Case Information
*1 Before W ILLIAMS , S YKES , T INDER , Circuit Judges . T INDER Circuit Judge
. Plaintiff Appellant Kenny A. Jones, Sr., alleges Defendants Appellees violated rights under Fourteenth Amendment. From first, however, counsel stated broadly vaguely. He listed series irrelevant facts un tethered any legal claims, asserted constitutional inju ry specifying what provisions Constitution violated how. Defendants—the Elkhart, *2 diana individual officers in Elkhart police depart ‐ ment—and district court were forced to guess at his ar ‐ guments in order to address them. Unfortunately, on appeal, counsel fashioned his brief in similar manner, asking us to reverse district court’s entry summary judgment Defendants. argument sections Jones’s brief recite le ‐ gal standards elements case but offer us no analysis how apply them facts at hand.
Once we reconstruct what we believe Jones’s argu ments, we required do under these circumstances, completed structure shows substan tive assertions hinge one critical fact: whether police officers who stopped his car arrested him did so cause. Because record supports dis trict court’s conclusion officers putting conclusion question, affirm district entry summary dismiss appeal. We find abuse its discretion regard discovery ders its ruling Fourteenth equal protection claim.
I. Factual Background
On October Kenny attended evening class Ivy Tech Community College South Bend, Indi ana. He left class around 7:30 p.m. then went home, where he sandwich drank ounce bottle beer (Bud Light), only alcoholic beverage he he consumed evening. Shortly thereafter drove sister’s house Elkhart. He left apartment around 1:00 a.m. drove McDonald’s, where purchased some food ate car. Around 1:20 a.m., began driv *3 ing south on Nappanee Street, going towards his home South Bend.
At 2:15 a.m. on October Lt. Chris Snyder Police Department initiated traffic Plain tiff’s vehicle speeding. While traveling northbound on State Road Elkhart, Snyder observed Jones’s vehicle traveling south at speed above posted miles per hour speed limit, and confirmed that Jones was traveling at miles per hour with his moving radar, which had been tested tuning fork internal check before use after stop. Snyder stated that he turned his car followed Jones’s vehicle couple blocks, during he observed Jones swerving his lane. He then turned on his emergency lights.
When Jones stopped his car response Lt. Snyder’s emergency lights, approached vehicle re quested Jones’s license registration. stated Jones had alcohol breath red, watery eyes. He al so observed speech slow slurred. When asked if he been drinking, responded he consumed one beer at 7:30 p.m.
Officer Bryan Moore arrived scene provide backup. According Snyder, Moore used Snyder’s portable breath test (PBT) device determine blood alcohol content (BAC). PBT showed BAC 0.096%. con tends Snyder, Moore, administered PBT, never told reading PBT. see Moore until after exited vehicle Snyder’s request.
Snyder stated that he observed that balance was not steady as he walked from car to a paved area off road. Snyder explained demonstrated a one leg stand Jones, asked if Jones had any medical problems that would prevent him from doing test. Jones responded that he extremely bowlegged as a result a childhood accident which legs broken. When Snyder asked if condition would prevent him from standing one leg, Jones answered yes. Snyder then explained demonstrated a different field sobriety test—the walk turn test. Jones stated that he did not have any questions re garding test. When Snyder asked whether anything would prevent Jones performing test, Jones stated began to perform test. Snyder noted that Jones could not keep his hands his sides, that he swayed back forth, that he touch his heel to his toe majority steps two passes. then read Jones Indiana Implied Consent No
tice, explaining he had to believe had been operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. explained while choice submit chemical test, would consequences refusing consent chemical test, including suspen sion his license. expressed confusion because he already taken breathalyzer test. asserts he speeding because he travels road regular basis recognizes area
speed trap. Although he states he makes sure pay close attention while driving, presumably cludes monitoring speed, cannot positively speedometer continually showed speed miles per *5 ‐ hour less. Jones tries to quibble with detail Snyder’s location prior to stop: he claims he drove past Snyder, who was sitting vehicle parked off to side road lights out. After Snyder and Jones made eye contact and vehicle passed Snyder, Snyder turned headlight, trailed vehicle five to six seconds, and then turned emergency lights.
Whether Jones consented to chemical test dis pute. Snyder states that he placed handcuffs Jones, but expressed Jones was not under arrest was merely being transported station test, to Jones consented. Jones he asked Snyder whether he was under arrest, as he was asking follow up questions why he was being asked ride downtown squad car, Snyder handcuffed Jones. When Snyder asked Jones whether he going take test, Jones did not answer question, but expressed frustration over options being described. Snyder told under ar rest suspicion operating motor vehicle while intoxi cated refusing chemical sobriety test (“operating while intoxicated refusal”). Moore then transported station. Further confusion ensued station, but those events are material appeal here.
II. History Litigation
A. Claims Raised sued Elkhart Officers Snyder, Moore, Jeff Gorball, well as Police Chief Dale Flibsen. His suit alleges Snyder unlawfully stopped seized cause; Moore have search vehicle Jones; Moore conspired deprive *6 constitutional rights under Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments based on racial animus; and Officer Gor ball, who was present at jail, maliciously and without probable cause recorded refused chemical test at police station. As City Elkhart’s liability, Complaint states:
On information belief, violation plaintiff’s Fourth Fourteenth Amendment rights by defendants consistent with institutionalized practice City Elkhart Police Department, known ratified defendant Elkhart, defendants acted deliberate indiffer ence, having time taken effective action prevent Police Personnel continu ing engage such conduct, including stop ping citizens without cause based race. Based these facts, appears raise following separate claims:
1. A claim under U.S.C. § Amend ment violations against some combination Snyder, Moore, Gorball alleging false arrest, excessive force, unlawful search; A § Fourteenth equal protection claim against Moore alleging they made based racial animus, conspired ser vice violation; *7 A § claim against of Elkhart alleging
existence of policy custom that, through arrests cause based racial animus, ‐ flicts constitutional injury.
Defendants filed motion summary judgment explicitly addressed false arrest, excessive force, un ‐ lawful search claims well as con spiracy claim. The summary motion argued Monell claim should fail because Jones suffered constitutional injury.
B. Discovery Disputes claims he was unable resolve several dis covery issues with Defendants. pursuit of theory traffic racially motivated, sought produc tion police reports warrantless arrests records of traffic stops. Specifically, asked inspect approximately eleven years records arrests stops made Police Department, encompassing 59,092 arrests 120,862 citations. Defendants produced electronic version data 2005—including spreadsheet detailing age, sex, race, address arrestee, nature date arrest—but claims data complete because it include affida vits, because requested inspect physical documents. Furthermore, Defendants con tinually evaded questions existence physical documents, until suddenly presenting him offer copy all physical documents prepayment $17,955 copying expenses.
Defendants claim they were limited infor ‐ mation they could provide to Jones because of federal and state laws confidentiality of databases ques ‐ tion. Civilians are barred from accessing databases Jones requested to use: Indiana Data and Communications System (“IDACS”) federal National Crime Infor ‐ mation Center (“NCIC”). Defendants also argue Jones requested unreasonable volume of data, had refused Defendants’ proposed, reasonable methods nar ‐ rowing scope discovery request. When refused to narrow scope requested data all, De fendants claim they offered produce physical copies documents reasonable fee cents page.
The magistrate judge denied Plaintiff’s motion order compelling discovery, granted Defendants’ motion quash subpoena. The district court also ruled against Plaintiff’s motion reconsider magistrate’s order. opinion matter included lengthy find ings affirming Defendants’ position they prohibit ed federal law from allowing access IDACS NCIC databases, Defendants pro posed reasonable various methods narrowing down request, including sample CD including more than 7,000 pages printouts spreadsheets summarizing formation electronic reports.
C. Summary Judgment its order ruling motion reconsider, dis trict ordered answer Defendants’ motion summary judgment. filed statement genuine issues material fact, set out legal intended pursue. Those issues included:
1. Whether and Moore wrongfully stopped, de ‐ tained, searched, falsely arrested and imprisoned Plaintiff to meet patrol division shift minimums for completed citations pursuant to wide spread practice although authorized written law express Policy, so permanent and well settled time to constitute custom usage force law, caus[ing] them to vio late Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Rights rights un der Fourteenth Amendments to United States Constitution.
2. Whether existed for wrongful stop, detention, search, false false impris onment October speeding, OWI [Operating While Intoxicated] refusal OWI endangerment.
3. Whether Defendants Moore conspired agreed under color state law violate Plain tiff’s rights under Constitution United States under law.
4. Whether [a] heel toe sobriety test constitutes delib erate indifference Plaintiff’s physical limitations denial due process under Fourteenth United States Constitution. Whether refused take [the] chemical test pur suant Indiana law implied consent test intoxication. *10 No. ‐ 6. Whether violated City Elkhart Police De ‐ partment policy by activating in car camera scene. Whether Snyder, Moore Gorball acting under
color law, violated department policy regard ing bias based profiling/discriminatory practices Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Rights under United States Constitution
(Pl.’s Statement Genuine Issues Material Facts in Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., 4, 16, 20, 25, 31, 34, ECF 65.) district court granted Defendants’ motion sum mary judgment all counts. has appealed sum mary judgment ruling partially, arguing court (1) district court abused its discretion quashing subpoena; (2) abused its discretion granting summary judgment sua sponte equal pro tection claim; (3) there exist genuine issues material fact as whether police department has policies cus toms constitutional deprivation; (4) genuine issue material fact exists whether “acted good faith” falsely arresting Jones.
III. Analysis
We review grant summary de novo , drawing all reasonable inferences favor Jones. Matthews E. St. Louis 2012). How ever, “may simply rest upon pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials ‘set forth specific facts showing genuine issue trial.’” *11 11 12 3912 Siegel v. Shell Oil Co ., 612 F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2010) (quot ing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The evidence presents must be “evidence reasonable jury could rely.” Good man v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc ., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). submitting these evidentiary materials, “must do more than simply show is some metaphysical doubt as material facts.” Siegel , 612 F.3d 937. He must “present definite, competent in rebuttal.” Par ent v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 694 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Butts v. Aurora Health Care, Inc ., 387 F.3d 921, (7th Cir. 2004)).
We begin our analysis clearing brush what matters have been appealed our review. It is clear us did not appeal items 4, 5, in list self styled genuine issues material fact; accordingly, those arguments are waived. See, e.g., Wachovia Secs., LLC Banco Panamericano 2012) (holding issue not raised in opening appellate brief is waived). The discovery issues district allegedly sua sponte equal protection claim are discrete easy isolate. claim did “act in good faith” in arresting appears be asserting have stopping arresting Jones—an appeal Genuine Issue Number
But slightly more perplexing § claim against Elkhart. After juggling theories alleged Fourteenth Amendment constitutional violations court, Plaintiff states outright appellate brief “[i]n case action alleged unconstitutional is, [ sic ] stop, seizure, search false bad faith *12 cause in violation the Amendment.” As the brief omits any mention racial profiling or injury rights gov ‐ erned the Equal Protection Clause, we find that has waived the racial profiling claim. Id. two substantive issues before us, then, are 1) the
claim that lacked probable cause stopping ar resting Jones, 2) the claim that the City is lia ble constitutional injuries resulting the stop ar rest probable cause. Because the first is sue we find that the record leaves no doubt that probable cause the arrest, we may dispose second issue well. It is well established that if plaintiff suffered no violation constitutional rights, City cannot be liable under § See Sallenger City Springfield 2010). As lack probable cause is only articulated constitutional violation appeal, once violation is defeated, cannot be held liable. And, naturally, once we find officers cause, they cannot held liable their individual official capacities either.
After analyzing issue, discuss two ancillary issues: claim court abused its discretion issuing its discovery orders, asser tion improperly ruled sua sponte equal protection claim.
A. Probable Cause We should first address assertion false ar rest claim appeals here “common law false arrest claim,” § false claim. raising new law claim grounded aspect pleadings trial *13 13 12 3912 briefings, seems attempting circumvent the finding of qualified immunity the po lice officers. It is a curious unsuccessful workaround, as need even reach the (unappealed) qualified immuni ty finding defeat probable cause argument. any case, as Indiana requires different showing of probable cause than does the federal claim—and probable cause is an absolute defense false both the § 1983 context, Abbott v. Sangamon County, Ill. , 705 F.3d 706, 713–14 (7th Cir. 2013), the Indiana context, Beauchamp v. Noblesville, Ind. , F.3d 733, (7th Cir. 2003)—we proceed traditional cause analysis. prohibits unreasonable searches seizures. However, the existence cause ren ders stops resulting warrantless arrests per missible. “Probable cause exists if at time the arrest, facts circumstances within officer’s knowledge are sufficient warrant prudent person, one reason able caution, believing, circumstances shown, suspect has committed, committing, is commit offense.” Thayer v. Chiczewski , F.3d (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks citations omit ted). “Probable … ‘is fluid concept relies common sense officers based totality circumstances.’” Id . (quoting United States Reed 2006)). We objectively “step into shoes reasonable person position officer,” consider facts known officer time. Id . (internal quotation marks citation omitted). We do consider subjective motivations officer. Id . *14 12 3912
In the case of Jones, existed probable cause the traffic stop the arrest. “When a police officer reason ably believes that driver has committed minor traffic fense, probable cause supports the stop.” United States v. Garcia Garcia , F.3d 608, (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Officer Snyder had probable cause the initial traffic based on reading given his radar gun— indicated that was traveling well above posted speed limit area, in violation local traffic rules—as well fact that was swerving his lane. Moreover, Snyder states an affidavit that radar gun was tested checked before after traffic stop, with no malfunctions detected. presents us rebut this showing cause. his statement facts, he denies he
was speeding because was always careful obey speed limit when driving stretch road—but assertion, its own, does nothing rebut fact reasonably believed was speeding, put into question accuracy radar gun. United States v. Muriel , F.3d (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e need only quire whether officer believe violation occurred, whether [the driver] actually tailgating”) (internal citation omitted); United States Cashman 586–87 2000) (officers’ esti mate fact undergirding violation need be “per fectly accurate”; it need only reasonable officer believe violation occurred). Even quibbles location squad car fails rebut fact possessed objectively reasonable belief speeding, based reading radar gun observation car. As stated above, we re *15 15 12 ‐ 3912 quire Jones “definite, competent evidence rebuttal,” Parent, 694 F.3d at 922, “evidence reasonable jury could rely,” Goodman, 621 F.3d Jones has not present ed us with any evidence this nature here. As is documentary rebutting assertion Snyder had probable cause, traffic stop violate Fourth Amendment rights.
Once Officer had probable cause conduct for speeding, could arrest out violating rights. See Atwater v. Lago Vista , U.S. 318, (2001); United States v. Childs , F.3d 947, (7th Cir. 2002) (“A person arrested offense punishable only fine typically given citation (a ‘ticket’) released, but Atwater holds Constitution allows police place person custody take him booked.“). Thus, we need address whether Officers Moore had cause arrest OWI refusal OWI ‐ endangerment.
However, note facts record clearly show these officers had reasonable basis conclude intoxicated, thus had OWI endangerment. See, e.g., Qian v. Kautz , F.3d 953–54 (7th Cir. 1999) (police reasonably sur mised driver who difficulty walking, hunched over, whose speech seemed slurred been operating vehicle while intoxicated); cf. Gutierrez Kermon 1011–12 2013) (applying Indiana law noting “common indicia intoxication” including “wa tery bloodshot eyes,” “the odor alcohol breath,” “unsteady balance,” “failure field sobriety tests”). Again, none arguments point rebuts this *16 ‐ showing probable cause. A quibble over the identity the officer administering the PBT does not put dispute the administration the test, or the results the test that indi cated Jones’s BAC was 0.096%. assertion that Jones con sumed one bottle beer that evening does not put into question the fact that Jones consumed alcohol that evening. While there might a question fact whether one light beer would cause accurate registration 0.096% hours later (though produced no facts scientific nature raise that question), is disputed fact that the machine register that BAC for Jones. That test result was sufficient support probable cause for OWI endangerment.
As OWI refusal charge, the proceedings below submitted he given adequate opportunity submit chemical test. But we agree analysis despite subjective confusion over why police taking him into custody, police officers reasonably understood response indicate refusal chemical test. As presents no suggesting officers’ understanding refused chemical test unreasonable, find officers cause arrest OWI refusal.
Because officers traf fic arrest, false claim is barred, whether it is § claim law claim. There is therefore remaining claim holding officers liable their official individual capacities. Furthermore, is unable identify constitutional injury, § claim against defeated. We conclude dis *17 17 12 3912 trict court correctly granted summary on claims.
B. Discovery Matters magistrate judge district court abused their discretion quashing Plaintiff’s subpoena large volume records citations. However, magistrate district courts enjoy extremely broad discre tion controlling discovery. A district court may only over turn magistrate’s decision if decision is “clearly errone ous or is contrary law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). turn, may only review district court’s discovery rulings abuse discretion. Scott v. Chuhak & Tescon, P.C ., F.3d 772, (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., F.3d (7th Cir. 1996)). district court does abuse its discretion “unless one or more following cir cumstances is present: (1) record contains no evidence upon which court could have rationally based its deci sion; (2) decision is based an erroneous conclusion law; (3) decision based clearly erroneous factual findings; or (4) decision clearly appears arbitrary.” Id. (citing Vallone CNA Fin. Corp ., 2004)). Furthermore, “we will reverse district court ʹ s decision concerning discovery absent clear showing denial discovery resulted actual substantial prejudice . ” Id. (internal quotation marks citation omit ted).
None circumstances are present here. brief presents argument record before district court lacked upon could have based its decision; decisions based erroneous conclusion law factual findings; *18 decisions clearly arbitrary. His only is to simply that “prejudiced by Magistrate’s abuse discretion.” We have held mere demonstration production discovery items would be helpful is not sufficient to reverse discovery order prejudicial. Scott “Without any references legal authorities any statement generously could considered legal argumentation,” “has given us no reason reverse.” Id.
C. Sua Sponte Ruling on Equal Protection Claim asserts district court ruled sua sponte equal protection claim. Because Defendants brief equal protection argument their summary judgment brief, argues, grant summary issue constitutes impermissible sua sponte conduct.
This assertion inadvertently bolsters our earlier com plaint style substance briefs. It is difficult see why Defendants difficulty grappling with legal play case. complaint is drafted broad, generalized strokes. It is true most generous possible reading complaint would yield conclusion complaint does make conclusory sug gestion equal protection claim, benefit hindsight are able make out pieces com plaint would support such claim. But it is means clearly presented argument Defendants failed respond, either out irresponsible lawyering some tacti cal decision conceal equal protection claim.
Our decision made easier, however, because dis trict noted Defendants’ omission when ruling *19 motion to reconsider the magistrate’s denial his motion to compel discovery, which ruling made before had filed his response to the summary judgment briefs. Defendants an adequate opportunity to respond this new argument. That is, this by no means true sua sponte decision in which the judge “decide[s] [a] suit[] without warning on the basis considerations the litigants not contesting.” Pactiv Corp. Rupert 2013). Indeed, Plaintiff raised the issue in briefing the motion compel. The court took note dispute, observed the equal protection claim “hinge[s] … part, fact ar rest occurred any cause,” ordered answer summary judgment motion, been filed by Defendants prior motion compel. Plaintiff Defendants briefed equal protection issue, opposition brief reply brief support summary judgment motion, respectively. Accordingly, we do find any impropriety part district court. provided litigants tice issue an opportunity brief it; all Federal Rules require it do granting summary judgment issue raised initial summary judgment brief. Id. (quoting Rule 56(f)).
IV. Conclusion For foregoing reasons, A FFIRM grant summary Defendants.