Herman Harris v. Zachary Pittman
927 F.3d 266
4th Cir.2019Background
- Harris (a 38-year-old man) was stopped by police after being mistaken for suspects in a stolen-vehicle alert; he fled, was pursued by Officer Pittman, and a hand-to-hand struggle ensued in wooded terrain.
- During the struggle each man deployed a taser ineffectively; a fight for Pittman’s holstered gun followed and an accidental discharge severed part of Harris’s finger.
- Harris (by his later Alford plea) admitted reaching for Pittman’s gun and that shots were fired; Harris contends Pittman gained control, fired once, Harris fell wounded and unarmed, and Pittman then stood over him and fired two additional shots.
- Pittman contends he fired while lying on the ground at a standing Harris who continued to pose an imminent deadly threat; he claims shots were in rapid succession and necessary to eliminate the threat.
- Procedurally: district court granted Pittman qualified immunity at summary judgment; the Fourth Circuit reversed, remanded; district court again granted summary judgment; this opinion reverses again, holding genuine factual disputes preclude qualified immunity on summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Harris) | Defendant's Argument (Pittman) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether, viewed in plaintiff's favor, Pittman’s final shots violated the Fourth Amendment | The final two shots were fired after Harris was wounded, on the ground, unarmed and subdued, so further deadly force was unreasonable | The shots were fired during an ongoing deadly struggle or in rapid succession when Harris still posed an imminent threat | Court: Crediting Harris’s version, a reasonable jury could find the final shots excessive; summary judgment improper |
| Whether the district court properly applied Scott v. Harris to reject Harris’s account | Scott inapplicable because no undisputed, authenticated record (e.g., video) blatantly contradicts Harris; court must credit plaintiff’s account at summary judgment | Pittman: Documentary evidence, witness statements, DNA, and plea facts blatantly contradict Harris so Scott applies | Court: Scott is an exception; the record does not blatantly and demonstrably contradict Harris’s disputed account; normal summary-judgment rule applies |
| Whether qualified immunity shields Pittman because the Fourth Amendment right was not clearly established | Waterman/Brockington made clear deadly force cannot be used after threat is eliminated; those precedents clearly establish Harris’s right not to be shot again once wounded and subdued | Pittman: law not sufficiently specific to put officer on notice; split-second judgments should get immunity | Court: Right was clearly established by Waterman and Brockington; qualified immunity denied at summary judgment |
| Whether the prior Alford plea or state-court facts preclude Harris’s civil claim or compel crediting prosecution summary | Harris’s plea does not confirm factual details and he disputed parts of the prosecutor’s summary; plea does not bar §1983 claim here | Pittman: factual summary accompanying Alford plea contradicts Harris and undermines his version | Court: Plea summary not a blatant contradiction and does not foreclose Harris’s account at summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding force reasonable at first shot may become unreasonable seconds later if threat is eliminated)
- Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying Waterman to hold continued shooting at a wounded, fallen suspect may be excessive)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (video evidence may bar a plaintiff’s account when it blatantly and demonstrably contradicts that account)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (constitutional limit: deadly force only when officer has probable cause to believe suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective-reasonableness standard for excessive-force claims)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (two-step qualified immunity analysis; later supplemented by Pearson)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts may exercise discretion in the order of the qualified-immunity two-step analysis)