In re: Dearnta Thomas, 988 F.3d 783

In 2011 Dearnta Thomas pleaded guilty to a substantive RICO offense and to violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) based on aiding and abetting a VICAR (18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3)) assault with a dangerous weapon; the VICAR predicates were two Virginia statutes, Va. Code §§ 18.2-53.1 and 18.2-282.
Thomas received a 180‑month sentence and did not appeal. He later sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The Supreme Court decided Johnson (2015) and Dimaya (2018), striking residual‑clause vagueness provisions; Thomas filed a § 2255 motion after Dimaya, which the district court denied as time‑barred.
The Supreme Court then decided Davis (2019), holding § 924(c)’s residual clause unconstitutional; Thomas moved for authorization to file a successive § 2255 based on Davis.
The Fourth Circuit considered (1) whether Davis announces a new rule made retroactive to collateral cases and (2) whether Thomas made a plausible claim that his § 924(c) conviction is invalid without the residual clause.
The court held that Davis is a new substantive rule that Supreme Court precedent makes retroactive and that Thomas has stated a plausible claim warranting authorization to file a successive § 2255 in district court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Davis announced a new rule and is retroactive on collateral review	Davis invalidates §924(c)’s residual clause and thus announces a new substantive rule that should apply retroactively	Government effectively conceded retroactivity in briefing; did not press contrary position	Court: Davis is a new substantive rule and, under Supreme Court precedent (e.g., Welch, Schriro, Tyler), is retroactive to collateral cases
Whether Thomas’s §924(c) challenge is plausible enough to authorize a successive §2255	Thomas contends his VICAR predicates (Va. Code §§18.2-53.1, 18.2-282) do not satisfy §924(c)’s force clause absent the residual clause, making his §924(c) conviction invalid	Government points to alternative analysis (examining the VICAR element "assault with a dangerous weapon") and authority suggesting that element may satisfy the force clause, so relief might fail	Court: On a prima facie/plausibility review, Thomas’s claim is plausible (competing approaches exist); authorization to file a successive §2255 is granted

Davis v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (invalidating §924(c)’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (invalidating ACCA residual clause; treated as announcing a new substantive rule)
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (invalidating §16 residual clause; relied upon in later vagueness decisions)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (holding Johnson announced a new substantive rule that is retroactive)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for when new rules apply retroactively)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (distinguishing substantive rules from procedural rules for retroactivity)
Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001) (explaining how Supreme Court decisions can make rules retroactive)
United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2019) (examined whether VICAR offenses predicated on Virginia statutes qualify under §924(c)’s force clause)
United States v. Keene, 955 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2020) (held VICAR conviction requires proof of the enumerated federal offense element, suggesting analysis can focus on the assault-with-a-dangerous-weapon element)
In re Irby, 858 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 2017) (standards for prima facie showing to obtain authorization for successive habeas)
In re Hubbard, 825 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (same; guidance on cursory merits glance and plausibility standard)