Hunter v. County of Sacramento
652 F.3d 1225
| 9th Cir. | 2011Background
- Plaintiffs allege excessive force at the Sacramento County Main Jail under a county-wide custom or practice theory (Monell).
- Lt. Twomey testified repeated major incidents from 2000–2005 with insufficient investigations or discipline.
- The district court granted summary judgment on most claims; Monell claim against County survived to trial.
- Plaintiffs proposed supplemental Monell jury instructions detailing various ways to prove custom or practice, including inaction as evidence.
- The district court ultimately instructed with a Model 9.4 definition of practice or custom and did not adopt plaintiffs’ supplemental instructions.
- A jury verdict favored the County; district court denied a new-trial motion; plaintiffs appealed seeking new instructions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the court err by not giving supplemental Monell instructions? | Hunter-Eley obj. to omission; supplemental instructions clarifying practice/custom were needed. | County's Model 9.4 definition sufficed; supplemental instructions were unnecessary. | No; the court erred in not using plaintiffs’ supplemental instructions. |
| Was the Model 9.4 definition an incomplete statement of law for this case? | Definition too narrow; failed to cover evidence of inaction and repeated violations as custom. | Definition aligns with Monell framework and not inherently misleading. | Yes; the definition was incomplete and misleading in context. |
| Was the error prejudicial to plaintiffs given the evidence? | Evidence of repeated uninvestigated violations could have established a custom; proper instructions needed. | Any error was harmless due to other evidentiary support. | Prejudicial; not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
| Did plaintiffs properly object to the Monell instruction under Rule 51? | Proposed instructions clearly objected to the instruction as written and requested additions. | Objections were not specific or timely enough to preserve error. | Yes; proper, sufficiently specific objections were raised. |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court 1978) (municipal liability requires a policy or custom)
- Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (Supreme Court 1997) (requires policy or custom, not respondeat superior)
- Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 1996) (custom must be persistent and widespread)
- Nadell v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 268 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2001) (custom may be inferred from repeated violations)
- Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1992) (evidence of repeated violations supports custom)
- McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1986) (evidence of conduct can establish custom)
- Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2010) (objections may be sufficiently specific via proposed instructions)
- Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2005) (harmless error standard for jury instructions)
- Voohries-Larson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 241 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 2001) (plain error review for lack of proper objections)
- Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2002) (Graham factors inform excessive force analysis)
- Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (Supreme Court 2011) (expanded discussion of policy or custom evidence and knowledge)
