Hector DeJesus v. Joseph Yorkovich, 16-3664

DeJesus, an older Illinois prisoner at Hill Correctional Center, was assaulted by his younger, larger cellmate (Evans) in July 2012 and robbed of commissary money. He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IDOC had implemented a two‑meal (brunch/dinner) pilot; DeJesus alleges portions were reduced in practice and some inmates were effectively starving, causing violence.
Hill’s intake and placement procedures require screening and staff assessment of compatibility (age, size, gang affiliation, violence history); DeJesus claims staff intentionally paired vulnerable inmates with aggressive ones.
Medical staff (Wexford) treated DeJesus multiple times: nurses cleaned wounds and gave ibuprofen; Dr. Sood prescribed Naprosyn and initially declined immediate x‑rays; later x‑rays showed congenital/degenerative findings per radiologist. DeJesus contends injuries were due to the assault and that staff were deliberately indifferent and conspired to conceal injury.
District court denied several discovery and expert appointment requests, granted summary judgment to IDOC and Wexford defendants, and found DeJesus failed to raise genuine factual disputes about policies or deliberate indifference.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Failure‑to‑protect / cell‑placement policy	Hill had policy of pairing older/weaker inmates with younger/stronger “predators,” causing predictable attacks	Placement followed compatibility rules; no evidence of an official policy to target vulnerable inmates	Summary judgment for defendants — no evidence of an official policy or factual basis to infer one
Nutrition policy causing violence	Two‑meal system and reduced portions intentionally starved inmates, provoking robberies/violence	Nutrition met caloric/protein requirements; plaintiff’s claims speculative and unsupported	Court refused to treat anecdotal complaints as proof of a policy; plaintiff’s theory speculative and implausible
Deliberate indifference in medical care	Wexford staff refused appropriate diagnostics (x‑rays), minimized complaints, and conspired to conceal injury	Medical staff provided ongoing assessment, medications, eventual diagnostic imaging; decisions were medical judgment	Summary judgment for Wexford — treatment showed active care; disagreement over diagnostics not deliberate indifference
Appointment of independent expert under Rule 706	DeJesus requested a court‑appointed expert to interpret x‑rays supporting causation	Rule 706 appoints neutral experts; judge found an expert unnecessary and unhelpful	Denial not an abuse of discretion — expert would not have aided the court or shown deliberate indifference

Proctor v. Sood, 863 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (summary‑judgment standard and medical‑care Eighth Amendment analysis)
Aguilar v. Gaston‑Camara, 861 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2017) (speculation insufficient to defeat summary judgment)
Consolino v. Towne, 872 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 2017) (conjecture does not create factual dispute)
McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 2013) (ongoing assessment undermines deliberate indifference claim)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (failure‑to‑protect standard requires actual knowledge of substantial risk)
Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2015) (notice standards for substantial risk)
Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 2014) (disagreement with medical judgment is not deliberate indifference)
Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2006) (medical judgment and Eighth Amendment)
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (medical judgment as central in Eighth Amendment claims)
Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2017) (active treatment militates against deliberate indifference)
Kennedy v. Huibregtse, 831 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2016) (Rule 706 appoints neutral experts, not party advocates)
Gil v. Reed, 381 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2004) (expert testimony standards)
Jones v. City of Elkhart, 737 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2013) (district court discretion in discovery rulings)