Houshang Momenian v. Davidson
209 F. Supp. 3d 288
D.D.C.2016Background
- Houshang and Vida Momenian bought three D.C. properties in 1990 secured by a promissory note; disputes over crediting of payments led to litigation against the sellers (the Interdonatos) in D.C. Superior Court, with Michael Davidson as their lawyer.
- On October 12, 2010, Davidson advised and obtained a settlement dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit with prejudice in exchange for a $15,000 credit; plaintiffs later received a foreclosure notice from the Interdonatos on May 7, 2012.
- Plaintiffs sued Davidson for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty on May 6, 2015 (later removed to federal court); the court previously dismissed the original complaint on statute-of-limitations grounds and allowed an amended complaint.
- The Amended Complaint added allegations that Davidson continued to represent them through at least April 2011 (billing statement), that Houshang telephoned Davidson roughly quarterly in 2011–early 2012, and that a recorded January 31, 2013 conversation showed Davidson assuring Houshang he had not forfeited rights.
- Defendant moved to dismiss again, chiefly arguing Plaintiffs’ claims remain time-barred under D.C.’s three-year statute of limitations; Plaintiffs invoked the discovery rule, the lulling doctrine, and the continuous representation rule as tolling theories.
- The court found the amended allegations insufficient to postpone accrual: a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered the cause earlier than May 7, 2012; neither lulling nor continuous-representation tolling applied; the action was dismissed with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether malpractice/breach claims are time-barred under the D.C. three-year statute | Momenian says discovery rule and added facts show accrual occurred later; tolling doctrines (lulling, continuous representation) delay accrual | Davidson says plaintiffs knew or should have known earlier; no tolling applies; claims are untimely | Claims are time-barred; dismissal with prejudice granted |
| Application of the discovery rule (when limitations begin to run) | Plaintiffs contend factual dispute about when they discovered the injury prevents dismissal | Davidson argues facts in complaint show accrual before the limitations period and dismissal is appropriate on Rule 12(b)(6) | Court applies discovery rule objectively and finds a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered the claims well before May 2012; accrual not postponed |
| Lulling doctrine as equitable tolling | Plaintiffs point to billing statements, periodic assurances (“working on it”), and 2013 recorded assurances as affirmative inducement to delay suit | Davidson argues those communications are not affirmative inducement to defer filing and do not meet D.C. lulling standard | Court: communications were not the kind of affirmative inducement required; lulling does not toll the period |
| Continuous representation rule tolling limitations | Plaintiffs assert Davidson’s ongoing contacts and client perception show representation continued into 2013 | Davidson notes plaintiffs hired new counsel by June 14, 2012 and any minimal post-settlement contacts don’t extend the particular-matter representation | Court: alleged contacts are minimal/vague; plaintiffs had new counsel by June 2012; continuous representation does not apply; limitations period not tolled |
Key Cases Cited
- Bussineau v. Pres. & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., 518 A.2d 423 (D.C. 1986) (articulates discovery rule elements for accrual under D.C. law)
- Williams v. Mordkofsky, 901 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizes need to allow time for lay clients to investigate malpractice allegations)
- Bailey v. Greenberg, 516 A.2d 934 (D.C. 1986) (defines narrow lulling doctrine requiring affirmative inducement)
- Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Grp., 494 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (lulling requires a specific act of affirmative inducement)
- Ray v. Queen, 747 A.2d 1137 (D.C. 2000) (inquiry notice and the plaintiff’s duty to investigate under the discovery rule)
- Diamond v. Davis, 680 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1996) (plaintiff’s duty of reasonable diligence to investigate claims)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard; dismissal when complaint lacks plausible factual content)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading requirements for facial plausibility)
- Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Rule 12(b)(6) standards and construing allegations in plaintiff’s favor)