Heidt v. Heidt
2019 ND 45
| N.D. | 2019Background
- Iverson (mother) sought modification of primary residential responsibility in 2016 for five minor children previously placed with Heidt (father) in 2013; two oldest had reached majority.
- After the divorce Heidt remarried and his new wife and her three children moved into his Grafton home, increasing household size and, according to Iverson, creating persistent arguing and a stressful environment.
- Iverson filed affidavits from herself and four children (two older minors and two older siblings) alleging household conflict, stress, and that at least two children wanted to live with her in Fargo.
- The district court granted a prima facie finding and evidentiary hearing for two children (V.E.H. and J.J.H.), denied a hearing for R.H.H., and denied a prima facie finding for the two youngest children (G.I.H., age 10, and G.O.H., age 7).
- The district court relied on the lack of strong expressed preferences by the two youngest children and characterized the remarriage and children’s statements as insufficient to establish a prima facie case; Iverson moved to amend the findings, which was denied.
- The Supreme Court reviewed whether the affidavits and circumstances established a prima facie case under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(6) (material change and best interests) and reversed, remanding for an evidentiary hearing for the two youngest children.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Iverson established a prima facie case of material change for G.I.H. and G.O.H. | Remarriage, addition of three step-children, ongoing arguing, and children’s affidavits show new stressful environment constituting a material change. | Remarriage and affidavits are vague and insufficient; lack of direct preferences from the two youngest undermines prima facie showing. | Reversed: affidavits and circumstances, accepted as true, were sufficient to show a prima facie material change. |
| Whether the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the two youngest children | The stressful household, alleged emotional harm, and poor parent–child relationships show modification may be necessary to protect emotional health. | Opposing affidavits dispute Iverson’s allegations and argue modification is not warranted. | Reversed: allegations, if true, supported a prima facie showing that modification might be necessary to protect children’s emotional health; evidentiary hearing required. |
| Whether opposing affidavits defeated the prima facie showing | Iverson: opposing affidavits only create factual disputes that must be resolved at hearing. | Heidt: submitted affidavits rebutting Iverson’s claims and showing no basis for modification. | Court: Opposing affidavits did not conclusively negate Iverson’s allegations; conflicting facts cannot be weighed at prima facie stage. |
| Whether the district court erred in denying motion to amend findings | Iverson argued the court should correct findings to reflect prima facie showing for all four youngest children. | Heidt relied on court’s original factual assessment. | Court found it unnecessary to decide the amendment ruling because it independently concluded prima facie was established and reversed on that basis. |
Key Cases Cited
- Thompson v. Thompson, 809 N.W.2d 331 (N.D. 2012) (defines material change as important new fact unknown at prior custody decision)
- Sweeney v. Kirby, 826 N.W.2d 330 (N.D. 2013) (prima facie standard for custody modification reviewed de novo)
- Wolt v. Wolt, 803 N.W.2d 534 (N.D. 2011) (district court may deny hearing only when movant’s allegations are facially insufficient or opposing affidavits conclusively negate claim)
- Kartes v. Kartes, 831 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 2013) (prima facie requires minimal evidence to allow factfinder to infer the fact at issue)
- Schumacker v. Schumacker, 796 N.W.2d 636 (N.D. 2011) (courts must accept truth of movant’s allegations at prima facie stage)
- Schlieve v. Schlieve, 846 N.W.2d 733 (N.D. 2014) (courts should be cautious about dividing primary residential responsibility of siblings)
- Stoppler v. Stoppler, 633 N.W.2d 142 (N.D. 2001) (split custody of siblings is generally disfavored)
- Brouillet v. Brouillet, 875 N.W.2d 485 (N.D. 2016) (approved split primary residential responsibility only with thorough explanation)
- Schroeder v. Schroeder, 846 N.W.2d 716 (N.D. 2014) (modification necessary when present environment endangers emotional health or impairs development)