Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada

judgment of the district court on the equity skimming counts.

AFFIRMED. GIBSON,

Michelle Plaintiff-Appellant, WASHOE, NEVADA;

COUNTY OF Kirkland,

Richard Washoe Co. Sher

iff; Ray Wright, Washoe Co. Chief

Deputy Sheriff; Williams, John Wash Supervising Sgt.; Bowlin;

oe Co. Rob Wormington;

Jereme Michele

Youngs; Thomas; Cook; Scott Robert

Mary Cloud, individually Jean and in capacities deputy

their as sheriffs of Co., Defendants-Appellees.

Washoe

No. 99-17338.

United States Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit.

Argued April Submitted 2001. May

Filed

tended the district court that Coun- and the defendants ty individual violated process rights by substantive due they manner in which treated him on appeals from night he died. She now grant summary judg- the district court’s affirm ment the defendants. We with and, in regard to the individual officers County. with We con- part, regard clude, however, summary judgment improperly granted question on the was deliberately indif- whether the was ferent to Gibson’s mental illness while he jail. at the custody county appeal grant Because follows defendants, summary for the re judgment is de novo. To determine whether view fact, material genuine there is issue of take account all the we into reasonable non-moving par inferences that favor the Air, Inc., ty. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Cir.2002). 1054, 1061(9th F.3d Reno, Nevada, for Jerry Mowbray, H. appellant. the Background I. Shannon, R. Washoe Gregory A. Gibson’s Death Nevada, Office, Reno, Attorney’s District “Attempts Locate” The To appellees. for the Stephen from Gibson suffered manic de-

pressive He hospital- disorder. had been ized several times for the disorder from until in his death and was in the psychiatrist, Dr. regular care of Tannen- baum, at the time of his death. Dr. REINHARDT, Before: TASHIMA and prescribed Tannenbaum medications to BERZON, Judges. Circuit help Gibson his control illness. BERZON, Judge. January, late was enter- Circuit Gibson phase. Early the morning manic on February 3, Stephen On Gibson January Wednesday, pacing he was and suffered a heart attack died while home, agitatedly through pointing his his custody the County, the Washoe Neva- large at the and gun twirling walls knife da, Department. wife Sheriffs packed his hands. Gibson then his (“Ms.Gibson”) brought law- Michelle house, refusing the clothes and left to tell § suit under on behalf of U.S.C. going. Ms. Gibson he where was When children, herself, their two and Gibson’s suggested that he take one she sheriff, estate, and against County, he often during sedatives that used his deputies a number of the who sheriffs phases, up manic he told and were at her to shut duty on the Washoe up Ms. con- her night Gibson died. Gibson said he would “take to a pack cigarettes, this statement and as he Interpreting paid mountains.” them, safety, to Ms. Gibson change a threat her flung as his across the counter children, packed things, gathered her past the cashier. thought Miranda Gibson home. went to her in-laws’ Ms. Gib- and drunk, might be no on but smelled alcohol Hospital also contacted Hills to son West him. arrangements for Gibson’s admis-

make Gibson left the store and continued sion. behave He strangely. wandered around days, Ms. the next two Gibson Over parking lot near his truck for about police times —once called several minutes and to the returned store several Rich, company psychiatrist of Dr. on eventually times. got Gibson into at an effort to find call West Hills—in truck, which did not have license plates, hospital. him and have taken Gibson away. deputies, and drove The who be- dispatches over were broadcast Four lieved was possibly driving that Gibson County police frequen- and Washoe Reno1 drugs, under the of alcohol influence cies: attempt observed turn Gibson out of PM, February 1 at a notice On 9:33 was lot, up parking try then back the turn broadcast, name and providing Gibson’s again, successfully. this time Gibson then describing description missing him as dep- drove deputies’ sight. out of the The endangered. The broadcast stated parking up uties left the lot and caught depressive that Gibson was “a manic on with in time to observe him drive medications, [reported] to have a several straight through an intersection from and does 10-32 with him not like loaded deputies left-turn lane. The then radioed police officers.” dispatch that were they stopping possi- PM, February “attempt an On 3:58 pulled ble DUI driver and Gibson over. (“ATL”) broadcast, dispatch locate” was Although stopped, re- promptly he stating depressive, that Gibson manic ignition fused to turn off the or to leave wife, might threatened to kill his had deputies requested the truck him when the a gun be armed with or knives. to do so. day, At 5:15 PM that another ATL same get Because Gibson refused to out of the broadcast, describing was Gibson and stat- truck, door, Hodges1 opened the driver’s that, in accord with the directions of ing arm, grabbed pulled and him doctor, Rich, Dr. brought his he should be Although shouting from the truck. he was Hospital emergency Hills com- to West yelling police obscenities and that the were mitment. This ATL was rebroadcast at truck, going plant something to in his Gib PM. 10:39 physically cooperative, son then became patrol his stepping toward the car with 2. The Arrest hands directed. on his head as February after on Just 3:00 AM sobriety Hodges a field administered County Anthony Miranda deputies Washoe that not test. Gibson was adamant he had Hodges Richard encountered and Gibson agreed test, drinking, pep- been but a convenience Gibson left outside store. the with obscenities all the pering officers truck the running lights his with on and while. Gibson’s made adminis- behavior open the driver’s door while he went into Finally, tration of the difficult. after test store. him the Miranda followed inside. beer, coffee, cup Hodges up,” Gibson told to “shut the fuck bought Gibson and dispatch police services. City Washoe with the Reno for its contracted irons, chain, chains, leg wrist and and placed and Gib- enough, had deputies the booking him the area. dragged through under arrest. son photographed After Gibson was and heard the Hodges had not Miranda and alone, him, booked, in placed the officers when it was broadcast ATL about Gibson holding cell. evening. the course of During that earlier arrest, deputies in to their the called the Meanwhile, Miranda com- Hodges and the name and dispatcher to check Gibson’s and, paperwork, consistently pleted their various crime registration against truck’s policy, drug the con- delivered with Although dispatcher per- the databases. Hodges in truck to tainers found Gibson’s back to reported these checks and formed duty. nurse on The nurse confirmed the dispatcher notify the did not deputies, the Deputy Miranda that medications subject of that deputies Gibson was was suf- somebody to stabilize who were directing ATL that Gibson outstanding an mental As far as the fering from illness. com- emergency Hills for be taken West shows, however, no one else on record mitment. jail duty night at the that was told about Hodges truck searched Gibson’s When that from likelihood suffered Gibson arrest, pre- he several after the located and, illness, mental aside from conclusions with Gib- scription medication containers that could be drawn from Gibson’s behav- did Although name on the label. he son’s ior, suspect no one else had reason to that drugs, recognize names of so suffered. Gibson suspected they “psych Hodges that were slipped during night, Twice Gibson meds,” tak- might not be Gibson time, first out of his waist chain. The his medication. ing duty cell deputies on entered Gibson’s arrest, physically During the was Gibson difficulty. the chain little replaced with they as cooperative deputies with the Later, morning, 6:00 in Gibson around him, to swear at handcuffed but continued again, banged of the slipped out chain deputies put After the Gibson them. repeatedly against it the window his cell patrol car headed for Washoe túne, Williams, Sgt. This John who door. however, phys- County jail, Gibson became charge decided night, combative, ically kicking partition be- should be further restrained. As front seats. The tween the car’s and back deputies readied to enter hold- several notify called ahead to the deputies cell, fighting Gibson assumed a stance bringing they the officers there that were up with his fists and shouted obscenities at suspect. in a combative them. to con- Because Gibson was so difficult 3. The Jail trol, then gave the order trans- Williams ar- Deputies Hodges Miranda and When containing a special fer him to watch cell a with at the Washoe Jail Gib- rived and a bench with attached soft restraints son, patrol car. get he refused to out of the opened Williams the cell door as helmet. car deputies pulled from the Four Gibson sprayed Deputy quickly Robert Bowlin jail’s sally port, him into and carried pepper spray. in the face The Gibson with area jail’s booking the vestibule as fell officers shut cell door Gibson incoming are searched. where arrestees knees, spray screaming that the was his There, they placed face down on Gibson Bowlin, him. Scott Gibson, burning Deputies floor. As the officers searched Thomas, me, and Cook entered the out, Robert “Help called Jesus.” repeatedly he Gibson; grabbed a waist cell and the three holding with The officers restrained Gibson down, dep- officers held Gibson while more trolled manic state and officers’ efforts help uties came to take Gibson from the to restrain him “resulted in physiologi- a holding cell. cally stressful state for Mr. which essentially resulted in a heart attack.” deputies dragged

Several into Gibson special up watch cell and shifted him County’s B. The Policies lay onto the bench. As face Gibson down detailed, Washoe has numerous bench, Deputies on the Youngs Michelle policies written procedures and concerning and Mary Jean Cloud climbed onto his the intake of at jail. detainees Most legs, back and while the deputies other pertinent policies here are those pro- and helped legs. restrain arms and his relating cedures to the medical evaluation struggle. Deputy continued to Jeremy (Other of incoming policies detainees. are words, Wormington’s described later in opinion.) this put him on We his stomach. And he First, point was still at this kicking upon an bringing arrestee into the screaming and fighting everything sally port; deputy “visually must assess was, yelling us and he for being prisoner any ... for signs obvious pepper sprayed twice ... guy this had injury sickness or requiring medical atten- an incredible amount of fight him. I jail’s tion.” nursing The staff also evalu- just huge mean fight amount of ‘cause inmates, ..., ates “all upon arrival any are, time, here were at this I don’t re- signs obvious injury sickness or requir- many deputies member how were on ing immediate medical attention.”2 The him, trying but I was to control his medical screening process to be conducted head, blade, left his shoulder his left by a medical staff member consists of sev- forearm, I Deputy and remember Cloud steps: eral a visual assessment of in- right my on right his back and he mate, filling out a questionnaire, medical jumped, like I mean lifted himself off the completion prevention of a suicide screen- mean, ... I guy bed this was fighting. form, completion of a treatment all And of a sudden for some reason I If consent form. is unable to looked at his head and I looked at Cloud provide the medical care prisoner that a like, and we looked down and Cloud’s needs, may reject the medical staff pulse.” “Get prisoner, prisoner and the will be taken to However, hospital. “Medical paramedic An on-site and several of the Screening process delayed will be if the deputies immediately administered CPR. combative, inmate uncooperative un- later, Several paramed- minutes team of effectively able to questions answer due to ics arrived and took Mary’s Gibson to St. intoxication.” Hospital, but Gibson never revived.

According autopsy report, Second, to an the im- prisoner prescrip- has “[i]f mediate medication, cause of Gibson’s death was se- tion the intake nurse will be arteriosclerosis, vere a disease of requested which to evaluate the medication and neither he nor Ms. Gibson had been aware. make determination whether medi- The defendants’ expert placed medical testified property cation is secured inor that the “entire milieu” of Gibson’s uncon- Infirmary up for follow care.” County's procedures 2. regarding The prisoner when "[i]f evaluation the visible or has jail's the injuries.” medical staff should evaluate procedure incom- claimed Another states appear detainees somewhat to contradict that a medical staff member "will check all inmates, procedure one another. One upon facility." (empha- states that the arrival to the added). nursing requested staff will be to make an sis (3) addition, policy deputies’ that that individual County requires rights; the policies, practices or actions resulted from twenty- unit be jail’s the medical staffed County of sheriffs customs the Washoe per- licensed medical day four hours policies, practices department, and these respon- The staff has sole sonnel. medical to or customs caused contributed and/or if sibility determining prisoner for “the death, pro- in of violation his due Gibson’s to accepted facility into the due refused rights.4 cess 1995, County medical Until the reasons.” through County policies in- In addition the de- employed, also had the state’s to above, that insane, Ms. Gibson asserted scribed criminally for a full- stitution policies other contributed to Gib- several health time clinical mental worker son’s death. contended that the lack She perform screenings health of jail to mental system communicating outstanding for of a however, until inmates. From 1995 another, from to from ATL’s one shift and there was no mental health worker at the patrol deputies deputies on or medical function, county jail bé- perform jail, staff at the revealed deliberate indif- relationship of a cause soured between to the rights ference constitutional of jail’s hospital. medical and the mental staff ill. mentally argued Ms. also that Gibson the time in the Coun- At that Gibson died adequately failed to train its custody, County did ty’s consequently, the in deputies recognizing handling and men- jail. not at the The men- screen detainees tally they ill individuals whom encountered in tal health evaluation service resumed in the course of their duties. after, words, the in Sheriff Kirkland’s disposi The district court referred the department “patch[ed] up those sheriffs tion of defendants’ motion for sum feelings.” bad mary judgment magistrate to a who judge, all granting recommended motion as to Litigation II. This First, magis of Gibson’s claims. Ms. Gibson, herself, Ms. behalf of her on judge inadequa trate determined that the estate, children, husband’s and her filed communicating in cies ATL’s could § complaint against under U.S.C. rise to a constitutional be give violation and, in County, their official Washoe any county duty provide cause the lacks sheriff, capacities, county individual competent emergency gen services sheriff, deputy the chief ser- supervising public, DeShaney Winnebago citing eral geant, deputies and several were on who Servs., County Dept. Soc. 489 U.S. duty night at the that died.3 Gibson (1989). 109 S.Ct. 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1) alleged causes of She three action: Harris, Second, citing City Canton v. deputies the individual excessive used 103 L.Ed.2d on due force Gibson violation of his (1989), magistrate judge concluded (2) process rights; dep- that the individual allegations Ms. uties showed deliberate indifference to failed adequately to train its sher Gibson’s serious mental health condition deputies recognizing dealing iffs process mentally violation his substantive due with ill individuals lacked merit. Deputies Hodges, negligence granted who arrest- district Miranda claims. The court defendants, ed were not named as summary judg- defendants' motion duty. nor was the on nurse ment on the consortium claim and declined to supplemental jurisdiction exercise over the alleged §a 4. Ms. Gibson also 1983 cause 1367(c). § state-law See 28 claims. U.S.C. deprivation liberty action for of her interest in rulings. appealed Ms. has not these consortium, her two husband’s state-law

1185 pattern First, was no evidence of a of a injury. There constitutional plaintiff a resulting violations from fail- can constitutional show that a municipality itself violated recognize ure to detainees’ mental illness- someone’s rights or that it directed its . es, concluded, magistrate judge employee nor to do so Board of deputies in recogniz- Brown, was the need to train Bryan County Comm’rs 520 of 397, 404, ing dealing mentally 1382, and with ill individu- U.S. S.Ct. 137 L.Ed.2d 117 (1994). als “so that the to do Alternatively, so 626 obvious” failure in limited situa tions, likely to result in plaintiff constitutional viola- a can demonstrate that a Third, characterizing municipality responsible tions. Gibson’s seri- for a constitu health ous condition as his mental ill- tional by tort committed employee, its disease, ness but as his severe heart even though it did not direct employee magistrate Id., 406-07, concluded that the individual to commit the tort. at 117 1382; Canton, defendants did not show 387, deliberate indif- S.Ct. 489 at U.S. 109 Finally, ference to his health. magis- S.Ct. 1197. judge rejected trate the contention that Under one liability, route to a the individual defendants had used exces- municipality may 1983, § be liable under in moving sive force Gibson from his hold- just are, persons as natural when because ing restraining special cell and him in the Congress § enacted 1983 it “intended]

watch cell. municipalities and government other local After considering rejecting Ms. Gib- units to among persons be included those objections magistrate’s report son’s to the Monell, § to applies.”5 .whom recommendation, court district 689, U.S. 2018. To show that granted the defendants’ motion for sum- municipality rights violated someone’s mary judgment. appeals. Ms. Gibson so, or employees instructed its to do plaintiff prove can municipality Analysis III. acted with required “the state of mind County Liability I. prove violation,” underlying just as a A municipality may be hdld liable plaintiff does when he alleges or she that a brought § under a claim under only person natural has violated his federal municipality when injury, inflicts an Comm’rs, rights. Board of may it not be held liable under Examples U.S. at 117 S.Ct. 1382. of respondeat superior theory. Monell v. path municipal liability this direct in Services, City New York Dept. Social city’s policy discriminating clude: a of of 658, 694, 436 U.S. 98 S.Ct. 56 against pregnant women violation of the (1978). L.Ed.2d 611 Amendment, Monell, Fourteenth 611; 56 L.Ed.2d A. County Liability Two Paths to policy-maker’s employees order to its At least two routes can lead to the capiases6 serve violation of the Fourth municipality Amendment, conclusion that a City has inflicted Pembaur v. Cincin- laws, part: party injured Section 1983 states in shall be liable to the law, who, equity, Every person in an action at suit in or other any under color of stat- ute, ordinance, custom, regulation, proper proceeding or us- for redress.... age, any Territory State or the District Columbia, capias 6. “A is a writ of attachment command- subjects, or causes to be sub- county bring subpoenaed official to jected, any citizen of the United States or appear person witness who has failed to before the jurisdiction other within thereof deprivation any rights, testify privileges, court to and to answer for civil con- tempt.” or immunities secured the Constitution 475 U.S. at 472 106 S.Ct. 1292. n. 1186

nati, 469, 1292, However, because held 106 S.Ct. 89 S.Ct. Monell 475 U.S. (1986); a county policy municipality may and. a that not be held liable L.Ed.2d 452 place aggres- respondeat superior, will a policymakers theory that know under of a in passive plaintiff municipality’s sive and homosexuals the same that the must show passive jail cell in of the homosex- to its violation deliberate indifference led omission right per- ual’s Amendment Fourteenth the employee and that the omission caused County v. San security. sonal Redman to commit Id. the constitutional violation. of (9th Cir.1991) (en 387, 1435 Diego, 942 F.2d prove at 1197. To deliber- banc).7 indifference, plaintiff ate -the must show municipality that the was on actual con- or route munici a second Under omission structive notice its would pality plaintiff allege need not liability, a likely result in a constitutional violation. municipality itself violated some Brennan, 825, 841, Farmer v. 511 114 U.S. or one rights one’s constitutional directed (1994). 1970, S.Ct. 128 L.Ed.2d 811 Com- Instead, so. of its to do employees pared to the more direct route to munici- plaintiff through omis allege can its above, pal liability discussed “much more responsible municipality sions is for problems presented proof’ difficult of are by violation committed one constitutional city employee in a case acting where though employees, of its even the munici constitutionally policy under a valid violat- pality’s facially constitutional, policies were rights. County ed someone’s Board of municipality employ did not direct the Comm’rs, at 117 520 U.S. S.Ct. 1382. action, ee to unconstitutional take the in As the now municipality did not of record stands the case have the state court, prove currently Ms. required underlying mind vio before Canton, 387-89, at may municipal lation. 489 U.S. 109 be to demonstrate lia- able (the individual, municipal any single 7. The defendants from the conduct of but policy-makers, gov its Sheriff Kirkland and Chief from the behavior of interactive several officials, Wright) Deputy assert may Sheriff that if we con whom ernment each of be act clude, do, infra, (citation omitted). faith.”) we see that the individual good as And in violating deputy Luman, are not liable for Fairley (9th defendants 281 F.3d 913 Cir. v. rights, they 2002), Gibson's constitutional then are explicitly rejected municipality's we liability. correspondingly absolved of Al argument held that it could not be liable as a though certainly there are circumstances in matter of because the had deter law correct, City proposition which this see of mined that individual officers had inflict Heller, 796, 799, Angeles U.S. Los v. 106 injury. ed no constitutional Id. 916. “If a Quin (1986) S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d 806 plaintiff established he suffered constitutional City Downey, 84 tanilla v. F.3d by injury City, the fact that individual (9th Cir.1996), rejected has been as an it officers is immaterial are exonerated to liabil requirement both inflexible this court and ity (emphasis original); § under 1983.” Id. Supreme Court. (9th Andaya, also Hopkins see v. 958 F.2d 881 Cir.1992). municipality example, may For be liable if case, event, any in this the constitutional an officer is exonerated the ba- individual on may violations which we hold the qualified immunity, sis the defense be- be liable occurred of the actions immunity cause even if an officer is entitled to before jail, defendants at the so the Coun- individual might a constitutional violation have oc- still Gates, ty being See, is not liable for what those held e.g., v. curred. 27 F.3d Chew violations, (9th Cir.1994). deputies County’s did. The as we Or a munici- 1438-39 later, develop pality involved the decision to commit may liability even if be liable cannot be custody jail deputies of the single Gibson to ascribed to a individual Owen officer. 622, 652, illness, despite City Independence, and to do his mental so with (a (1980) 63 L.Ed.2d no to treat that illness while was direction he 'systemic' injury” may specially "result not so much to handle him because of it. crime, under either route described above. convicted a bility but had only been arrested, jury rights There is evidence from which a could his derive from the due process rather than properly Eighth conclude that itself clause protection against Amendment’s cruel and rights violated Gibson’s under the Consti- punishment. unusual addition, Wolfish, Bell v. 441 In tution. there is also evidence 520, 535, 1861, U.S. 99 S.Ct. 60 L.Ed.2d properly from which a could conclude (1979); 1124, Agnos, 447 Frost v. 152 F.3d County’s that the failures to act caused its (9th Cir.1998); Grimm, 1128 Carnell v. 74 employee rights, to violate Gibson’s (9th 977, Cir.1996). F.3d 979 that those failures amounted to deliberate indifference under Canton. needs, regard With to medical process imposes, the due clause at a mini

B. Municipal The First Route to Lia- mum, duty same the Eighth Amend bility imposes: ment “persons in custody ha[ve] In considering whether munici right the established to not have officials person’s pality rights itself violated or deliberately remain indifferent to their so, employee its do directed to the focus is Carnell, serious medical needs.” 74 F.3d statement, municipality’s “policy on the or duty provide at 979. This medical care dinance, regulation, officially decision encompasses psychiatric detainees’ needs. adopted promulgated by body’s Cabrales v. County Angeles, Los 864 1461(9th City Praprotnik, 1454, officers.” St. Louis v. Cir.1988), vac’d, F.2d 490 112, 121, 915, 1087, 2425, 485 U.S. 108 S.Ct. 99 U.S. 109 S.Ct. 104 L.Ed.2d 982 (1989), (1988) Monell, reinstated, opinion (quoting L.Ed.2d 107 886 F.2d 436 235 (9th Cir.1989), denied, 2018). 690, case, 1091, cert. 494 at In U.S. U.S. 98 S.Ct. this 1838, 108 (1990); 110 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 966 see all drawing reasonable inferences from the Faulkner, 269, also Wellman v. 715 F.2d Gibson, in record favor of Ms. we conclude (7th Cir.1983); Lamm, 272 Ramos v. 639 County’s policies procedures that the (10th Cir.1980). F.2d In order to regarding incoming medical evaluations of comply duty with their in engage constitutionally detainees violated Gibson’s evidencing acts deliberate indifference to protected right to receive medical care needs, inmates’ psychiatric medical and custody County. while of the Be jails provide must medical staff who are explaining why policies fore violated “competent prisoners’ prob to deal with right, we first right describe Hoptowit Ray, lems.” 682 F.2d more detail. (9th Cir.1982). Right 1. The to Medical Care While in Eighth Under Amend Custody indifference, ment’s standard of deliberate alleges Ms. Gibson that the Coun person denying prisoner is liable for ty violated right to receive ade only person needed medical care if the quate custody medical care while disregards “knows of and an excessive risk Farmer, County. Because Gibson had not been safety.”8 to inmate health and (if Eighth upon degree any) 8. Because the Amendment’s deliberate not "turn of fault subjective indifference standard looks to the plaintiff underly- must show to make out an person charged mental state of the with vio- violation;" of a constitutional claim in- treatment, lating right a detainee’s to medical it stead is used to determine when a munici- confusingly it—somewhat from the pality’s expose liability —differs omissions it to for the standard, Canton indifference deliberate employees. federal torts committed its apply opinion. which we also in this The Canton, 1197; at n. 489 U.S. Canton deliberate indifference standard does action or his inaction. of either his order basis at 511 U.S. Farmer, 114 S.Ct. 1970. risk, it is not the excessive to know of merely “be aware person enough that Policy 8. The could be which the inference of facts from light viewed in the most When risk of serious that a substantial drawn dem the record favorable Ms. exists, he must also draw harm [ ] County’s failure to re that the onstrates person should have Id. If a inference.” urgent need for medical spond to Gibson’s risk, not, then the but was been aware of a direct result of an affirma attention was Eighth the person has not violated the deliberately policy that was County tive Amendment, the matter how severe no standard, indifferent, to the Farmer under 895, Gomez, F.3d v. 267 risk. Jeffers un County find the liable this need.9 To Cir.2001). 914(9th person But if a is (1) Farmer, had must have der harm, risk of serious aware of a substantial risk of policy posed a a substantial (2) a neglecting Gibson; for may a be liable person known serious harm to 837, at policy posed that its this risk.10 Id. needs on the medical prisoner’s serious Farmer, 838-39, U.S. at City Heights, "punishment.” 511 Harker 503 see also Collins v. of 1061, 1970; Seiter, 115, 122, L.Ed.2d 501 112 S.Ct. 117 S.Ct. see also Wilson U.S. 114 (1992). 294, 300, 2321, opposed to the Fanner stan- 261 As L.Ed.2d U.S. 111 S.Ct. 115 dard, impose liability a not, unless (1991). which does not limiting does 271 This word person actual notice of conditions has however, appear in the Fourteenth Amend- harm, the pose a risk of serious substantial detainees, ment, having pretrial not been assigns liability even when a standard Canton convicted, punishment. subject to are not that it municipality notice has constructive Furthermore, en- the Fourteenth Amendment remedy to its omissions in order needs to provide only states will not for the sures that rights. of constitutional avoid violations penal settings, but needs of those in medical 841, Farmer, 1970(ex- at 114 S.Ct. by anyone a state from obtain- for restricted distinguishing standards on plicitly the two DeShaney, own. 489 medical care on his basis). 998; Youngberg v. at S.Ct. U.S. 109 307, 324, Romeo, 457 U.S. 102 S.Ct. so, is we do not address 9. Because that (1982). quite possible, It is there- L.Ed.2d 28 necessary prove subjective whether it is fore, provided pretrial protections against entities Farmer state of mind in suits by detainees the Fourteenth Amendment Farmer, 511 U.S. rather than individuals. Cf. provided those con- some instances exceed 1970("considerable concep- by Eighth prisoners Amendment. victed difficulty any for tual would attend search government subjective of a enti- state of mind footnote, previous the Su- 10. As noted in the government offi- ty, as distinct from that of that it difficult preme Court has commented is cial”). subjective of mind of a to determine the state Similarly, we do not consider whether there Farmer, government entity. 511 U.S. at detainees, pretrial which as are instances in not, does 114 S.Ct. 1970. This statement prisoners, may opposed to establish convicted however, preclude possibility that a mu- meeting the violation without constitutional subjective nicipality possess the state of can indifference standard. Farmer deliberate First, required Farmer. it is certain- mind by analogy applied the standard Frost Farmer ly possible municipality’s policies ex- that a detainees, process rights pretrial to the due acknowledge plicitly that substantial risks of subjective but does not indicate whether Second, cases harm exist. numerous serious applies See in all such instances. standard through municipalities act held that have Frost, F.3d at 1128-30. course, are, policymakers, natu- their who explained protections pro- Farmer that the persons, be deter- ral whose state of mind can prisoners convicted are limited be- vided to Comm’rs, See, e.g., Board mined. presence "punish- of the word cause of 403-04, (citing Amendment, U.S. at 117 S.Ct. 1382 basing Eighth in the ments” Monell, 2018). prove 436 U.S. at subjective standard on the need that made him uncoopera- 114 S.Ct. 1970. combative and tive, and because Gibson was combative record, could con- present theOn uncooperative County policy directed County’s screening that the medical clude jail’s medical staff not to evaluate Gib- policies only posed substantial risk if son to determine he had an urgent medi- harm to but in fact caused serious result, cal need. As a Gibson’s serious County’s him serious harm. The written untreated, medical needs went Gibson was require Screening” procedures “Medical jailed rather than hospitalized, and inmates, its medical staff to “check all police treated as if he were either upon facility, any arrival to the obvious or, stated, Deputy intoxicated as signs injury requiring of sickness or medi- Miranda “just If somebody pissed cal attention.” an inmate needs medical who was angry and only hospital provide, attention that can off.” policy prisoner County’s take identify This failure to urgent hospital. According to Washoe medical needs was exacerbated another County Raymond Wright, Undersheriff County policy regarding prescription medi- policy required this also the medical staff cation incoming found with detainees. Un- ... “incoming to screen folks for mental policy, der this an officer who discovers alone, Standing policies illness.” these are medication is to turn it over to a medical assuredly But there a constitutional. is who, turn, person, staff place is to exception procedures: critical to these medication either in property” “secured Screening process “The Medical will be “in Infirmary up for follow In care.” combative, if delayed uncoop- the inmate is policy, Deputy Hodg- accordance with this effectively erative or unable to answer es, officers, arresting one of the gave the questions (emphasis due to intoxication.” prescription three psycho- containers added). tropic bearing medication Gibson’s name mandatory exception This to the Coun- that he found in truck Gibson’s to a medi-

ty’s screening procedures normal medical member, informing cal staff her that he poses a substantial harm risk serious to believed the psychotropic.12 medication was those with certain mental illnesses. There County’s Because the regarding directives is evidence in the record that a common did using medication not include the medi- symptom of someone a manic state is cation to determine and alleviate the arres- they that uncooperative. are combative and needs, tee’s immediate medical no one at symptom Gibson exhibited that when the jail responded urgent to need Gibson’s police jail. him to brought Because of medical treatment. uncooperative, Gibson was combative and performed Had the medical staff a medi- place,11 no medical evaluation took al- cal evaluation of if he had a Gibson to see though police conduct did other book- requiring medical condition immediate at- procedures, searching such as Gibson tention, police him. it could have directed the to photographing Stated different- ly, urgent it was medical An hospital. Gibson’s need take Gibson to the mental County argu- Hodges 11. Deputy Counsel for the stated at oral 12. stated he said that to "Here, policy they ment: "The to do a medical nurse: were in I don't is evalua- the truck. person taking they tion when the comes I in.... Mr. Gib- if he's them. don’t know if are Then, prevented happening by being psychotropics according son that from or what.” to they put place Hodges, “they combative so him in a to calm that the nurse told him were him down. He didn't calm down. He esca- mental health kinds of medicines that would somebody.” lated situation.” stabilize however, County’s liability, mem- The by a trained medical staff evaluation surely only policy have revealed Gibson’s a hinges ber would on the existence of only medical staff Not did the condition. poses that substantial risk of serious psychotrop- provided by the clues harm, have County also on was but whether medication, at the but Gibson’s behavior ic Farmer, of this risk. aware deputies, numerous jail was so bizarre that 837, 114 1970. direct evi Although S.Ct. diagnose someone in a manic untrained to person’s rarely dence of mental state state, special took note of it.13 exists, always necessary prove it is not to awareness, in subjective as this person’s in the record to

Finally there is evidence “subject quiry demonstration if inference that the medical support the cir ways, including usual inference from him prevented staff had evaluated 842, 114 Id. at cumstantial evidence.” jail, him entering the and directed from case, plethora hospital, certainly almost a mental lead a rea circumstantial evidence could needed, he would have received the care infer jury that the sonable face rather than conditions worsened policies present the risk aware of that its Following his outlook. death ed. investiga- of Nevada conducted an State psychiatrist, tion and interviewed Gibson’s First, could conclude Tannenbaum, and his Dr. about Gibson knew policymakers inevitably some Dr. that condition. Tannenbaum stated jail urgent arrive at with prisoners the control” person when a “becomes out of hospitalization. problems requiring health phase, “always a due to manic staff are that County policy requires The fact that manage hospital them set- able to in our detainees be for medical condi- checked However, ting.” people in a manic state requiring tions immediate attention indi- any type do “real well do not with knowledge. cates such vulnerability, Because authority.” of this Second, policies the make it County’s particular in manic people a state are at a policy-makers keenly clear that were penal setting risk in a if their situation illness, phas- aware that mental manic goes person unidentified. in the manic “[A] in particular, range es within the were may like ... state look one of the worst problems that re- health would sometimes have, a you they’re sick criminal[s] but addition, urgent poli- care. the quire we can and ... person easily who treat reveal that knew policymakers cies easily prison system.” can die in a [who] people that in a sometimes manic state will result, County’s policy

As a of not be combative. evaluating incoming detainees who were combative, Significantly, County had a detailed even when the medical staff concerning policy access to that would facili- the administration of had medications that, alia, evaluation, drugs pro- posed particular psychotropic tate an a inter such suffering drugs people risk to as vides that such must sometimes be Gibson— —such forcefully emergency from a manic state. administered on an Deputy Hodges cursing stated that because of Gib- stated that was not of row swings” type you son’s “mood he believed that Gibson "the that someone that’s hear from meds, mentally taking just ill and ... "was wasn’t his ... drunk this was someone that was irrational, drug.” Deputy obviously upset some ... or he was on kind of incoherent Nagl "it you Eric stated was weird how he was ... not incoherent can’t hear to where acting” they’re saying, that his behavior "was almost ... or understand but what light Deputy making like a switch.” Mike Gar- And incoherent sense.” danger very because an imminent land as “a relationship” basis described bad prisoner might or others exist.14 In addi- psychiatric hospital between state officials tion, County policy requires placing-“in- supplied who psychiatric personnel, mates with mental disorders-that become staff, jail’s medical and the sheriffs de- in special violent” watch [or] combative partment. County That the tolerated such policy requires frequent cells. Another long lapse in this service for such a in checking prisoners medical unit cells arbitrary trivial and personali- reason .as a violent, disordered, mentally are “who ty conflict County demonstrates that the demonstrating behavior.” bizarre/unusual ignore chose to the acknowledged mental policy pres- And another requires still health needs of detainees.15 ence of a mental health technician to be We note that- the question of whether present jail days at the five Addi- week. County policies rights violated Gibson’s testimony by tional Kirkland fur- Sheriff hinge County does not on whether policy- policymakers ther indicates that knew County’s policies makers knew that they safely needed to deal and effec- pose would risk of substantial serious tively special challenges posed by with the particular. harm to long As as mentally “Certainly ill: well-known it’s can infer that the policymakers that the Washoe is the second policy knew that their of not screening people or third houser of who largest have certain incoming pose detainees would state, including mental difficulties situation, risk to someone in Gibson’s we the Nevada Mental Health Institute.” summary judgment must reverse the Third, suggests the record Farmer, County. favor of the 511 U.S. at only knew it had to treat (“it 843-44, 114 does not matter harm, mentally ill in order avoid but ... a prisoner whether faces an excessive practice that it had made a ignoring risk ... personal reasons to him or 1995, the..County need. Until full- had a prisoners all because in his situation face professional time mental health on site at a prison such risk” and when officials know jail perform the to mental health screen- rampant rape of inmate and nothing do ings jury of detainees. A reasonable could it, obviously about “it would be irrelevant program infer this existed because the liability.that-the guess to officials could not County recognized had that it needed such precisely beforehand attack who would a program provide adequate order to whom”); Redman, 942 F.2d at mental health care to detainees and to County emphasizes The the facts that by avoid serious harm caused of the lack unhealthy Gibson had an heart and that In County dropped such care. the autopsy coronary his listed severe arterio- professional position— its mental health sclerosis as the cause óf his death. As a years and did not fill it for four be- —not result, County that it argues was not policymakers cause concluded it was but, unnecessary, deliberately to indifferent to serious according the record Gibson’s us, before because of what Kirk- medical medi- “[t]he Sheriff need because serious portion psychotropic drug poli- job description’s 14. This of the sional. If duties includ- cy "Pyschotropic states: medications will not screening incoming ed detainees for mental forcefully be illness, administered healthcare staff all the more basis exists to con- then unless a court order exists there immi- is County clude that the knew of the need to danger nent to self or others.” incoming screen detainees for mental illness ignore and to it. chose precise 15. The record not about is clear screening profes- role of mental health County. Instead at the hands of case was Mr. fered this cal need at issue disease, serious medical attending mental to Gibson’s coronary not his of Gibson’s needs, ill- County reacted Gibson’s health condition.” cell, pepper him in a by locking ness is, it, as we understand argument This him, shackling him for several spraying summary causation—on one about hands, feet, waist, drag- and by the hours easily could con- jury a judgment record corridor, having and through him ging County caused Gibson’s clude that top him. The deputies climb on two Indeed, County’s medical ex- death. find, result, likely jury could was severe recognized that Dr. Welti pert Charles physiological distress. psychological and stressful state” “physiologically Gibson’s may municipali- A recover from a plaintiff fatal heart attack. resulted in Gibson’s in a injuries far suit ty less severe Instead, is about County’s argument Canton, nature. this (cid:127) Cf. County if the foreseeability: Even of action for 1197(allowingcause deliberately indifferent to Gibson’s mental action to provide medical care failure condition, indiffer- health this deliberate municipal officials left proceed when because did not cause Gibson’s death ence ly- ailments woman with severe emotional knew nor had reason to neither hour). police floor for an ing on a station fatal attack would result know that a heart addition, injuries indisput- In these were from mental ignoring severe behavior ably foreseeable. Uncontrollable health condition. consequence of not identi- is a foreseeable reject argument for two rea- We condition, having and fying a manic place, there is sufficient sons. the first someone, chain, drag pepper spray which, evidence in the record on physio- psychological with attendant re- find that death is foreseeable could harm, consequence is a foreseeable logical person a manic treating of not sult dealing with someone who is out of penal setting. him in a As noted placing control. earlier, in an interview with the Nevada Dr. Tannen- Department Investigation, principle legal The “time-honored person an untreated baum testified that wrongdoer takes his victim as he prison in a easily a manic state “can die if him” means that finds in- system,”16 rapid pulse and that a injuries it also liable for Gibson’s other pressure commonly are as- creased blood liability death. must bear for Gibson’s Although the sociated with manic bouts. Bd., v. Nat’l Labor Relations Wakefield may in died not precise way which Gibson (9th Cir.1986). 1437, F.2d 1438 Some foreseeable, the extreme stress have been “eggshell times referred to as the skull” possibility and the system on Gibson’s doctrine, principle this renders defendants trigger would a fatal reaction of this stress cause, they any physical injury for liable foreseeable. some sort were unforeseeable, they matter how once no body. As a plaintiffs inflict harm on a Second, if the is correct even leading torts hornbook states: death not a foreseeable conse- indifference, agreement There almost universal is of its deliberate this quence risk, for upon liability beyond quite County. not exonerate the argument does they when only injury consequences, suf- unforeseeable Death was not the only partly legible, an accu- appears transcript inter- of the interview is 16. It from the of this quotation possi- rate of elaboration is not view that Dr. Tannenbaum elaborated on this this However, transcript possibility. because this ble. erate indifference doctrine contains a person of impact upon an follow heightened foreseeability requirement, this plaintiff. requirement differs from the traditional magic circle were drawn as if It is foreseeability requirement it, negligence only who breaks person, one about requires indifference insofar as deliberate finger, cut on the much as a even so subjectively to be aware harm to the defendant resulting all liable for becomes likely that serious to result from a may it be harm person, although provide failure to medical care. But the is held liable The defendant death.... injuries does personal of deliberate indifference doctrine not for unusual results unforeseeable, that a regarded require particular consequence as be which are predictable required The de- than is under as ... heart disease.... more such only is liable for law. Accordingly, fendant of course traditional tort conduct approved to which the defendant’s the use of extent First Circuit has aggravation in an of the § resulted in a eggshell has skull doctrine 1983 case condition, and for the not pre-existing Figueroa-Torres facts. v. To with similar was; aggra- 270, (1st it but as to the ledo-Davila, condition as 232 F.3d 274-76 Cir. vation, foreseeability 2000) is not a factor. (police may be liable for officers person of a a diseased and death with al., et Prosser and Keeton Page Keeton W. enlarged spleen though even the death was § Torts 43 at 291-92. on The Law of po consequence not a foreseeable spe “§ Because 1983 creates hitting kicking).17 lice’s liability” Supreme Court cies of tort reasons, County’s pol- For the above light in of the interpreted the statute “has risk of posed icies substantial serious liability.” Tahoe-Sier of tort background enough harm to circumstantial Council, Inc. v. Tahoe ra Preservation exists that a reasonable evidence 216 F.3d Regional Planning Agency, County policymakers Cir.2000) could infer that knew (9th City (quoting 783 n. 34 ignore existed and that this risk chose Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monte it. Ltd., 119 S.Ct. rey, (1999)), aff'd, U.S.

143 L.Ed.2d Municipal Li- The Second Route C. -, L.Ed.2d 517 ability (2002). diverging see no reason We impose liability against To- Supreme general guid from the Court’s Canton, plaintiff must County under Although in the delib- ance this situation. communicating basis for a violation of Gibson's pattern lapses cannot be the 17. The prior to Gib- right medical services to receive regrettable, prob case is the ATLs but, facts, son’s arrest. negligent, it does ably under these process due violate Gibson’s substantive not Gibson, however, police arrested Once the including exceptions, rights. With some police custody did police and the he was in police custody when person is in when deliberately duty to remain indif have a person peril, places a an officer's conduct needs. DeSha to his serious medical ferent generally 14th Amendment does not 199-200, "[t]he ney, 109 S.Ct. 998. But 489 U.S. at provide as require police medical officers supports that the inference no evidence City private citizens.” Penilla sistance County's County's policymakers knew that the Park, (9th Huntington F.3d 709 Cir. communicating police 115 policies for defective 1997) DeShaney, (citing 489 U.S. at 109 dispatches and between field between shifts arrest, Thus, 998). prior jail employees to Gibson’s a substantial risk S.Ct. created people duty provide assis harm to those police had no medical of serious medical Farmer, result, at County’s placed police custody. to Gibson. As a tance communicating 114 S.Ct. 1970. system ATLs for deficient 1194 (1) County employee that

show: that a violated nurse knew a substantial risk to Gib- (2) County that has rights; Gibson’s son’s health existed and she declined to act policies that amount to deliber customs upon knowledge, deliberately she was (as phrase ate indifference is defined indifferent to right Gibson’s constitutional (3) Canton); policies by these to receive medical care. employ moving

were the force behind 2. Deliberate under Can- ee’s violation of Gibson’s constitutional Indifference ton County in the that the could rights, sense ap an prevented have the violation with find, juryA present could on the Page, propriate policy. City Amos v. record, that the nurse’s constitutional vio (9th Cir.2001). 1086, 1094 257 F.3d arguably lation resulted from an omission County’s'policy regarding the han County Employee 1. A Violated Gib- prescription dling of medication.19 Rights son’s Canton, Supreme Court stands, jury As the record now police held that a “failure to train” officers duty could find that the nurse who was on may serve liability as the basis for under night at the on the of Gibson’s death § “where the 1983 failure to train amounts deliberately was indifferent to Gibson’s rights to deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs. As discussed persons police with whom the come into above, for the nurse to have been deliber contact.” 489 at 109 U.S. S.Ct. 1197. (as phrase defined ately indifferent is Farmer) regarding supervi Policies of omission needs, she,must to Gibson’s then, employees, “policies” sion of can be aware of have been a substantial risk of Farmer, 837, or municipal liability serious harm. 511 U.S. at “customs” that create 1970; Frost, Monell, 152 F.3d at 1128-30. S.Ct. under if only but the omission “reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ juryA could find that the nurse knew possibility choice” to countenance the aof in the Gibson was throes of a manic 389-90, constitutional violation. Id. at state on the of three basis facts: she had 1197; Oviatt, see also 954 F.2d at medical training, she that Gibson knew (“[A] governmental body may local be exhibiting behavior consistent with if it policy liable has a of inaction and such illness,18 mental and she knew that Gibson inaction protect amounts to a failure to possessed psychotropic medication “that rights.”). jury may constitutional A infer somebody.” would stabilize A could that a municipality made such a deliberate also conclude that a trained nurse would municipal choice “when a actor disregard hospitalization know that could have re- condition, ed a known or consequence lieved if obvious of his and that Gib- Comm’rs, jail, presented son remained in he action.” Board dan- ger both to himself and to others. If the at U.S. S.Ct. 1382. Whether me, swings. significant 18. When asked if he told the medical staff To that was the fac- "demonstrating that Gibson was bizarre tor.” be- havior consistent with someone who was ill," mentally Deputy Hodges responded: prerogative, 19. As was her Ms. Gibson did not "Yes, they story would have known the be- name the nurse aas defendant. This fact cause he was combative that time.... [W]e does not affect our determination that the telling everybody happened, you were what may nurse have committed a constitutional know, and, swings particular. did, with the mood I violation in the event that she legally don’t know how much detail I would have responsible whether the went into. I would have mentioned the mood that violation. place in displayed policy has the medications “secured government property local Infirmary up to the constitutional or in the for deliberate indifference follow care.” rights generally Significantly, policy of its citizens is failed to suggest Oviatt, 1478; 954 F.2d at Blair that the nurse act question. any should on informa- Pomona, 1074, bear, 223 F.3d 1079 tion that City might the medication even (9th Cir.2000). in the event that the nurse was unable to perform a medical city evaluation because recognized The Court that when Canton precluded policy medical evaluations when remedy the need to omission “is so uncooperative, combative, the detainee is obvious, inadequacy likely and the so to or intoxicated. result in the violation of constitutional policymakers city ... of the can A rights, jury could also find that this omission reasonably have been sufficiently likely be said to deliberate- was to in result the viola- ly indifferent to the need.” 489 U.S. at tion of a right detainee’s to medical care may 1197. The need to act that the County deliberately indiffer- any person above, be because reasonable ent to obvious these needs. As discussed need; recognize example, County actually would officials knew that some jail armed officers often detainees who because will arrest arrived at the would felons, it that a munici- fleeing urgent is obvious have medical and mental health pality hospitalization. must train its officers in the consti- needs requiring immediate deadly the use of policymakers people tutional limitations on The also knew that suffering force. Id. at 390 n. 109 S.Ct. 1197. from mental are illness some- addition, standard In Unlike the deliberate indifference times combative. if a screening po- used to determine violation of detain- had created a mental health sition, right jail ee’s to receive medical care took so knew that em- policymakers place, ployees identify not contain a needed to this standard does and address Farmer, subjective component. neglect 511 U.S. mental in illnesses order not to result, prisoners. 114 S.Ct. 1970. As a there medical needs of prove for Ms. that is no need County policymakers Given that the ac- County policymakers actually knew that tually regu- knew that the staff would their in likely omissions would result larly respond have to to detainee mental constitutional violation. needs, health it should have been obvious case, policy County’s had a that the omission could well re- in a required arresting give officers to sult constitutional violation.20 Because any prescription county policy nurse medications forbids medical evaluations pol- found incoming incoming with an detainee. The on detainees who are combative icy required the it uncooperative, further nurse either was obvious J., (O’Connor, concurring part 20. Canton itself concerned claim that in dissent- Canton, City police ing part) (citing defendant had failed to train its in 489 U.S. at 1197). dealing emotionally officers in with the dis- Even if this claim is correct Concurring part dissenting contrary, turbed. in the absence of a record to the it is part, diag- Justice O’Connor wrote "the on the record in this case. Sheriff not correct County jail nosis of mental is not one of ‘usual Kirkland that the illness testified Washoe po- mentally recurring people with more ill than all but a [the situations which housed deal,' result, must ”... such that lack of train- of Nevada As a lice] handful institutions. general, jails therein would be "the kind of omission whatever can be said characterized, itself, necessity diagnosing that can be in and of as a mental illness is a recurring usual and situation in the Washoe ‘deliberate indifference’ constitutional rights.” County jail. 489 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. 1197 a mental that policy instructing someone who had illness Had the had a uncooperative the medical staff information made them combative to use ob- If, however, from a prisoner’s not be evaluated. tained medication to would detainees, nurse, prescrip- incoming screen after combative detainee arrives with observing light Gibson’s behavior in of his in their own psychotropic tion medication medication, likely name, would have concluded way an alternative to identi- there is that Gibson was the midst of a manic fy Although with medical needs. those phase and transporting recommended him actually conclude that the could nurse There, hospital. to a mental Gibson could person did in need of identify Gibson as needed, have received the treatment he treatment, County’s mental health rather than face only conditions that made policy medication did not instruct her to Alternatively, his outlook worse. the nurse upon policy- act realization. When administering could have considered that their makers know medical staff mem- emergency medication on an basis. bers will encounter those with men- urgent yet provide health fail tal needs for the ’ II. Deputies Individual Liability needs, it identification of those is obvious that a constitutional violation could well A. Deliberate to Medical Indifference result. Needs The individual defendants in this Moving S. Force deputies case were the sheriffs who had Having summary determined that contact with Gibson after he was admitted judgment inappropriate question is on the behavior, jail. to the proved Their while it County’s whether the omission amounted fatal to was not unconstitutional. to deliberate indifference to the constitu The support record does not the conclusion rights tional of citizens with whom the that deputies individual defendant department contact, sheriffs came into we indifferent, were deliberately under must consider whether these omissions standard, subjective Farmer to Gibson’s “moving were the force” behind the viola mental health condition. tion of rights. Gibson’s constitutional We Of all the individual had officers who find that there is sufficient evidence to contact with night Gibson on the of his preclude summary judgment ques on this death, only Hodges Miranda and knew tion as well. might that Gibson’s behavior be connected illness,

In order a “moving to be force” to mental they found and because injury, behind we must find discussed Gibson’s prescription medi- deficiency” County’s the “identified in the cations. Miranda and Hodges are not de- policies fendants, “closely however, is related to the ultimate there no evi- Canton, injury.” that, 489 U.S. at upon 109 dence bringing Gibson into the 1197; Oviatt, (as jail, they see also 954 F.2d at any deputies told of the there nurse) plaintiffs 1478. The opposed burden is to establish about the medicine injury “that the would have been avoided” Similarly, containers. there is no evidence that, had the a policy directing had its having received the medicine contain- medical staff to use information obtained Hodges, ers from Miranda and the nurse prisoner’s from medication to determine duty—also on not a defendant—informed jailed whether he hospitalized any should be deputy the individual defendants and, former, if the under what conditions. suggested Gibson’s medications Oviatt, mentally 954 F.2d at 1478. he ill. According to the sum-

1197 detention, record, id., only Deputy during pretrial Bow- individuals mary judgment any that contain- drug lin aware we have that was even determined the Fourth Gibson, jail with but he ers came into the “applicable Amendment sets the constitu were, the did know what medications not considering tional limitations” for of claims purpose. or their during pretrial excessive force detention. v. County, Pierce Multnomah 76 F.3d short, deputies jail In at knew all the the 1032, (9th Cir.1996), denied, 1043 cert. 519 condition what about mental was 1006, 506, 136 U.S. 117 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 397 they of his Al could observe behavior. (1996). explicates Graham therefore the peculiar on remarked his though several pretrial standards to a applicable detention and dramatic shifts from swings mood in compliance, there is no excessive force claim this circuit. combativeness actually of them knew any evidence that Graham, Supreme the serious, connoted treata that this behavior explained determining Court that whether can that say ble mental illness. Nor we a defendant use of force was officer’s “rea obviously ill that mentally Gibson was so sonable” the under Fourth Amendment deputies, training the who had received no “requires balancing careful of the nature and diagnosis treatment of regarding quality and on the of the intrusion individ illness, must have known that Gib mental against ual’s Fourth Amendment interests exhibiting symptoms son of mental the countervailing government at interests in at lapses The communication illness. 396, stake.” 490 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. 1865 commendable, hardly are but the (internal omitted). quotations This analy who, deputies lapses, of re because these requires sis “careful attention facts unaware of Gibson’s mental condi mained case, particular in circumstances each having tion held liable for been cannot be issue, including severity of the crime at to it. “deliberately indifferent” See Farm suspect poses whether an immediate er, 838, 114 511 S.Ct. 1970. U.S. threat to the officers or safety oth ers, actively he is resisting whether B. Excessive Force arrest or to evade attempting by arrest claims Ms. Gibson that the indi Id.; Garner, flight.” also Tennessee v. see deputies vidual defendant used excessive 1694, 8-9, 471 U.S. 85 105 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d restraining resulting force in his (1985) (whether seizure is reasonable magistrate death. The that found judged by under the Fourth Amendment is reasonable, deputies was force used circumstances”).21 “totality therefore, the defendants were agree. not liable. We Finally, the Graham Court ad monished courts to examine circum pro The Due Process clause underlying stances a Fourth Amendment tects from pretrial detainees the use viewpoint claim from the of the reasonable punish excessive force that amounts to scene, officer on “rather than with the Connor, ment. Graham hindsight.” vision of U.S. at 20/20 395 n. L.Ed.2d 443 For, calculus of “[t]he 1865. (1989). Although Supreme has Court embody reasonableness must allowance for not expressly decided whether the Fourth are police the fact often officers prohibition Amendment’s on unreasonable judgments protect split-second searches and seizures forced make continues —in flee, pretrial resisting attempting to' for ex- In the context detention rather arrest arrest, ample necessarily than it is clear all the factors be relevant. —will suspect in Graham —whether the mentioned tense, uncertain, split- that are tion which officers must make circumstances rapidly evolving the amount of second decisions. all the circum- Under —about necessary particular in a situ stances, force that is deputies’ decisions under 396-97, 109 ation.” Id. at S.Ct. 1865. these difficult circumstances resulted restraining forcefully Gibson no more than these standards to the case Applying reasonably necessary. was We therefore us, that the individual before we conclude affirm grant the district court’s of sum- deputies cannot be held liable defendant mary judgment for the deputy individual against force for the use of excessive Gib- Sgt. defendants and Williams. son. From the Gibson arrived at moment jail, struggling against dep- the the he was PART, AFFIRMED IN REVERSED uties, invective, hurling generally be- PART, IN AND REMANDED. violently. Be- having very strangely party Each to bear its own costs on cause we have determined that there is no appeal. proof deputies duty the on at the were aware Gibson’s behavior was connect- REINHARDT, Judge, Circuit illness, ed to his treatable mental we can- concurring: having not hold them accountable for I fully opin- While concur in the court’s dangerous prisoner treated Gibson as ion, I separately expand point on a write one, despite tragic rather than a sick the opinion relegates to a footnote consequences of this error. (n.9). Brennan, Although Farmer v. 511 time, perspective Given that at the 114 U.S. 128 L.Ed.2d 811 deputies’ night conduct that was reason- (1994), subjective establishes test for de- Because he was alone in his holding able. termining deliberate indifference in the slipped cell when he out of his chain waist defendants, case of individual that case window, began against it banging Supreme reasonably Court made it point posed Gibson—at that no immedi- — clear that the same standard does not anyone ate danger to but himself. But apply in actions against government enti- Sgt. Williams was concerned that Gibson involving adoption ties of affirmative door, might shatter the window in his cell policies. government The Farmer Court thereby placing any both himself and offi- that, subjective stated while a standard is might cers who to enter the have cell at appropriate for determining liability risk of harm. The decision to enter Gib- officials, prison conceptual “considerable son’s cell and restrain him was therefore difficulty any would attend search for the reasonable. subjective governmental state of mind of a Moreover, deputies began once the entity, as distinct from govern- that of a restrain him spe- move mental official.” Id. S.Ct. 1970. cell, watch fought vigorously. cial he back Here, import whether we the more No than passed more three minutes from stringent subjective Farmer standard or deputies the time the brought Gibson into apply stringent objective the less standard special watch cell and death. Dur- his Harris, time, employed City Canton v. ing that fighting Gibson was hard 378, 388-89, against deputies’ U.S. 109 S.Ct. efforts to restrain him, (1989),1 record, creating precisely the kind of situa- L.Ed.2d 412 when Farmer, standard, however, jective 1. See also U.S. at appropri- is not an ("It determining would be hard liability prison to describe the Can- ate test for understanding Eighth ton of deliberate indifference officials under the Amendment as in- cases.”). anything objective. terpreted ... as but Canton's ob- in our

H99 to Ms. most favorable light in the viewed County’s failure to that the shows medical needs her husband’s

respond to affirmative result of an Coun- a direct in- demonstrated deliberate

ty policy that Thus, no this need. there is

difference definitively resolve in this case to

cause applies to of which standard question of how obvious County, regardless instead, pur- can may be. We

answer decision, simply apply the of this

poses standard. stringent

more THE AND FOR USE

UNITED STATES TECHNOL

BENEFIT OF WALTON Inc., INC.; Technology,

OGY, Walton Plaintiffs-Ap corporation,

an Illinois

pellants, ENGINEERING, INC., a

WESTSTAR corporation; Reliance

California Company,

Opinion a Cali Insurance Defendants-Appel corporation,

fornia

lees. 99-35311, 99-35457.

Nos. Appeals,

United States Court

Ninth Circuit. April 2001.

Argued and Submitted May

Filed

Case Details

Case Name: Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Date Published: May 22, 2002

Citation: 290 F.3d 1175

Docket Number: 19-15716

Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.