Hull v. Town of Newtown
174 A.3d 174
| Conn. | 2017Background
- On March 2, 2010, Stanley Lupienski, who reported auditory hallucinations and shortness of breath, was taken by Newtown police into involuntary custody under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-503(a) and transported to Danbury Hospital; officers did not search him prior to transport.
- Andrew Hull, a hospital employee, was later shot by Lupienski; Andrew and Erica Hull sued the Town of Newtown alleging police negligence for failing to search Lupienski.
- Plaintiffs’ primary theory: Newtown Police arrest policy (search-incident-to-arrest) imposes a ministerial duty to search anyone “taken into custody,” which they say includes § 17a-503(a) custody; alternatively, plaintiffs invoked the department’s prisoner transportation policy as imposing a mandatory search.
- Defendant argued the arrest and transportation policies govern criminal arrests/prisoners only, do not apply to § 17a-503(a) civil mental-health custody, and that any search duty would be discretionary (thus barred by governmental immunity).
- Trial court ruled § 17a-503(a) custody is not an ‘‘arrest’’ under the police policy; summary judgment for the town was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Newtown arrest policy’s duty to "search the person arrested" applies to persons taken into custody under § 17a-503(a) | Arrest policy defines arrest as “taking a person into custody,” so it mandatorily requires searching anyone taken into custody including § 17a-503(a) detainees | Arrest policy is limited to criminal arrests (warrant/probable cause, Miranda, handcuffing); § 17a-503(a) is civil mental-health custody with different purpose/standards | Held: No. Arrest policy applies to criminal arrests only; § 17a-503(a) custody does not trigger the policy’s search requirement |
| Whether the prisoner transportation policy mandates a search before transporting someone taken under § 17a-503(a) | Transportation policy’s prisoner definition is broad; thus it covers § 17a-503(a) detainees and requires search before transport | Transportation policy is aimed at criminal prisoners (handcuffing, double-locks); Lupienski was not a prisoner under that policy | Held: No. Transportation policy governs criminal prisoners; it did not impose a ministerial duty to search Lupienski |
| Whether the alleged duty was ministerial (exposing the town to liability) or discretionary (governmental immunity) | Policy language (“shall conduct a thorough search”) creates a mandatory, non‑discretionary duty | Even if policies used mandatory language, they apply only in criminal context; taking under § 17a-503(a) is a civil/medical function and discretionary issues remain; immunity applies | Held: No ministerial duty arose here; governmental immunity shields the town |
| Whether civil custody under § 17a-503(a) should be treated as criminal arrest for policy/constitutional purposes | Plaintiffs cite analogies where civil seizures have been called arrests and argue safety/consistency require searches | Court: § 17a-503(a) serves narrow medical/emergency-evaluation purpose (reasonable cause of psychiatric disability, 24‑/72‑hour limits), distinct from criminal probable‑cause/arrest framework | Held: § 17a-503(a) custody is qualitatively distinct from criminal arrest and does not import arrest procedures or mandatory search incident rules |
Key Cases Cited
- Marchesi v. Board of Selectmen, 309 Conn. 608 (standard of appellate review — plenary review of legal conclusions)
- Coley v. Hartford, 312 Conn. 150 (discussing governmental immunity and police discretionary acts)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (warrantless arrest reasonable only with probable cause for criminal offense)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (custodial-interrogation protections informing meaning of custody)
- Hopkins v. O'Connor, 282 Conn. 821 (contextualizing § 17a-503 as medical/health function vs. law-enforcement)
- Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310 (when municipal rules create ministerial duties)
- Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94 (interpretation of mandatory language "shall")
- State v. Arias, 322 Conn. 170 (factors for determining custody for Miranda purposes)
- State v. Jackson, 304 Conn. 383 (objective reasonable-person test for custody)