to provide parity with adults and protect juvenile appellate rights | State: Rulemaking is for the rules committee/public process; juveniles have alternative paths (vacatur/dismissal or later appeal after adjudication) and harms are overstated | Held: Court declines to amend rules in the opinion; refers the issue to the rules committee/public process rather than changing rules sua sponte |
Key Cases Cited
- Kirwan v. Welch, 133 Ill. 2d 163 (1989) (supervision is not a final judgment; it defers disposition until supervision ends)
- In re Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 359 (2009) (juvenile delinquency phases: findings, adjudicatory, dispositional; final judgment is dispositional order)
- In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d 122 (1982) (dispositional order as final judgment in juvenile delinquency cases)
- In re B.C.P., 2013 IL 113908 (2013) (Court modified rules to permit State appeals of interlocutory suppression orders in juvenile cases; explained limits of incorporating criminal rules)
- In re Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d 134 (2010) (prior statutory framework limited supervision to pre‑delinquency entry)