In re: James Allen Irby, III v.
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9736
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- In 2003 James Irby murdered Terrence Deadwyler (shot and stabbed) and set his clothes on fire; Irby was convicted of second-degree retaliatory murder (18 U.S.C. §1513/§1111), causing death with a firearm (18 U.S.C. §§924(c) & 924(j)), and arson (§844(i)).
- Jury convicted on Counts 2 and 3 and of second-degree retaliatory murder as a lesser-included offense of Count 1; Irby received a 38-year sentence.
- Irby’s initial §2255 motion was denied; he sought authorization to file a successive §2255 invoking Johnson v. United States (invalidating the ACCA residual clause).
- Irby argued Johnson’s reasoning should invalidate the §924(c) predicate because murder might not qualify as a "crime of violence" under §924(c)(3).
- The Fourth Circuit applied the categorical approach and concluded murder necessarily involves the "use of physical force" under §924(c)(3)(A)’s force clause, so Johnson (targeting the residual clause) did not help Irby.
- Court denied authorization for the successive §2255 because Irby failed to make a plausible claim for relief: second-degree retaliatory murder is categorically a crime of violence under the force clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson’s invalidation of the ACCA residual clause permits a successive §2255 challenge to Irby’s §924(c) conviction | Johnson applies to §924(c) residual clause; murder might not qualify as a crime of violence, so §924(c) enhancement is invalid | Johnson is limited to the residual clause and does not affect offenses that qualify under §924(c)’s force clause; second-degree murder requires use of physical force | Denied — Johnson is inapplicable; Irby failed to show a plausible claim for relief |
| Whether second-degree retaliatory murder is a "crime of violence" under §924(c)(3)(A) (force clause) using the categorical approach | Murder can be committed by indirect means and hypotheticals show it might not require "physical force" under some formulations | Murder necessarily involves the use (even indirect) of physical force capable of causing pain or injury; Castleman and Curtis Johnson support that indirect application (e.g., poison) is still "use of force" | Held — Second-degree retaliatory murder is categorically a crime of violence under the force clause |
| Whether Castleman and Curtis Johnson foreclose the idea that indirect means (poison, devices) are not "use of force" | Irby relied on hypotheticals and Torres-Miguel to argue indirect means can avoid the force element | Castleman rejects the distinction; use of devices or indirect means knowingly to cause bodily harm is "use of force" | Held — Castleman undermines Torres-Miguel; indirect application still qualifies as force |
| Whether Torres-Miguel compels a contrary result that murder need not involve physical force | Torres-Miguel was cited to argue threats/poisoning hypotheticals exclude force | Castleman supersedes Torres-Miguel’s poison-based reasoning; Torres-Miguel is distinguishable and its reasoning is rejected | Held — Torres-Miguel’s poisoning rationale is no longer persuasive in light of Castleman |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (made Johnson retroactive on collateral review)
- Johnson v. United States (Curtis Johnson), 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (interpreted "physical force" in ACCA as force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (holding that causing bodily injury requires physical force and that indirect means can constitute "use of force")
- United States v. Hubbard, 825 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (articulated the two-step showing required for authorization to file a successive §2255)
- United States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2016) (applied the categorical approach to §924(c) and held armed bank robbery is a crime of violence under the force clause)
- United States v. Alfaro, 835 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2016) (rejected an interpretation that would classify murder outside the force clause while keeping lesser offenses inside)