In re Derrico G., 2014 IL 114463

Minor (Derrico G.) pleaded guilty to aggravated battery on a public way as part of a negotiated plea recommending 18 months’ felony probation; other charges were nolle prossed or struck pursuant to the plea.
The trial court accepted the plea but delayed entering judgment pending a social investigation and possible disposition.
Under pre-2014 §5-615 of the Juvenile Court Act, a court could order a continuance under supervision before a finding of delinquency only if no listed party (including the State’s Attorney) objected; the State objected here and insisted on probation.
The trial judge sua sponte found the State’s pre‑finding veto provision unconstitutional (separation of powers, equal protection, due process) and entered continuance under supervision over the State’s objection.
Illinois Supreme Court granted direct review; it reversed the trial court’s constitutional ruling, vacated the supervision order, and remanded for proceedings consistent with the plea agreement and statutory scheme.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §5‑615’s pre‑finding consent/State veto violates separation of powers	Trial court: Executive (State’s Attorney) veto over a sentence usurps judicial sentencing power	State: Legislature may allocate prefinding diversion decisions to executive branch; precedent permits prosecutorial discretion	The veto provision is constitutional; no separation‑of‑powers violation (court reversed)
Whether §5‑615 violates equal protection	Trial court/respondent: Juveniles are disadvantaged because adult supervision statutes lack a State veto	State: Juveniles are not similarly situated to adults; negotiated plea and felony status distinguish respondent	No equal protection violation (respondent not similarly situated; negotiated plea bars claim)
Whether §5‑615 was arbitrarily or unconstitutionally applied / due process	Trial court: State’s decision was arbitrary and enforced without standards; judge sought prosecutor justification	State: Prosecutorial charging and settlement discretion is broad and not subject to compelled justification; facts/support for objection existed	No due process violation; State’s objection was reasonable and not arbitrary

In re Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d 134 (2010) (construed §5‑615 to allow State’s Attorney to object to pre‑finding supervision)
In re T.W., 101 Ill. 2d 438 (1984) (upheld consent requirement for prefinding juvenile supervision)
People ex rel. Devine v. Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d 445 (2007) (addressed post‑finding vacatur and limits on court’s remedial authority)
People v. Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d 93 (1988) (recognized broad prosecutorial discretion and rejected requiring prosecutors to justify charging decisions)
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (Supreme Court on prosecutorial discretion and capital sentencing disparities)
People v. Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d 531 (1979) (approved prosecutor discretion in juvenile removal/transfer decisions)
People v. Phillips, 66 Ill. 2d 412 (1977) (upheld executive role in prefinding diversion decisions without infringing judicial sentencing power)
People v. Hammond, 2011 IL 110044 (2011) (discussed how legislature may define or restrict State’s Attorney authority and recognized prefinding diversion distinctions)