Hicks v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms for the United States Senate, 873 F. Supp. 2d 258

Hicks, former Telecommunications Operation Specialist for the Senate, sues Winn and Kaufman for assault, false imprisonment, and IIED, plus religious discrimination and retaliation against the Senate.
Winn and Kaufman move to substitute the United States under the Westfall Act, alleging they were acting within the scope of employment; Hicks challenges the scope as to Count IV.
Court agrees to substitute United States for assault and false imprisonment claims if those claims are within scope; FTCA immunity remains for those claims.
Court allows limited discovery on whether Winn and Kaufman acted within scope, focusing on alleged misuse of Capitol Police internal complaint procedures.
FTCA does not waive immunity for assault or false imprisonment; those claims are dismissed if substitution stands; IIED claim subject to limited discovery.
Judicial posture: resolution hinges on scope-of-employment analysis under agency Restatement framework; discovery limited to scope and intent questions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Westfall Act substitution is proper for Count IV	Hicks argues conduct not within scope, so substitution is improper.	Winn and Kaufman contend they were acting within scope; substitution appropriate.	Substitution granted as to assault and false imprisonment; these claims dismissed.
Whether FTCA waives immunity for assault and false imprisonment	FTCA does not apply to these torts; removal would bar these claims.	FTCA immunity bars assault/false imprisonment claims.	Immunity not waived; claims dismissed.
Whether discovery is warranted on whether the conduct was within scope for IIED	Discovery could show outside-scope, negating Westfall certification.	Limited discovery only when allegations rebut the certification; otherwise not allowed.	Limited discovery permitted on scope and alleged misuse of internal complaint procedures.

Stokes v. Cross, 327 F.3d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (liberal pleading suffices to rebut scope)
Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (limited discovery not a fishing expedition)
Koch v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D.D.C. 2002) (Westfall Act scope determination; prima facie evidence of scope)
Hill v. United States, 562 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2008) (certification is prima facie evidence of scope)
Caesar v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2003) (tort arising from dispute over employer’s business may be within scope)
Majano v. Kim, 469 F.3d 138 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (intent to serve master; scope depends on dispute underpinning conduct)
Johnson v. Weinberg, 434 A.2d 404 (D.C. 1981) (assault arising from transaction within the employer’s business may be foreseeable)
Majano v. Kim, 2005 WL 839546 (D.D.C. 2005) (foreseeability and scope of employment in confrontations)
Haddon v. United States, 68 F.3d 1420 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (attenuated connections fail scope; not every illegal act serves master)
Reddick v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 398 A.2d 27 (D.C. 1979) (direct relation to employment duties required for scope)