Henson v. United States, 55 A.3d 859

Two uniformed officers on routine patrol in a high-crime Northeast DC area approached three young men and asked to pat them down for weapons; two consented, but Javon Henson fled after an officer placed a hand on his arm and asked his destination.
Henson attempted to walk away, led to a chase of 20–30 yards, during which he slipped and was eventually restrained; officers recovered a handgun from his waistband and later a bottle of alcohol during a search.
Trial court denied suppression, finding that Henson was not seized until officers gained physical control after the fall, at which point there was reasonable suspicion to justify a stop and frisk.
Henson was convicted of carrying a pistol without a license, felon in possession of a firearm, possessing an unregistered firearm, and unlawfully possessing ammunition; suppression appeal followed.
Appellate court reviews suppression rulings de novo on legal questions and gives deference to trial court findings of historical fact, with preference to inferences favorable to the prevailing party.
Concurrence notes ambiguity in the Fourth Amendment analysis and argues Wardlow factors should not be applied mechanically; nonetheless, joins the majority on the seizure timeline and suppression outcome.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did an unsuccessful detention constitute a seizure?	Henson argues the initial grab and request to stop amounted to a seizure.	The majority holds no seizure occurred until physical control was achieved after the fall.	No seizure occurred until after he fell and was physically restrained.
Was there reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a stop and frisk?	Wardlow factors (unprovoked flight and high-crime area) justify a stop.	Wardlow factors must be applied with particularized facts, not formulaically.	Yes, the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and frisk.
Did the seizure timing affect the illegality of the search?	Earlier, without seizure, there was no basis for the frisk.	Seizure occurred later, after flight and arrest.	Seizure occurred after flight; later frisk was supported by reasonable suspicion.
Does flight in a high-crime area support reasonable suspicion when consent to pat-down was involved?	Appellant’s flight may be innocent or provoked by police.	Flight supports suspicion, especially with high-crime area and weapons concerns.	Flight, in context of area and circumstances, supported reasonable suspicion.

Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (U.S. 1989) (seizure occurs when officer successfully stops the arrestee, not during pursuit)
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (U.S. 1991) (an unsuccessful attempt to detain by force does not constitute a seizure)
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (U.S. 2007) (seizure defined by withdrawal or control of freedom of movement)
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (U.S. 2000) (unprovoked flight in a high-crime area supports reasonable suspicion)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (U.S. 1991) (distinguishes show of authority from seizure; pursuit alone does not seize)
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (U.S. 1991) (consent to search and seizure considerations in street encounters)
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (U.S. 1990) (reasonable suspicion standard under totality of circumstances)
United States v. Johnson, 496 A.2d 592 (D.C. 1985) (flight as consciousness of guilt considered among factors)
Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295 (D.C. 2010) (clarifies factors for reasonable suspicion in Wardlow context)
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (U.S. 1980) (test for submission to police authority (reasonable behavior entering investigation))