Hill v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
946 F. Supp. 2d 817
N.D. Ill.2013Background
- Hills sue Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and LPS Field Services for FDCPA, ICFA, trespass, and privacy claims; FDCPA and ICFA claims are proposed class claims, trespass/privacy are individual.
- Wells Fargo was mortgagee/servicer; LPS acted as Wells Fargo’s agent for property entry, boarding, and posting notices.
- Foreclosure proceedings began June 7, 2010; in 2010–2011 Wells Fargo/LPS allegedly entered the Hills’ home and affected the property (locks changed, hot water tank altered, etc.).
- Nov. 1, 2010 break-in reported; Hills alerted the state court at status hearing in Dec. 2010 that Wells Fargo had no right to enter.
- Postings and visits by LPS agents from 2011–2012 allegedly threatened or effected nonjudicial dispossession and related actions.
- Court dismisses FDCPA claim on statute-of-limitations grounds; ICFA claim survives but only for unfairness, not deceptive conduct; class allegations are struck.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FDCPA time bar bars any §1692f(6) claim | Hills argue timely within one-year period for some acts. | LPS contends most acts outside the period; some after within period insufficient. | FDCPA claim dismissed as time-barred. |
| Whether ICFA unfairness claim can proceed (and deceptive claim is viable) | Unfair and deceptive practices alleged by LPS’s break-ins and postings. | Posts acceptable; conduct not deceptive; only unfairness possible. | ICFA unfairness claim survives; deceptive claim dismissed. |
| Whether Hills adequately pled deceptive ICFA claim | Postings allegedly deceptive to imply dispossession. | Postings not deceptive in context; no misrepresentation. | Deceptive ICFA claim rejected. |
| Whether class allegations can proceed under Rule 23 | ICFA class action appropriate for unfair conduct nationwide in Illinois. | Predominance fails; different states’ law; individualized inquiries. | Class allegations struck; ICFA unfairness claim may proceed only, not as class action. |
| Whether discovery would cure pleading defects and allow repleading | Leave to amend could fix deficiencies. | Defects not curable; class issues preclude certification. | Court allows limited leave to replead FDCPA/ICFA aspects; class allegations struck without prejudice. |
Key Cases Cited
- Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726 (7th Cir.2004) (FDCPA statute of limitations)
- Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir.2009) (dismissal on limitations at pleading stage permissible when dates unambiguous)
- Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) (rigorous analysis of class certification; early determination)
- Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943 (6th Cir.2011) (early ruling on class certification permissible)
- Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir.2012) (predominance analysis in Rule 23(b)(3))
- Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663 (7th Cir.2008) (unfairness under ICFA; case-by-case analysis)
- Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill.2d 403 (Ill.2002) (ICFA fairness/unfairness framework)
- Lox v. CDA, Ltd., 689 F.3d 818 (7th Cir.2012) (unsophisticated consumer standard; interpretation of postings)
- Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (Supreme Ct.2011) (statutory damages and class action considerations)
- Sperry & Hutchinson Co. (cited in ICFA unfairness context), 405 U.S. 233 (Supreme Ct.1972) (unfairness standard reference)