in Re Austin Matson, 332780

Background

Respondent (Austin Matson) sexually touched his 2½-year-old adopted twin sisters on three occasions when he was 16; the incidents were reported ~3 years later when the children were ~5½.
Prosecutor charged respondent with two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-2) after respondent turned 19; the case was transferred to family division because he was under 17 at the time of the offenses.
Prosecutor moved to waive juvenile jurisdiction so respondent could be tried as an adult; respondent admitted culpability (waiving probable-cause phase) but the family court held a best-interest (phase II) hearing.
Court-appointed evaluator (Neumann) testified respondent posed a low-to-moderate recidivism risk, attributed the offenses to immaturity, opportunity, and pornography, and noted respondent’s ongoing voluntary counseling and strong family support.
Family court considered statutory waiver factors, gave great weight to offense seriousness but concluded that rehabilitation prospects and lack of predatory pathology weighed against waiver; denied waiver and, because respondent was an adult at the time of the hearing, the charges were dismissed.
Prosecutor appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by denying waiver and effectively immunizing respondent from adult prosecution.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether family court abused its discretion in denying prosecutor’s motion to waive juvenile jurisdiction	Waiver required because offenses were serious (CSC-2 on toddlers) and denial produced dismissal, leaving respondent unpunished	Denial proper because statutory factors (rehabilitative potential, lack of predatory pathology, voluntary treatment, family support) weigh against waiver	No abuse of discretion; denial affirmed
Whether seriousness of CSC-2 alone mandates waiver	Seriousness and victims’ young age demanded greater weight and waiver despite other factors	Legislature did not include CSC-2 in automatic-waiver list; seriousness alone insufficient	Court correctly declined to create a judicial automatic-waiver rule; seriousness, though heavily weighted, did not compel waiver
Whether court misweighed culpability and aggravating factors (planning, victim impact)	Culpability/aggravators (young victims) support waiver	Evaluator found acts opportunistic, not premeditated; admissions and treatment support rehabilitation	Court’s assessment of culpability and mitigating evidence was not clearly erroneous
Whether absence of juvenile-system punishment/programming requires waiver to adult court	Lack of juvenile dispositional options and programming necessitate waiver so punishment/programming can occur	Juvenile code emphasizes rehabilitation; respondent had voluntarily engaged in effective treatment reducing recidivism risk	Court permissibly considered informal rehabilitation; absence of formal juvenile sanctions did not mandate waiver

Key Cases Cited

People v Conat, 238 Mich. App. 134 (1999) (CSC-2 is not an automatic-waiver offense)
People v Schneider, 119 Mich. App. 480 (1982) (family court retains jurisdiction to hold waiver hearing even if subject is now an adult)
In re Wilson, 113 Mich. App. 113 (1982) (standard of review for waiver decisions)
In re Fultz, 211 Mich. App. 299 (1995) (analysis of waiver factors; denial may be abused when facts show extreme danger to public)
People v Fultz, 453 Mich. 937 (1996) (Supreme Court reversal on waiver abuse in an especially egregious case)
People v Buie, 491 Mich. 294 (2012) (abuse-of-discretion standard defined)
People v Dunbar, 423 Mich. 380 (1985) (juvenile code must be liberally construed to favor rehabilitation)
Miller v Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (juveniles’ lesser culpability and greater capacity for rehabilitation inform sentencing/juvenile considerations)
Graham v Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juveniles’ diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform affect punishment analysis)
People v Hana, 443 Mich. 202 (1993) (juvenile adjudication principles)
People v Schumacher, 75 Mich. App. 505 (1977) (prospects for rehabilitation must be seriously considered in juvenile cases)