Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Whirlpool Corporation
865 F.3d 1372
| Fed. Cir. | 2017Background
- Homeland Housewares petitioned the PTAB for inter partes review of claims 1–16 of U.S. Patent No. 7,581,688 (the ’688 patent), owned by Whirlpool; the Board found claims not invalid for anticipation by Wulf and did not construe “settling speed” in its Final Written Decision.
- The ’688 patent claims an automated pulsing blender cycle in which each pulse has: (A) a constant operating speed, (B) a deceleration to a predetermined "settling speed" (less than operating speed and >0) indicative of contents having settled around the cutter, and (C) an acceleration back to operating speed.
- Wulf (prior art) discloses automated blender routines and discusses pulsing between high and low speeds to allow material to fall back to the blades; Figure 25 of Wulf shows a “ramp down to low, low for 5 seconds, ramp to high” sequence.
- The Board declined to adopt an explicit construction of “settling speed” and concluded Homeland failed to show anticipation by Wulf; Homeland appealed to the Federal Circuit.
- The Federal Circuit reviews claim construction de novo (Teva) when no relevant extrinsic evidence is relied upon and reviews PTAB fact findings for substantial evidence; the panel construed “a predetermined settling speed” and assessed anticipation by Wulf.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Homeland) | Defendant's Argument (Whirlpool) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper construction of "predetermined settling speed" | Must be a speed slower than operating speed that permits contents to settle; no empirical-test requirement | Should require empirical testing to determine settling speed for a particular blender/load | Court: "predetermined settling speed" = a speed slower than operating speed that permits settling; does not require empirical testing per claim language and specification context. |
| Whether Wulf anticipates claim 1 of the ’688 patent | Figure 25’s "low" speed and sequence correspond to claim 1’s constant, deceleration-to-settling-speed, and acceleration phases | Wulf does not disclose a settling speed (or automatic pulsing as claimed); Board found Wulf lacked the claimed limitations | Court: Wulf’s Figure 25 meets all structural limitations of claim 1 under the adopted construction; claims anticipated and invalid. |
| Weight of patentee expert testimony (Faerber) | N/A (patentee’s expert argued Wulf does not disclose settling speed) | Expert testimony showed Wulf’s low speed would not cause settling and that maintaining settling speed for 5s is nonsensical | Court: Discounted portions of Faerber’s testimony that were inconsistent with Wulf’s specification and the intrinsic record. |
| Standard of review / PTAB duty to construe disputed claim terms | PTAB must resolve actual claim-scope disputes when raised | PTAB did not construe term in final decision but used an earlier institution description; Board’s fact findings entitled to deference | Court: Construed term de novo (no extrinsic evidence) and reversed PTAB anticipation holding; addressed claim construction and anticipation itself. |
Key Cases Cited
- Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) (claim construction review when extrinsic evidence not relied on)
- Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (claims given ordinary meaning and read in view of the specification)
- 02 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (courts must resolve actual disputes about claim scope)
- In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with written description)
- Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (specification embodiments do not limit broader claim language)
- Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (claim-construction inquiry begins and ends with claim language)