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Stoppler v. Stoppler
633 N.W.2d 142
N.D.
2001
Check Treatment

*1 2001 ND 148 STOPPLER,

Bradley Plaintiff John Appellee, Kaye STOPPLER, Defendant Appellant.

No. 20000330.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Aug. *4 Grenz, Linton, ND, for L.

Donavin plaintiff appellee. and Bair, Bair, Garrity Garrity, Patricia E. LLP, Mandan, ND, Kelsch, for defen- & appellant. dant Bismarck, Summers, Anne Elizabeth Litem, un- ND, participated ad Guardian 8.7(e). der N.D.R.Ct.
NEUMANN, Justice. appealed Kaye Stoppler has Kyle

[¶ 1] entered judgment September Bradley filed John in a divorce action affirm part, reverse Stoppler. We proceedings. for further part, and remand January married in 1992. A motion an order issued parties The [¶ 2] Kyle KayLee, parties was born to the contends the court’s de- daughter, visitation, previ- custody, proper- two children from a on Kyle’s in 1993. terminations division, parties with the on a marriage ty lived and its failure to award her ous ranched, Bradley spousal support clearly farm. farmed are erroneous. during the home most Kyle worked outside Kyle twice took the chil- marriage. I Bradley. In 1999 and left be- dren Kyle contends the trial court’s [¶ 5] romantically involved Keith Ha- came clearly custody determination is erroneous. 11, 1999, Kyle told gen. September On determination, making custody In an initial a divorce and dis- Bradley she wanted a trial court must base on the best Hagen. Kyle and closed her affair with child, interest and welfare of the consider- the marital

the children moved out of ing all of the factors listed in N.D.C.C. 19, 1999, September home on to live with 14-09-06.2(1). Chepulis, Reeves Kyle’s mother. ¶63, 10, ND 591 N.W.2d 791. Bradley sued for a divorce on 14-09-06.2(1), N.D.C.C., Section *5 23, September hearing, 1999. After a provides part: in interim trial court issued amended or- custody, 1. For of purpose the best granting Bradley temporary custody der interests and welfare of the child is KayLee, Kyle permit- of from prohibiting determined the court’s consider- ting “KayLee to associate with or in the be ation and evaluation of all factors af- presence Hagen,” giving Kyle of Keith and fecting the best interests and welfare days “visitation for three with of the child. These factors include all during alternating the week and on week- following applicable: of the when judgment Septem- ends.” The entered on love, affection, a. The and other 27, 2000, granted Bradley ber a divorce emotional ties existing between the grounds [Kyle “on the that Stoppler’s] parents and child. Hagen adulterous with Keith capacity b. The disposition and of has caused irreconcilable differences be- love, parents give to the child them”; care, tween Bradley awarded affection, guidance and and con- to custody, KayLee; granted and control of tinue the education of the child. visitation, including reasonable alter- c. disposition The of the to parents nating eight weekends and weeks of con- food, provide the child clothing, with visitation; tinuous summer determined care, medical or other remedial care Kyle’s monthly net income and fixed her recognized permitted and under the month; support obligation per child at $50 laws of this state lieu of medical parties’ distributed the property; marital care, and other material needs. specified spousal support “[n]o is awarded Defendant”; to Bradley pay length directed to d. The of time the child has $2,015.48; the Guardian ad Litem satisfactory and di- lived a stable envi- $2,500 Bradley pay Kyle’s rected to and desirability ronment attorney days. maintaining continuity. fees within 60 unit, permanence, family e. The as a Kyle filed a of appeal notice and a existing proposed of the or custodial stay motion for a of the and child home. support provisions pending the outcome of the appeal. f. parents. The court denied the The moral fitness of the

147 differently does not entitle to physical health dence us The mental and g. finding A reverse the trial court. of fact parents. clearly only reviewing erroneous if the school, home, community and h. The court on the entire evidence is left with of the child. record firm a definite and conviction that a preference The reasonable i. made. mistake has been child, if deems the child to the court intelligence, under- be of sufficient ¶63, 8, Chepulis, Reeves v. 1999 ND 591 experience express standing, 791, Reimche, quoting N.W.2d Reimche v. preference. ¶ 1997 ND j. Evidence of domestic violence- split custody siblings generally “While k. The interaction and interrelation- disfavored, McAdams, McAdams v. for interaction ship, potential or the (N.D.1995), N.W.2d 647 we have affirmed interrelationship, of the child half-siblings.” Ryan it some cases of v. in, who resides any person (N.D. Flemming, 533 N.W.2d frequents the household present, 1995). especially appropriate “It is that may signifi- parent of a who having deciding close cases to do with cus- inter- cantly affect the child’s best fit tody parents of children between two The shall consider that ests. court regard given due to the trial that be history inflicting, or ten- person’s opportunity to determine the credi- harm, inflict, dency physical bodi- Dinius, bility of the witnesses.” Dinius assault, ly injury, or the fear (N.D.1989). 210, 214 Estab- harm, bodily injury, or as- physical and nurture are patterns lished of care sault, persons. on other *6 in relevant factors for consideration decid- allegations not making l. The of false ing custody. Heggen Heggen, v. faith, by parent in one good made (N.D.1990). “An award of other, of harm to a child against the fact, and custody finding is a of this Court as defined in section 50-25.1-02. custody not a award unless it will disturb Any by m. other factors considered Brown, clearly erroneous.” Brown is partic- to relevant a the court be to ¶ 199, 10, 1999 ND custody dispute. ular child considering In the thirteen fac- a limited re We exercise 14-09-06.2(1), by N.D.C.C. specified tors custody a child award in divorce view of a—fa- the trial court found one—factor cases: c,b, Kyle, and found seven—factors vored is a A trial court’s determination i,h, j, neither of the g, and 1—favored finding fact that will not be set aside five regard to the other parties. With appeal clearly unless it is erroneous. on factors, the court found: pre- are findings A trial of fact all KayLee has lived on the farm complaining The D. sumptively correct. a farm- life. Her father is demonstrating of her party bears the burden Certainly there are risks clearly is appeal finding on that a of fact er/rancher. dangers on a Good reviewing findings In erroneous. farm/ranch. appreciation fact, in the common sense and we must view the evidence in necessary is dangers A the risks and light findings. most favorable to the ranch. a farm or views of order to be safe on permissible choice between two bumps, bruises clearly KayLee did suffer some the evidence is not erroneous. in father’s she was her might the evi- and a burn while Simply because we view Hagen prior an affair with Keith to the farm. was also custody on the separation.” Her adulterous re- parties’ was in her mother’s injured she while Hagen ongoing. lationship in Brad- with Keith is Braddock. While custody in Hagen Her sexual misconduct with Mr. dock, her bike and was Kaylee fell off attempted continues. has not to her foot on a She injured. And she burned shield her children from her being operated lawnmower which was Hagen. Hagen stays Mr. Mr. even par- Prior to the with by her half-brother. the Defendant at the Defendant’s good, the farm was a with separation, ties’ mother’s house. He interacts with her satisfactory environment in stable KayLee even knows her mother a child. Just because one sons. which to raise man, not her seeing another who is parties has chosen leave suddenly days, father. Now we tend to believe does not turn the farm farm any consenting that what two adults do unsatisfactory dangerous into an okay. plain fact is together raise a child. Mr. But place which to that this sexual misconduct the De- the risks and dan- Stoppler understands Hagen fendant and immor- simply on the farm. He has been a farm- Mr. gers Zander, life. no credi- al. Yern discovered the Defen- all his There is er/rancher compromising position in a a Stoppler ble evidence to show that Mr. dant place daughter patron in some kind of male motel the hot tub of would his Motel. Zander em- jeopardy on the farm. Willows Mr. was ployed at the Motel at the time. Willows This factor favors the Plaintiff. The Defendant contends that the male period, During E. the interim patron himself I upon forced her. do along Defendant with her two sons from story. not believe version prior marriage, Espe- live with Doreen explain any help did not to or seek She rum, Defendant, the mother from Mr. Zander when she was discov- Doreen’s small house in Braddock. Af- just ered. left and went home. She divorce, ter the plans Defendant weighs This factor heavily favor of move to where current- Bismarck she is the Plaintiff. ly working Health for U.S. Care. The *7 Defendant, sons, along with her two family hopes form a unit. She to add Defendant relationship K. a KayLee family Possibly, to the unit. Hagen. Hagen with Keith Mr. is a soft- Hagen,

the Defendant will add Keith her spoken who person has been convicted boyfriend family to the unit. Since the driving three times of while under the Defendant plans moving on out of her influence, diagnosed and has been as an house, mother’s she is not able to inform diagno- Notwithstanding alcoholic. the court about a custodial home. The sis, Hagen Mr. does not he is an believe plan Plaintiff the farm lives on and his alcoholic and continues to drink alcohol. stay to hopes on the farm. He that the seldom, very He testified that he drinks farm will KayLee’s continue to be custo- drinks, two, three, once a month and' dial home. beers, maybe. four completed He has This factor favors the Plaintiff be- aftercare, outpatient treatment and always Kay- cause the farm has been he AA. does attend There was some permanent Lee’s home. testimony girl- from Mr. Hagen’s former friend, Reich, F. Kasey The Defendant in her that post Hagen Mr. brief stated, “Kyle having did admit to told her that he had to take classes for Hagen plans living testi- Mr. on Hagen Mr. Court. anger management. convictions or that he has no assault Defendant. fied violent with women. Other ever been KayLee’s It not be in in- would best uncorroborated testi- than Ms. Reich’s custody terest to award to the Defen- no evidence to show that mony, there is dant. of assault Hagen Mr. has been convicted [¶ 9] Most the factors list Mr. been violent with women. or ever 14-09-06.2(1) § ed in N.D.C.C. are rela plans testified that he on Hagen also tively Michigan Supreme clear. As the things when living with the Defendant however, recognized, Court has factors d So, down. he settled and calmed are phrased awkwardly.” and e “are somewhat having on a definitely plans Smith, Ireland v. 451 Mich. children in with the Defendant (1996). Considering potential future. interrelationship of for interaction and inquiry Factor d calls for a factual not be KayLee Hagen, with Mr. it would (how stable, long has the child been a interest of to reside the best environment?) satisfactory and then with a person in the same household (“the desirability states a value of main- has been convicted three times of who taining continuity”). literally, Taken DUI, diagnosed as an alcoholic and been appears inquiry factor e to direct an into treatment, to despite continues consume the extent to which a “home” will serve alcohol. permanent “family as a unit.” weighs heavily in the This factor Essentially, at n. 8. factor d addresses Id. Plaintiffs favor. environment, stability including past a setting, place physical consideration of case, M. In this there has been some prior as well as a consideration of the by the badmouthing of the Defendant family lifestyle part unit and its as that According KayLee. Plaintiff in front of setting. quality It addresses the also report, KayLee Anne Summers has environment, desirability past that and the saying things bad stop told her father to d, continuity. factor maintaining Under And, according about her mom. Ms. a factor to be considered “prior report, making the Plaintiff is Summer’s arrange- determining when the custodial De- stop badmouthing an effort to for child.” 2 San- ment which is best considering all the fac- fendant. After Little, Custody Morgan dra Child & Visi- tors, custody KayLee will be awarded (2001). Practice 10.09[2] tation Laio & Overall, Stoppler to the Plaintiff. Mr. e, hand, other deals with Factor on the good father. He loves his has been *8 permanence for as a fami- prospects future Financially, ability he daughter. has ly clearly degree “there is a of unit. While Also, ability he to care for her. has e, “the overlap between” factors d and KayLee’s personal needs. to care for for prospects focus of factor e is the child’s to be raised on the KayLee can continue Ireland, family a environment.” stable family family farm in the home. Ms. ways at 690. The court noted living with her Stoppler temporarily stability may in be undermined: which in her mother’s small crowded mother can stability of a child’s home be The not have a custodial home. She does ways. in various This undermined adulterous affair home. Her continuous to unfa- might frequent include moves diagnosed with a alcoholic who continues persons a of settings, miliar succession very troubling alcohol is for the to use home, home with the continui- proposed in the live-in romantic custodial residing ty Bradley’s pro- the environment of parent, custodial or companions for the course, home, analysis which posed custodial disruptions. Of potential other mix d and e. examined seems to factors every needs to be situation individually. Nevertheless, have [¶ 12] as we e, the considering n. 9.1 In factor Id. at noted, degree overlap there is a between weigh bearing all the facts trial court must finding regard factors d and e. -While provide can best their parent on which ing may logically factor e seem inconsis that child “the of a custodial home benefits tent, when we consider trial court’s permanence, family a is marked as together factors and e analyses of d unit.” Id. at 691. f, m, analyses k it its of factors is clear KayLee’s and found fu the court believed analysis The trial court’s family ture for a stable environ prospects appropriate. finding of factor d was In its permanent family ment with a more unit merely it considered the farm not as a greater Bradley’s custody. in Con were location, way of but as a life that is a sidering light the evidence a most favor significant part of the environment fact, findings able to the trial court’s KayLee has lived. The trial court which correct, which are conclude presumed we weighed also examined and the risks in the trial award not court’s clear life, way herent that an issue raised ly erroneous. by Kyle, protections as well as the from Bradley’s experience risk as a farmer- II provide. rancher can It is clear the trial contends the trial “court’s court found has lived in a stable only alternating award of weekend visita- environment, satisfactory an environment evenings tion with no additional between in part many which included the elements KayLee’s is insufficient to meet needs farm, of life on the and it is clear the trial clearly erroneous.” court maintaining further found the conti nuity of that environment is desirable. 14-05-22(2), [¶ 14] Section N.D.C.C., provides: analysis

[¶ 11] The making an custody, After award of of factor e a more is bit troublesome. The shall, upon request court of the noncus- first several sentences of the court’s find parent, grant rights todial such of visita- ings regarding clearly factor e address the tion as will enable the child and the family Kyle’s pro nature of the unit of parent to maintain par- noncustodial posed custodial home and the likely rela ent-child that be benefi- will unit, permanence family just tive of that as child, finds, cial unless the court contemplates. the factor two sen The last a hearing, likely after that visitation is per tences, however, speak to place, endanger physical the child’s or emo- environment, haps family rather than unit. tional health. Nothing in the paragraph appears to ex family Bradley’s pro amine the unit primary purpose The is to visitation Rather, children, posed promote custodial home. best interests of the the trial *9 compare likely parents. court seems to the not relative the wishes the v. Schiff ¶ 9, 191; permanence family Kyle’s 113, of the unit of 2000 ND 611 N.W.2d Schiff D.F.G., recognized 1. We frequent have for a child. In moving re is evt stable environment 16, ¶ 216, dence parent's inability provide of a to 1999 ND 602 i N.W.2d 697.

151 Ackerman, 135, guidelines v. 1999 ND have been established for trial Ackerman ¶ 775, 13, Ruff, with the courts in v. N.D. 596 N.W.2d 332. “Visitation 78 52 Ruff (1952), Fischer, to parent presumed be N.W.2d 107 and Fischer v. noncustodial (N.D.1966).” merely the child’s best interests and is not 139 N.W.2d 845 VanRosen parent, VanRosendale, noncustodial but privilege 790, a of the dale v. 333 N.W.2d ¶ Schiff, (N.D.1983). child.” at 9. A trial right a of the 791 “Although property divi on visitation is treat- equal court’s determination need equitable, sion not be to be fact, finding a which we will affirm ed as trial explain any court must substantial clearly Zuger it v. unless erroneous. disparity.” Northrop Northrop, v. 2001 ¶ 97, ¶36, 804; 31, Zuger, 8, 1997 ND 563 N.W.2d ND “A 622 N.W.2d 219. trial 695, Griffeth, 698 Reinecke v. 533 N.W.2d court’s determinations regarding division (N.D.1995). property findings of marital are treated as fact appeal that will not be reversed on “Nothing prevents [¶ 15] clearly unless erroneous.” Id. voluntarily adjusting these families from spirit compromise differences in a their “In [¶ 18] order to make an cooperation accomplish to best distribution, equitable the trial court must Peterson, of all.” Peterson v. interests first net par determine the worth of the ¶14, 28, If ND 559 826. 1997 N.W.2d Freed, ties’ v. property.” Freed 454 adjust are their visitation parties unable (N.D.1990). 516, 520 “To review a differences, KayLee parents after division, property we need to understand have exercised visitation accordance the reasons for the trial court’s decision.” provisions judgment with the for a 432, Pfliger Pfliger, v. 461 N.W.2d an oppor time sufficient to afford (N.D.1990). The trial court must indicate tunity forge closer ties the custodi prop a rationale for its distribution of the divorce, parent required by al the visi ¶ 31, 10, erty. Northrop, 2001 ND again. E.g., tation issue can be addressed necessary N.W.2d 219. “A factual basis Iverson, 739, Iverson v. reviewing for a court to understand wheth (N.D.1995) (“A trial court’s decision on er a trial court’s distribution of marital finding modification of is a of fact visitation clearly property is erroneous.” Hoverson clearly reversed which will not be unless ¶ Hoverson, 27, 629 2001 ND erroneous.”). fails to N.W.2d 573. trial court “When might provided 16] While we have [¶ division, fully explain property we will provisions had tried different visitation we upset fairly not it if the reasons are discer case, we conclude the trial court’s visi- Pfliger, or deduction inference.” nible clearly tation determination is not errone- at 436. “If the trial court fails to articu ous. adequate prop factual for its late basis erty division or we are unable to determine Ill through deduc its rationale inference or contends the tion, we will remand for clarification of property clearly division is errone missing conclusory findings.” Nor 14-05-24, ous. “[w]hen Under N.D.C.C. ¶ throp, at granted, a divorce is the court shall make The trial court made the follow- equitable such distribution of the real and may September division in its personal property parties ing property as fact, just findings amended conclusions proper.” seem “While there is no law, judgment: for certain and order for distributing property, set rule *10 152 determining findings not make the val- DIVISION: After did

5. PROPERTY debts, make a of assets or and did not of the Ruff-Fischer ue full consideration Guidelines, finding determining determined a the net worth of the the Court has parties’ property. of the are unable parties’ division marital We equitable fair and parties to be as follows: to the and debts to discern what was awarded property value, are, therefore, its and unable or the fact that Taking into consideration any meaningful review of the provide prior to was a farmer/rancher Plaintiff con- property distribution. We to- and that his income is marriage the must be property clude the distribution farming tally on the and dependent vacated and remanded for redetermination operation, he shall be awarded ranching find- preparation complete of more and livestock, grain growing and all feed ings. hand, possession, all his on vehicles property possession, his personal

his acquired he has since personal property IV separation, savings his and parties’ Kyle contends the trial [¶ 21] accounts, debts, checking all his all debts sup spousal court’s failure to award her sepa- parties’ he incurred since the has clearly erroneous. port Under N.D.C.C. debts, ration, farming/ranching and all 14-05-24, “may .compel the trial court his insurance. parties either of the ... to make such account that Taking into Defen- party suitable allowances to the other for dependent upon is not dant’s income support during period life or for a shorter farming ranching operation and and the just, may having as to the court seem Defendant’s continuous adul- fact of the regard parties to the circumstances of the tery, be awarded items on De- she shall respectively.” Spousal support determina Exhibit which include the fendant’s G findings tions are treated as of fact that following: goods all household her appeal will not be reversed on unless clear possession, goods her household Nelson, v. ND ly erroneous. Nelson house, T.V., bed, spare Twin size Kitch- ¶ 527; 176, 9, Zuger Zuger, v. chairs, couch, chair, dishes/pots/pans, en ¶ A 1997 ND 563 N.W.2d 804. freezer, dressers, lamp three and enter- property court cannot consider division center; personal property all tainment spousal support separately and in a vacu debt; possession, in her her vehicle and um, togeth but must examine those issues accounts, savings checking per- Ketelsen, er. Ketelsen 1999 ND acquired she property sonal has since ¶ 6, may The trial N.W.2d 185. court debts, parties’ separation, all her all spousal support reconsider issue incurred since the parties’ debts she it property when redetermines the distri any separation, pension retirement or prepares complete bution and more find assets, any may insurance she have ings on remand. get- obtained. To assist Defendant in feet, ting back on her she will be award- $10,000.00 a payment

ed from Plain- V Payment tiff. is to be within 60 made property The distribution and days Judgment. of the date of the provisions judgment spousal support disputes There were are reversed and remanded for further about commodities, cows, proceedings opin- the value of in accordance with this debt judgment owed to The affirmed. Bradley’s father. The trial court ion. is otherwise *11 VANDEWALLE, As W. is evident from this finding, [¶ 23]GERALD the trial SANDSTROM, C.J., DALE V. strong and court found a relationship existed KAPSNER, JJ„ RONNING KayLee Kyle. However, CAROL between and the concur. trial court failed to impact address the of this relationship stability Kay- on the of Justice, MARING, concurring part Lee’s environment desirability and the of dissenting part. and continuity the of this after the Therefore, divorce. it my opinion that II, III, I concur in Parts and [¶ 24] IV (d) the trial court However, incorrectly applied majority I am factor opinion. of the § the trial N.D.C.C. 14-09-06.2. opinion findings the that regarding fact and conclusions of law the (d), [¶ applying 26] When factor a trial child determination were induced court must length examine of time “[t]he (d) by application erroneous factors the child has lived in satisfactory a stable (f) § and of N.D.C.C. 14-09-06.2. There- desirability environment and the of main- fore, I respectfully dissent from Part I. taining § continuity.” N.D.C.C. 14-09- (a) The trial court found factor 06.2(d). majority correctly The states that 14-09-06.2, love, § of N.D.C.C. the affec- “factor past stability d addresses of envi- tion, existing and other emotional be- ties ronment, including a place consideration of child, parents tween the to favor physical setting, as well as a consider- awarding custody Kyle. making In this ation prior family unit and its life- finding, the trial court stated: style part However, as of that setting.” majority the fails recognize that the parents

Both love and show affection trial court dy- did not consider how the child, KayLee Stoppler, for their who “prior family namics of the unit” However, July was born on the affected past stability KayLee’s environment. existing KayLee emotional ties between The majority treatise cited in its appear and her mother stronger to be at (d) recognizes discussion of factor im- than existing this time those between portance maintaining that the child’s ac- KayLee and her father. relationships plays customed the stabili- Summers, Anne Ad Li- Guardian ty of the child’s environment. See Sandra tem, pointed report Kay- out her that Little, Morgan Custody Child & Visitation Lee is much more being comfortable (2001) (“Impor- Law & Practice 10.09[1] with KayLee’s every- her mom and that tant maintaining considerations include day and emotional needs of life are life, continuity stability in the child’s bymet her mom. especially relationships in the child’s Zander, Donna a friend of the Stop- others.”). parents, siblings and piers, that the Defendant testified was case, In this the trial court did primarily responsible for the care of relationships not consider how the between KayLee KayLee usually and that went KayLee KayLee and between help. to the for Defendant Susan Her- and her half siblings past affected sta- zog, a social worker with West Central Furthermore, Center, bility of her environment. Human Service has been coun- seling KayLee concerning the current trial court never addressed the “desir- ability maintaining continuity” family According situation. to Ms. Her- of these Instead, zog, relationships was worried about not be- after the divorce. ing merely past able to live with her mom. the trial court considered *12 case, i.e., farm, in its application the the the trial court erred

physical setting, and (d) dangers setting. inquiry in that of factor it made no into inherent when the would receive benefits that of an original In the context cus- continuing relationship from with determination, said, tody have “[w]hile we Kyle, the had cared for her on parent who consideration, stability is a it is community daily a basis. overriding. outweighed not It can be a residence elsewhere. favoring factors original 29] In to the custo- [¶ addition relationship in child’s with the Continuity a above, dy determination cases discussed closest, very is nurturing parent also a custody our modification of eases illus- also stability.” of Roen v. important aspect trate the role that a important child’s rela- (N.D.1989) (ci- Roen, 170, 174 tionship nurturing parent plays with the omitted); tation accord v. Schmaltz stability the of the child’s environment. In ¶ 212, 10, Schmaltz, ND N.W.2d 1998 586 (N.D. Olson, 97, v. 411 Orke N.W.2d 101 of (affirming custody 852 an award to a 1987), we that the trial court erred in held to move planned father who the children changing from the custody mother to the had lived they from town in for nine the so, emphasized father. In we that doing Furthermore, it years). proper is for trial “stability” important aspect the of is “the importance courts to address “the of sta- stability relationship of the child’s with the bility continuity in the of the and lives custodial Id. at 100. parent.” We further the benefits to the children children and that, emphasized that is “[i]t continuous continuing relationship from the children’s uninterrupted relationship and that has cared with who had for them on parent the important the child been to since the di- daily Heggen a v. 452 Heggen, basis.” See 100-101; accord vorce.” at v. Id. Blotske (N.D.1990). 96, have re- N.W.2d 101 We Leidholm, 607, (N.D.1992) 487 611 N.W.2d the peatedly recognized importance that (“It continuity of the par- the custodial relationship is continuing properly this ad- critical, relationship ent-child that not (d) 14- dressed under factor N.D.C.C. continuity stepparent-child the rela- Kjelland, v. Kjelland 09-06.2-. 2000 ND See tionship.”). have also stressed the im- We ¶ (“Under 86, 10, 609 100 factors N.W.2d portance maintaining continuity the (d) (e), court acknowledged the trial importance that the relationship over stability Tom’s greater and commitment to continuity of the maintaining physi- child’s A parenting. party’s par- commitment to setting. example, cal For v. Klose enting to is a valid factor consider in deter- Klose, 94, (N.D.1994), 524 96 the N.W.2d custody.”); Foreng Foreng, v. 509 mining brought a motion for change ex-husband (N.D.1993) 38, (listing factors N.W.2d 40 the ex-wife after moved (e) from (a), (b), (d), and as that factors “bear Jamestown to Bismarck with the children. upon parties’ parenting ability, the emo- motion, support In of his ar- husband tional disposition and with the relationship gued expressed preference children a child”); Swanston, v. 502 Swanston (N.D.1993) stay (“The in Jamestown with him. id. See 509 trial stated, In rejecting argument this we favorably court “a stability considered preference child’s to remain communi- continuity of the children’s relation- Curtis, father,] ty where and familiar ship his friends surround- [the with and the ben- ings predictable are general- efits that would flow from located but continuing that patterns ly important should relationship. ‘Established of care not override need relevant for the child maintain a stable nurture are factors for the relation- ”). trial ship parent.” court to have considered.’ In with custodial at 97. this Id.

155 Likewise, case, present in the while the court can consider prior physi- child’s KayLee’s trial prior court could consider cal if setting the facts of the case warrant setting, by failing it erred physical See, to such .consideration. e.g., Evans v. weigh Evans, (Alaska against impor- this consideration 1994); P.2d maintaining continuity Kay- tance of McBride, (Alas- Craig 639 P.2d Kyle. 1982). Lee’s However, ka factor, under this *13 courts “must consider each parent’s re- (d) Interpreting factor to encom- spective ability to maintain stable and sat- pass continuity prior of a parental child’s isfactory relations between themselves and relationships only is not in accordance with McQuade, the child following separation.” cases, also, prior our in but accordance added). 901 P.2d at 426 (emphasis There- interpretations given to identical fac- fore, “the fact physical that the location of tors'by other state courts. As is evident a child’s changes may home have little or from majority’s citation of v. Ireland no bearing on the stability of the home.” Smith, 457, 686, 451 Mich. 547 N.W.2d 690 Craig, (Rabinowitz, 639 P.2d C.J., at 308 (1996), Michigan provides law for a factor concurring). (d) § identical to factor of N.D.C.C. 14-09- Continuity and for a stability child come Comp. 06.2. See Mich. Ann. Laws only not from staying in the house, same 722.23(d) (West However, § Supp.2001). going or to the same school. Consider- (e), it permanence was factor of the ation given should also be to social and home, proposed family that was at in issue emotional factors such as pri- who the Ireland, (d). Ireland, not factor See 547 mary care-giver was for the child and case, N.W.2d at 689-90. In a recent a whether the separated child would be Michigan Appeals Court of did have the siblings from family if members he opportunity directly address appli- placed parent was with one rather than 722.23(d). cation of section Phillips See v. the other. Jordan, 17, Mich.App. 183, 241 (2000). so, 189 In doing recognized it (Alas- Rooney Rooney, 212, v. 914 P.2d 217 importance continuity parent- 1996). (d), ka Under factor “[s]tability is relationship child over continuity of the often a function of parental attitude and n physical setting. child’s id. (affirming See geography.” Craig, not of 639 at 308 P.2d that,, the trial finding while the (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring). plaintiff, parent, the child’s custodial had In [¶ addition to erring applying 32] frequently residences, changed “the child’s (d), factor the trial court also erred its plaintiff home was with may wherever that (f) application § of factor of N.D.C.C. 14- parents be and that punished could not be. 09-06.2. In determining the best interests move”). for having to child, (f) of a factor allows a trial court to Like Michigan, Alaska law also examine moral par- “[t]he fitness of the (d) provides for a factor identical § to factor ents.” N.D.C.C. Our re- 14-09-06.2©. n § of N.D.C.C. 14-09-06.2. See Alaska Stat. cent cases have indicated that an extra- 25.24.150(c)(5)(Michie 2000). The Alas- marital affair or relationship adulterous ka Supreme little, Court has noted that given any, “the should be if weight under stability criteria of continuity must be this factor unless there is evidence that the light considered in of the facts of each affair had an adverse effect on the chil- particular McQuade McQuade, case.” v. In Foreng, dren. we affirmed an award of (Alaska 1995). Thus, 901 P.2d 426 custody to a mother who had an extramar- addressing stability continuity, a ital where the trial court simply contra- child’s interests izing have a detri- a best did not

found that the affair of the Child overriding purpose venes the on the children. impact mental Custody Act.” Id. so, refused to doing In we at 40. N.W.2d of ex- “that evidence relations are not necessari- suggestion Extramarital adopt the se, an irre- one will relationships, per indicator how ly a reliable tramarital parent-child Id. relation- of moral unfitness.” function within the indication futable certainly has Likewise, Gregg, ship. we affirmed a such conduct Gregg While fitness, spousal it bearing that an extramarital on one’s finding trial court’s one will probative not be how not relevant need mother was affair a child. Because of its interact or raise the children were fitness because moral ¶ signifi- 204, 10, value and the probative limited ND by it. 1998 not affected ascribing Schmaltz, potential prejudicially cant for 312; 1998 ND see also fact, ¶ weight to that ex- disproportionate (affirming *14 852 586 N.W.2d itself, conduct, may in and of tramarital a father who had an custody to award of factor f. not be relevant to be- parties separated the but affair after divorced). they fore were (footnote omitted). Michigan courts Id. apply to reasoning extended this have (d) Like factor of N.D.C.C. [¶ 33] cohabitation, extra- unmarried as well as (f) 14-09-06.2, virtually § factor also has a Schmidt, marital affairs. See Hilliard Michigan under law. counterpart identical 316, 263, 267 Mich.App. 586 N.W.2d 231 722.23(f) § Comp. Laws Ann. See Mich. (1998) Fletcher, 896); 526 at (citing N.W.2d (West interpreting In factor Supp.2001). Truitt, 38, Mich.App. Truitt v. 172 see also (f), Michigan Supreme Court stated (1988) (“Standing- 458 words of this factor are that the critical alone, cohabitation is not unmarried parties involved.” See “fitness immorality under the enough to constitute Fletcher, Mich. 526 Fletcher v. 447 Act.”). Custody Child (1994). N.W.2d case, applying In this factor (moral [¶ 34] fitness), the oth- Factor f like all (f), finding that the trial court made no factors, statutory person’s er relates to a Kyle’s boyfriend with her had cohabitation paren- evaluate parent. fitness as a To fact, KayLee. on In effect adverse fitness, par- must look to the tal courts court made to only reference relationship and the effect that ent-child (f) KayLee under factor is the statement at have on that the conduct issue will seeing her “KayLee even knows mother Thus, question under relationship. man, is not her father.” No- another who morally superi- factor f not ‘whois the explain did the trial court how this where adult;’ question par- concerns the related to how will function conduct provide ties’ relative fitness to for their Rather, trial court parent. as a child, disposition moral of each given the Kyle’s wrongfully presumed that cohabita- con- party as demonstrated individual boyfriend indicated moral tion with duct. (f). Foreng, factor unfitness under See Thus, “questionable Id. the court held that (refusing adopt at 40 f if only conduct relevant to factor it is a position “that evidence of extramarital re- type necessarily sig- of conduct that has a se, is an irrefutable indica- lationships, per on one function nificant influence how will unfitness”). moral tion of (footnote omitted). parent.” In as Id. reasoned, I court holding, the Because believe the trial reaching this court (d) (f) and of N.D.C.C. punish infidelity jeopard- misapplied “to at the risk of factors 14-09-06.2, respectfully I dissent and application remand for a correct would

the law. Mary Maring, Muehlen J.

2001 ND 151

McKENZIE COUNTY SOCIAL BOARD, Plaintiff

SERVICE Appellant,

J.C.Y.B., by through Michon C. Litem, ad

Sax as Guardian

F.H., Plaintiffs,

C.G., Appellee. Defendant and

No. 20010047.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Aug.

Case Details

Case Name: Stoppler v. Stoppler
Court Name: North Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: Aug 29, 2001
Citation: 633 N.W.2d 142
Docket Number: 20000330
Court Abbreviation: N.D.
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