599 B.R. 173
Bankr. N.D. Fla.2019Background
- Debtor Dahlia Harrison filed Chapter 13 on March 26, 2018—one day before a scheduled foreclosure sale of her claimed homestead (the Chipley Property).
- Despite notice of the bankruptcy filing (Debtor delivered petitions to state counsel and the county clerk), Deltona proceeded with the foreclosure sale on March 27, 2018 and was sole bidder.
- Deltona obtained a certificate of title, changed locks, posted no-trespassing signs, turned off utilities, and kept Debtor out of the property for ~94 days post‑petition.
- Debtor, proceeding pro se, filed a sanctions motion; Deltona and its bankruptcy counsel (Fuqua & Milton) delayed admitting the sale and took no immediate action to undo the post‑petition possession.
- After evidentiary hearings, the bankruptcy court found Deltona and its counsel willfully violated the § 362 automatic stay, awarded compensatory (including emotional distress) and punitive damages, and ordered counsel to show cause why additional Rule 9011 sanctions should not be imposed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the post‑petition foreclosure sale and continued possession violated the automatic stay and were willful | Harrison: sale and continued lockout occurred with actual notice of petition; failure to undo conduct makes violations willful | Deltona: initial sale was mistake of state counsel; argued stay annulled or Debtor acted in bad faith | Court: Violations occurred and were willful; knowledge + intentional acts satisfied Eleventh Circuit willfulness test |
| Whether bankruptcy counsel should be liable for stay violations | Harrison: counsel learned of sale on appearance and failed to undo it; their inaction and misleading filings aided continuing violations | Counsel: asserted legal grounds (bad faith, stay annulled) and did not immediately vacate sale | Court: Counsel willfully violated stay by failing to act and making false/misleading representations; liable under § 362(k) and § 105(a) |
| Whether Debtor proved emotional distress damages without medical evidence | Harrison: proved significant, non‑fleeting distress via testimony, video, and corroboration of conduct (lockout, stalking, law‑enforcement encounter) | Deltona: argued medical evidence required or distress was insufficient (relied on Lodge) | Court: Emotional distress awarded—evidence met Eleventh Circuit standard for significant distress; medical proof not required for egregious violations |
| Whether punitive damages and other sanctions are appropriate | Harrison: defendants acted egregiously, vindictively, and in bad faith—punitive damages needed to deter | Deltona: challenged multiplier limits and sought offset against amounts due under foreclosure judgment | Court: Punitive damages appropriate as conduct was egregious; offset denied (no mutuality/equity); counsel ordered to show cause re: Rule 9011 sanctions |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Horne, 876 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 2017) (attorney liability and inclusion of attorney fees in § 362(k) actual damages)
- Lodge v. Kondaur Capital Corp., 750 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2014) (standards for emotional distress damages under § 362(k))
- In re Soares, 107 F.3d 969 (1st Cir. 1997) (automatic stay operates immediately upon filing)
- Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539 (11th Cir. 1996) (court may impose sanctions under inherent authority)
- Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2004) (creditor knowledge of stay sufficient for willfulness analysis)
- In re Lansaw, 853 F.3d 657 (3d Cir. 2017) (emotional distress may be recoverable as actual damages under § 362(k))
- Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (Supreme Court discussion of punitive/compensatory ratios)
