[¶ 1] Lyn Karjalainen, formerly known as Lyn Schroeder, appeals the district court order denying her motion to amend the amended divorce judgment granting Travis Schroeder primary residential responsibility of their children. Karjalainen argues she established a prima facie case for a change in primary residential responsibility and, therefore, is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We affirm, concluding the district court did not err in determining Karjalainen established a material change of circumstances had occurred but failed to establish a prima facie case that modification is necessary to serve the best interests of T.S. and A.S.
I
[¶ 2] Karjalainen and Schroeder were married in June 1999. They have two children, T.S., born in 2000, and A.S., born in 2002. In June 2007, a divorce judgment
[¶ 3] In March 2009, Karjalainen moved to change custody and relocate T.S. and A.S. to Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Schroeder opposed Karjalainen’s motion and requested an award of primary residential responsibility. The parties filed a stipulation of significant change of circumstances requiring a change of custody. In December 2009, a hearing on this matter occurred. On February 4, 2010, the district court entered an amended judgment that awarded Schroeder primary residential responsibility. In March 2012, Karja-lainen informed Schroeder she would be relocating to Omaha, Nebraska, in the summer of 2013.
[¶ 4] In May 2013, Schroeder moved to Florida. Schroeder met Karjalainen in Omaha, where he transferred T.S. and A.S. to Karjalainen for her summer parenting time on his way to Florida, one week earlier than the usual summer parenting time schedule. In July 2013, Kar-jalainen moved to amend the judgment requesting the district court award her primary residential responsibility. Schroeder opposed Karjalainen’s motion. Both parties submitted affidavits. In August 2013, Schroeder moved for an order to show cause why Karjalainen should not be held in contempt of court for failing to return T.S. and A.S. to him in compliance with the amended judgment. Karjalainen responded and Schroeder replied.
[¶ 5] On September 6, 2013, the district court denied Karjalainen’s motion. The district court determined a material change in circumstances had occurred since the February 2010 amended judgment because both parties relocated, but Karjalainen did not establish a prima facie case that the best interests of T.S. and A.S. required a review of primary residential responsibility. The district court found, “[ojther than conclusory unsupported statements, there has been no showing by competent evidence that the move itself to Florida by [Schroeder], as their primary residential parent, has or will adversely affect the best interests of the parties’ two minor children.” The district court determined a hearing was needed to address the parenting time schedule due to the change in circumstances since its prior parenting time determination. The district court also ordered Karjalainen to return the children to Schroeder immediately on the grounds her failure to return the children to Florida on August 12, 2013, in compliance with the amended judgment, was without legitimate justification. Kar-jalainen appealed.
II
[¶ 6] Karjalainen argues the district court erred, as a matter of law, in denying an evidentiary hearing on her motion to modify primary residential responsibility. Karjalainen asserts she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because she established a prima facie case for a change in primary residential responsibility of T.S. and A.S. According to Karjalainen, she presented competent evidence, based on personal, firsthand knowledge, and is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her motion to modify primary residential responsibility.
[¶ 7] When a party seeks modification of primary residential responsibility more than two years after entry of the prior order establishing primary residential responsibility, the party must initially establish a prima facie case justifying modification. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6. “Whether a party presented a prima facie case for a change of primary residential responsi
a. On the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior order or which were unknown to the court at the time of the prior order, a material change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the parties; and
b. The modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.
N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(6). “A material change in circumstances means important new facts that were unknown at the time of a prior custodial decree.”
Schumacher,
[¶ 8] The party moving for a modification of primary residential responsibility is entitled to an evidentiary hearing after the party moving has met its burden of establishing a prima facie case justifying a modification.
Schumacher,
[¶ 9] “The trial court must accept the truth of the moving party’s allegations and may not weigh conflicting allegations in deciding whether to grant a hearing.” Id. at ¶8. A prima facie case may be rebutted by evidence that the moving party is not entitled to the relief requested. Id. A prima facie case is not rebutted by evidence that merely creates conflicting issues of fact and “a court may not weigh the conflicting allegations in considering whether a movant has established a prima facie case.” Id. “If the opposing party’s counter-affidavits fail to establish the moving party’s allegations have no credibility or are insufficient to justify modification, an evidentiary hearing must be held to resolve conflicting evidence and determine whether a modification in primary residential responsibility is warranted.” Id.
[¶ 10] Karjalainen argues she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because she established a prima facie case for a change in primary residential responsibility of T.S. and A.S. under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6. Karjalainen asserts she presented competent evidence, based on per
[¶ 11] When considering whether an evidentiary hearing is required under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(6)(a), a district court must first determine whether a material change of circumstances has occurred. On appeal, Schroeder argues there was no material change in circumstances. This Court has long recognized that “[r]elocation of a parent may constitute a material change in circumstances.”
Mock v. Mock,
[¶ 12] The next consideration for the district court in determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required under N.D.C.C. § 14 — 09—06.6(6)(b), is whether “[t]he modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.”
[¶ 13] The district court did not address each allegation set forth in Karja-lainen’s affidavits, making a summary determination that the documents submitted do not establish a prima facie case. The district court did not find an adverse affect on the children’s best interests.
[¶ 14] In her affidavits in support, Kar-jalainen alleged Schroeder has expressed in correspondence to her and the children that he intends to restrict, limit, or infringe upon Karjalainen’s parenting time. Karjalainen did not include copies of this correspondence nor did Karjalainen submit affidavits of A.S. or T.S. to support this allegation. This Court has recognized that allegations of parental frustration of parenting time may be a basis to grant an evidentiary hearing.
Anderson v. Jenkins,
[¶ 15] Karjalainen alleged the children were distraught about the move from Grand Forks, having little time to say good bye to teachers and friends. Karjalainen’s allegation is based on her firsthand observation. However, her allegation ignores that the children would have to move re
[¶ 16] Karjalainen alleged the children found it difficult to be separated from their half-siblings, which caused T.S. to have an emotional breakdown in school. This allegation is not supported by competent firsthand knowledge as there is no reference in Karjalainen’s affidavit regarding how Kar-jalainen knew about T.S.’s emotional breakdown in school or its cause. Presumably, it would have occurred in Grand. Forks, so it is unlikely for her to have firsthand knowledge. Karjalainen’s assertion that T.S. and A.S. were upset about not being able to see their half-siblings every month and crying about it was based on discussions Karjalainen had with the children about a modification of visitation that would occur because of Karjalainen’s move to Nebraska. Karjalainen’s observation' does constitute firsthand knowledge, but it is not enough to warrant a change in primary residential responsibility. The record establishes the children would be separated from their half-siblings, regardless of Schroeder’s move to Florida, because Karjalainen was moving to Nebraska. Karjalainen, again, included hearsay in her affidavit that A.S. was upset after a conversation with Schroeder when Schroeder allegedly told A.S. he would only get to see his half-siblings if Karjalainen traveled to Florida. She has failed to show a basis for actual personal knowledge, and conclu-sory statements without evidentiary factual support are insufficient to justify modification.
[¶ 17] Karjalainen alleged T.S. preferred to stay in Nebraska. “A mature child’s reasonable preference to live with a particular parent may constitute a material change in circumstances to justify a change in primary residential responsibility if there are persuasive reasons for that preference.”
Miller v. Miller,
[¶ 18] Karjalainen alleged the schools in Omaha, Nebraska, are superior to those located in Florida. This allegation is con-clusory because Karjalainen failed to provide information on how she knows this. The prima facie case that modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the children could be supported by competent information or evidentiary facts regarding the superiority of one school district over another. A.S. had been diagnosed with
[¶ 19] Karjalainen alleged T.S. and A.S. would be living with their paternal grandfather in Florida, who “ha[d] a history of violent behavior, ha[d] been known to throw parties in which mass amounts of alcoholic beverages [were] easily accessible, and openly dr[ank] in excess in the children’s presence” and she observed pornography in the house. We have repeatedly explained that “ ‘[a] material change of circumstances can occur if a child’s present environment may endanger the child’s physical or emotional health or impair the child’s emotional development.’ ”
Lanners v. Johnson,
[¶ 20] All other allegations Karjalainen made were not relevant or competent to determining whether Karjalainen established a prima facie case that the best interests of the children justify modification of primary residential responsibility. Karjalainen makes broad, generalized, con-clusory allegations without a sufficient evi-dentiary basis or a showing of actual firsthand knowledge.
[¶ 21] In her affidavits, Karjalainen suggests she may be in a better position to care for the children because of her improved circumstances. However, again, Karjalainen’s assertions about the improvements in her life, and the increased instability in Schroeder’s life, are concluso-ry allegations. These types of allegations by themselves would not “be sufficient to show a significant change in circumstances.”
Miller,
[¶ 22] To establish a prima facie case, Karjalainen’s affidavits must provide competent admissible evidence. The majority of Karjalainen’s allegations are conclusory and are not supported by evidentiary fact or fail to show Karjalainen had firsthand knowledge. The few facts Karjalainen presents that are more than conclusory
Ill
[¶ 23] Based on our de novo review of the record, the affidavits Karjalainen presented to the district court contained allegations that, even if found to be true, do not establish a prima facie case under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(4). We affirm the district court’s order denying the motion to amend the amended judgment. We conclude the district court did not err in determining Karjalainen established a material change of circumstances had occurred but failed to establish a prima facie case that modification of primary residential responsibility is necessary for the best interests of the children.