Heidt v. Heidt, 923 N.W.2d 530

Background

Parties divorced in 2012; in 2013 primary residential responsibility for seven minor children was awarded to Robert Heidt.
In 2014 Heidt remarried and his new wife and her three children moved into Heidt’s home, increasing household size and creating reported household conflict.
In June 2016 Trina Iverson moved to modify primary residential responsibility for the five remaining minor children, alleging a material change and harm from a stressful home environment.
Iverson submitted five affidavits (herself and four children); two older minors (V.E.H. and J.J.H.) explicitly sought to live with Iverson, the two youngest (G.I.H., age 10, and G.O.H., age 7) submitted no affidavits.
The district court found a prima facie case only for V.E.H. and J.J.H., denied an evidentiary hearing for G.I.H. and G.O.H., and denied Iverson’s motion to amend; Iverson appealed as to the two youngest children.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Iverson established a prima facie case for modification of primary residential responsibility for G.I.H. and G.O.H. under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(6)	Iverson argued affidavits and circumstances (remarriage, added children, household arguing, children’s stress, risk to emotional health) show a material change and that modification is in the children’s best interests.	Heidt argued affidavits opposing modification rebut Iverson’s allegations and that the youngest children did not express a strong desire to move.	Reversed: prima facie case was established for G.I.H. and G.O.H.; evidentiary hearing required.
Whether district court may deny hearing based on absence of affidavits from very young children	Iverson argued surrounding evidence and sibling affidavits plus potential harm suffice despite no affidavits from the youngest.	Heidt relied on lack of direct statements from the two youngest and contested affidavits.	Held that lack of direct affidavits from young children is not dispositive; the submitted affidavits and circumstances sufficed.
Whether splitting siblings precludes granting a hearing for some children and not others	Iverson argued the district court should consider sibling separation implications and not deny hearing solely to avoid split custody.	Heidt implicitly argued the court could avoid creating a split by denying modification absent stronger proof.	Court: Potential for split custody is disfavored and must be considered, but it does not bar a prima facie finding; here it supported holding a hearing.
Whether opposing affidavits conclusively rebut a prima facie showing	Heidt argued his affidavits showed Iverson’s allegations were false and thus no prima facie case.	Iverson argued opposing affidavits only created factual disputes that should be resolved at hearing.	Held opposing affidavits did not conclusively disprove Iverson’s allegations; conflicts must be resolved at an evidentiary hearing.

Key Cases Cited

Thompson v. Thompson, 809 N.W.2d 331 (2012) (defines material change in circumstances standard)
Kartes v. Kartes, 831 N.W.2d 731 (2013) (prima facie case standard: bare minimum to permit factfinder to infer change)
Sweeney v. Kirby, 826 N.W.2d 330 (2013) (prima facie review is de novo)
Wolt v. Wolt, 803 N.W.2d 534 (2011) (opposing affidavits must conclusively negate movant’s claims to avoid a hearing)
Schumacker v. Schumacker, 796 N.W.2d 636 (2011) (court must accept truth of movant’s allegations when assessing prima facie case)
Schlieve v. Schlieve, 846 N.W.2d 733 (2014) (courts should be cautious about dividing primary residential responsibility)
Stoppler v. Stoppler, 633 N.W.2d 142 (2001) (split custody of siblings is generally disfavored)
Brouillet v. Brouillet, 875 N.W.2d 485 (2016) (approves split primary residential responsibility only with thorough explanation)
Schroeder v. Schroeder, 846 N.W.2d 716 (2014) (modification may be necessary where child’s environment endangers emotional health)